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EFFECT OF SECTION 3 (a) (10) OF THE SECURITIES ACT
AS A SOURCE OF EXEMPTION FOR SECURITIES
ISSUED IN REORGANIZATIONS
ALTHOUGH the chief purposes of the Federal Securities Act1 are to deter the
fraudulent flotation of securities and to provide the purchasing public with in-
formation upon which to base a judgment in choosing investments, 2 the Act
acquires additional significance when applied to securities issued in the course
of a reorganization, whether those securities are certificates of deposit issued
by a protective committee, or definitive securities issued by the new or re-
organized corporation. For not only does the Act operate to protect the public
at large from the irresponsible flotation of worthless securities via the reorganiza-
tion route, but incidentally, it also serves in part to protect the existing holders
of the reorganizing corporation from the abuses to which they have sometimes
1. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 905 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77 (a-na)
(1935).
2. See Douglas and Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933 (1933) 43 YALE L. J.
171, 172; Comment (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 456, 457.
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been subjected.3 This dual protection is to be afforded by the requirement
that information be filed concerning the issuance of the securities and the affilia-
tions of the issuers, the accuracy and completeness of that information to be
assured by the imposition of liabilities for falsifications or omissions. But
these provisions are undoubtedly burdensome,4 and it'appears to be part of the
policy of the Act that they should not be imposed where adequate supervision
is otherwise supplied. For Section 3 (a) (10) provides an exemption for cer-
tain reorganization issues which are directly supervised by a judicial or admin-
istrative body.5 Implicit in this exemption is the theory that direct super-
vision constitutes an adequate substitute for enforcing compliance with the Act.0
The soundness of this premise depends, of course, largely on the thoroughness
and ability with which the supervision is carried out. It is the purpose of this
Comment, first, to determine when, and from what bodies the supervision requi-
site to exemptions under Section 3 (a) (10) may be available, and secondly, in
the light of that determination, to appraise the efficacy of the supervision thus
afforded as a substitute for the sanctions of the Securities Act.
The situations where exemptions under Section 3 (a) (10) may prove neces-
sary are rather numerous. A reorganization, using that term in its broad sense 7
3. For expositions of the abuses prevalent in reorganizations, see Lowmr-art, Tu-
INVESTOR PAYS (1933); Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganization Act (1933) 47 Mrtv.
L. REv. 18, 19, 20; Comment (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 905. But cf. Douglas, Protective
Committees in Railroad Reorganiations (1934) 47 HAuv. L. REv. 565.
4. The trouble, expense and liability attendant upon compliance with the Act is a
serious problem to reorganizers who usually are faced with difficulties enough in other
connections. See Ballantine, Amending The Federal Securities Act (1934) 20 A. B. A. J.
85, 86; Dodd, Reorganization Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy For What? (1935) 48
HAzv. L. REv. 1100, 1119, 1120; Fried, The Effect of Section 77B On Real Estate Reor-
ganizations (1935) 4 BRooX. L. REV. 310, 318; Wehle, Railroad Reorganizafions Under
Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act: New Legislation Suggested (1934) 44 YA=n L. J. 197,
203; Legis. (1934) 34 COL. L. REV. 1348. The situation in regard to protective committees
has been eased somewhat by the elimination of individual liability of committee members.
48 STAT. 905 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77 b (4) (1935).
5. The section exempts "any security which is issued in exchange for one or more
bona fide outstanding securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such exchange and
partly for cash, where the terms and conditions of such issuance and exchange are approved,
after a hearing upon the fairness of such terms and conditions at which all parson to
whom it is proposed to issue securities in such exchange shall have the right to appear, by
any court, or by any official or agency of the United States, or by any State or Territorial
banking or insurance commission or other governmental authority exprcssly authorized by
law to grant such approval . . !1
6. Compare the negative implication contained in the following statement referring to Sec-
tion 4(3) of the old Securities Act: "Reorganizations carried out without judicial supervisdon
possess all the dangers implicit in the issuance of new securities and are, therefore, not exempt
from the act. For the same reason the provision is not broad enough to include mergers
or consolidations of corporations entered into without judicial supervision." See H. R.
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 133 C. C. H. § 2162.02.
7. The term "reorganization" is sometimes applied only to a readjustment of a cor-
poration's financial structure necessitated by threatened or actual insolvency. See Davnro,
FnuAcimr. Pouicy oF CoaPoRArToes (3d ed. 1934) 1086, 10S7. The term is here used,
however, to mean any readjustment of a corporation's financial structure, including m0-ger,
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may be accomplished in a variety of ways. A list of the more important methods
would include the following: a voluntary scaling down of the corporate debt
structure pursuant to an agreement among the security holders; an exchange
of new stock for existing shares of the same corporation; a sale of the cor-
porate assets to another corporation; a statutory merger or consolidation; a
sale of the corporate assets resulting from a foreclosure by entry or under a power
of sale provided for in a mortgage or deed of trust; a judicial sale of the cor-
porate assets to another corporation, typically in foreclosure; a reorganization
under a state statute; and a judicial proceeding under Section 77 or 77B of
the Bankruptcy Act.8 Any of the foregoing methods of reorganization fre-
quently involves the issuance or exchange of two types of securities which may be
subject to the Securities Act. First, it has very frequently proved expedient to
centralize the interests of the security holders during the proceedings by setting
up protective committees, which solicit the deposit of securities, issue certificates
of deposit in exchange, and thereafter exercise the rights of their depositors in
regard to the reorganization; 9 secondly, definitive securities of the new or re-
organized corporation must ordinarily be issued. The issuance or exchange of
both the certificates of deposit and the definitive securities, or in some cases
even the solicitation thereof,10 necessitates the filing of a registration state-
ment with the Securities and Exchange Commission unless the securities are in
some way exempt from the Securities Act.11 While other exemptions are occa-
consolidation, etc. Cf. Rules and Instructions Accompanying Form E-1, 133 C. C. H.
§ 7231 (5).
8. For descriptions of these various devices, see DzwiNo, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1083
et seq.; 15 FLETcmm, CYCLOPEDIA OF CoRPoRATioxNs (1932) §§ 7200-7294; GLENN, LIQUIDA-
TroN (1935) §§ 421-433; PAYN, PLANs Or CORPORATE REOR0ANIZATION (1934) 1-61;
Hills, Consolidation of Corporations by Sale of Assets and Distribution of Shares (1931)
19 CAL=F. L. REv. 349; Lowenthal, supra note 3; Weiner, Corporate Reorganization:
Section 77B of The Bankruptcy Act (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 1173; Comment (1935) 45
YA.E L. J. 105.
9. The activities of protective committees have frequently been discussed. See, for
example, CRAVATH in STmrsoN AND oTims, Soms LEAL PnAsEs or CoRPouPAr FxnANcmo,
REORGANIZATION Am REuIAToN (1930) 153, 162-174; RonRmcur, LAw AND PRAcTIcE IN
CORPORATE CONTROL (1933) 65-95; TRAcY, CORPORATE FoRrzcxosuazs (1929) § 309; Carey
and Brabner-Smith, Studies In Realty Mortgage Foreclosures (1933) 28 ILL. L. Rav. 1,
3-11; Comment (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 905; and see authorities cited supra, note 8.
10. A registration statement regarding certificates of deposit must be in effect before
the solicitation of deposits. See Note to Form No. D-1, 133 C. C. H. § 6901. Registration
in connection with the issuance of definitive securities must precede the promulgation of
the reorganization plan, if the plan is submitted by, or with the consent of the prospective
issuer of securities under the plan, and if those assenting or failing to dissent will be bound.
Rules and Instructions Accompanying Form E-1, 133 C. C. H. § 7231(3).
11. See Legis. (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 1348. Registration would apparently be unneces-
sary as to definitive securities issued to existing stockholders of a corporation in pursuance
of a sale of assets or merger or consolidation provided for by statute or charter, If a
majority vote of the stockholders would effectuate and make binding the plan or agreement
involved. See Rules and Instructions Accompanying Form E-1, 133 C. C. H. § 7231,
(5) Note. But a somewhat ambiguous statement by the Commission makes it doubtful
whether this would be true if the new securities were issued partly in exchange for old
sionally available,"2 recourse will often be had to Section 3 (a) '(10).
In order to gain exemption under that Section, the following requirements
must be fulfilled: 1) the securities must be Lssued in exchange for other securi-
ties, or partly in such exchange and partly for cash; 2) there must be a hearing
on the fairness of the terms and conditions of such exchange before any court,
or before any official or agency of the United States, or before any state or ter-
ritorial banking or insurance commission or other governmental authority
expressly authorized by law to perform this function;' 3 3) notice must be given
to all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities, and they must have
the right to be heard;' 4 4) the body conducting the hearing must approve the
fairness of the terms and conditions of the proposed exchange-in the case of
certificates of deposit, approval of the deposit agreement is apparently suffi-
cient,' 5 while in regard to definitive securities, approval of the reorganization
securities and pa'tly for cash. Id. (6). Registration is likewise unnecessary in regard
to certificates of deposit issued pursuant to proceedings under Section 77B provided that
the deposit of securities involved merely constitutes "approval" or "acceptance" of the
reorganization plan folr the purposes of Section 77B, and provided depositors are not
bound to pay expenses. S. E. C. Release No. 296 (Class C) Feb. 15, 1935, 133 C. C. H.
§ 2162.08. Some committees are using this device to avoid registration, but it weakens
the committee's position. See Dodd, supra note 4, at 1120. Many have obtained exemp-
tions under Section 3 (a) (10) instead. See Spaeth and Friedberg, Early Developments
Under Section 77B (1935) 30 Ir. L. REv. 137, 146, 147.
During 1935, 135 reorganization issues were registered through 105 registration statements.
The statements covered securities having an approximate value of $133,402,379. See S. E. C.
Release No. 634, Table X, Jan. 23, 1936.
12. The more important exemptions concerning reorganization issues are as follows:
(1) Both definitive securities and certificates of deposit issued in a Tailroad reorganization
under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act are exempted by that section. 47 ST,%. 1474,
as amended by 49 STAT. 911, 11 U. S. C. A. § 205 (f) (1935). (2) Definitive securities
and certificates of deposit issued subsequent to confirmation of the reorganization plan
in proceedings under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act are exempted by that section.
48 STAT. 920 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. § 207 (h) (1935). This does not exempt certificates
of deposit issued prior to confirmation of the plan. S. E. C. Release No. 296, Feb. 15,
1935, 133 C. C. H. § 2162.03; see Legis. (1934) 34 Co. L. Rlv. 1348, 1351. (3) Section
3 (a) (9) of the Securities Act exempts "Any security exchanged by the issuer with its
existing security holders exclusively where no commission or other remuneration is paid
or given directly or indirectly for soliciting such exchange." It has been indicated that
"commission or other remuneration" means something otheir than expenses for printing,
clerical salaries, etc. See 133 C. C. H. § 2161.03. But the exemption is narrow. For
in large reorganizations, commissions are usually paid for solicitation. See Legis. (1934)
34 CoL. L. REv. 1348, 1355, n. 51. And certificates of deposit would not be included since
they are not exchanged with the existing security holders of the committee.
13. General Counsel of the Commission has indicated that the words "expressly authorized
by law" do not apply to courts, or to officials or agencies of the United States. With
the possible exception of a state banking or insurance commission, however, a state govern-
mental authority must have clear and explicit statutory authorization to hold hearings
on the fairness of the terms and conditions of the exchange, from the standpoint of the
investors, issuer, and consumers involved, and to approve or disapprove the same. Op.
of Gen'l Counsel, S. E. C. Release No. 312 (Class C), March 15, 1935, 133 C. C. H. § 2162.07.
14. See Op. of Gen'1 Counsel, supra note 13.
15. See letter to Goldwater and Flynn, Aug. 24, 1934, 133 C. C. H. § 2162.05.
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plan pursuant to which they are to be issued is necessary.10 Accordingly, the
bodies which may grant exemptions under Section 3 (a) (10) must have juris-
diction both to afford hearings at which the prospective recipients of securities
have the right to be heard, and to approve the fairness of deposit agreements
or reorganization plans as the case may be.' 7 The problems may be discussed
conveniently with reference first to the courts, and secondly, to administrative
bodies.
COURTS
The fundamental problem involved in considering the power of the courts to
afford exemptions by passing upon the fairness of reorganization plans and
deposit agreements is that this function has an administrative rather than a
judicial aspect. Difficulties are presented in the form of various interrelated
concepts, such as the necessity that there be a controversy between two parties
over the fairness of the plan or agreement,' 8 that the court's decision will estab-
lish and fix the jural relations of the parties,19 that the judgment be coupled
with some form of coercive execution, 20 and that the effect of the judgment will
not be nullified by the action of another branch of the government.-' In some
cases, the issue as to the fairness of a reorganization plan might be brought par-
tially within these traditional modes of thought. For example, a creditor who
would otherwise be cut off from enforcing his claim against the corporate assets
by a judicial sale may nevertheless enforce his claim if the sale is made pursuant
to an unfair plan of reorganization. 22 Likewise, a stockholder who would other-
wise be bound may sometimes set aside or enjoin action leading to a radical
change in the corporate existence, such as a stockholders' sale of the corporate
assets, or a merger or consolidation, if the plan involved is unfair.2 3  Again, it is
16. Occasionally the reorganization plan is contained in the deposit agreement. This
should not alter the requirements for the exemption of either class of securities. But as
will appear in the text, the power of some bodies to render their approval is cleaver In
the case of a reorganization plan than of a deposit agreement. In such cases, approval
of an agreement containing a reorganization plan might be more readily obtainable than
an approval of the deposit agreement alone. Cf. Matter of Prudence Bonds Corp., No.
26545 (E. D. N. Y., Sept. 14, 1934); Legis. (1934) 34 Coi. L. Rav. 1348, 1353, n. 42.
17. Presumably, the Commission would rule that an approval was ineffective to afford
an exemption if it was rendered by a body considered by the Commission to lack the
necessary jurisdiction.
18. See Arnold, Trial By Combat And The New Deal (1934) 47 HARv. L. Rav. 913.
19. See BORCHARD, DzcLARAToRY JunDomTs (1934) 6.
20. See Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 73, 74 (1927); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 15 F. (2d) 434, 440 (N. D. Il1. 1926). This
concept, however, has been exploded. See BORcHARu, op. cit. sltpra note 19, at 9, 10.
21. See FRANxKFURTER AND KATZ, CASES ON FEDERAL JURISDIcON AND PR-ocznDUI (1931)
1-24. Cf. note 17, supra.
22. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913).
23. Eagleson v. Pacific Timber Co., 270 Fed. 1008 (D. De. 1920) (sale of assets);
MacArthur v. Port of Havana Docks Co., 247 Fed. 984 (D. Me. 1917) (sale of assets);
Outwater v. Public Service Corporation, 103 N. J. Eq. 461, 143 Atl. 729 (1928), aff'd
without opinion, 104 N. J. Eq. 490, 146 Aft. 916 (1929) (merger); see Rohrlich, Suits
In Equity By Minority Stockholders As A Means Of Corporate Control (1933) 81 U. op
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possible that an attempt to issue new stock in return for old shares of the same
corporation might be enjoined if the exchange would modify unfairly the relative
rights of different classes of stockholders in the corporate property. -4 Accord-
ingly, in such cases, the fairness of the reorganization plan may present a con-
troversial issue in regard to which a judicial decision will fix certain jural rela-
tions of the interested parties. But at the time the court's approval of the
plan is sought for exemption purposes, such a controversy might be regarded as
too remote a possibility to present a proper case for decision.2 5 And in other in-
stances even a potential controversy seems lacking. For example, in a voluntary
scaling down of the corporate debt structure, where an individual non-assenting
creditor would not be barred by the reorganization from enforcing his claim against
the corporate property, no justiciable controversy over the plan would seem to be
presented, since a court decision that the plan was fair would not affect the legal
relations of the parties. This is likewise true of a deposit agreement, the fairness
of which appears to constitute no more of a justiciable issue than the fairness of
any other contract.26  Moreover, in the case of a deposit agreement, an addi-
tional obstacle exists, for either exemption or registration must precede the soli-
citation of deposits.' 0  Consequently, a committee seeking exemption would
ordinarily have no depositors, and hence, at the time exemption was sought, no
one would appear to have an interest in contesting the fairness of the agreement,
even if it were otherwise justiciable. The extent to which the courts may be
said to have the necessary jurisdiction regardless of these conceptual difficulties
depends largely on the type of proceedings in which the hearing and approval is
sought. The situations where resort to the courts may prove necessary are
roughly divisible into three groups: first, where the exchange of securities or the
solicitation thereof is to occur during judicial proceedings which are not pro-
vided for by some special statute; second, where the exchange or solicitation is
PA. L. Ri. 692, 708-713; Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 105, 114-120. The last-dted
Comment points out at page 119 that it is not always clear whether unfairne.s alone, in
the absence of fraud, is a sufficient basis for court action.
24. See Rohrlich, supra note 23, at 702-705.
25. "'An investigation' is a proceeding unknown to a court of justice, either in law
or in equity. Courts sit and hear evidence in order to adjudicate the rights of parties
actually or potentially before them. They do not preside over niere investigations,
grounded either on curiosity or as merely preliminary to a (possible) future suit" Parker
v. New England Oil Corporation, 13 F. (2d) 158, 163 (D. Mass. 1926); see Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 15 F. (2d) 434, 440 (N. D. Ill. 1926); d.
BoaRcnm, op. cit. supra note 19, at 40-50.
26. Disputes concerning deposit agreements have sometimes arisen, usually involving a
depositor's right to withdraw, or to have the committee removed. But the courts have
rather uniformly treated the agreements as contracts to be "construed" or "rescinded" on
the usual grounds, and fairness has apparently not been considered as an opsrative fact.
See, e.g., Habirshaw Electric Cable Co. v. Habirshaw Electric Cable Co., Inc., 296 Fed. 875
(C. C. A. 2d, 1924); Jewett v. Commonwealth Bond Corp., 241 App. Div. 131, 271 N. Y.
Supp. 522 (1st Dep't, 1934) (committee removed for "breach of trust"). In Harrigan
v. Pounds, 147 lis-c. 666, 264 N. Y. Supp. 363 (Sup. Ct. 1933), the court discusced the
-one-sidedness of the deposit agreement at considerable length, thus indicating that its
unfairness affected the rights of the parties. But this decission was reversed. 239 App.
Div. 1, 265 N. Y. Supp. 676 (1st Dep't, 1933).
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to take place while judicial proceedings in accordance with some special statute,
such as Section 77 or 77B, are under way; and third, where it is to occur at
a time when no judicial proceedings are in progress.
1. Equity Receivership. The typical non-statutory reorganization in the fed-
eral courts, and to a lesser extent in the state courts,
2 7 is carried out while the
corporation is in equity receivership. 28 The desired readjustment may be effected
by a foreclosure or receiver's sale,2 9 a judicial decree fixing the rights of the
parties,30 or a voluntary ieadjustment of the corporate financial structure without
a judicial sale or decree.31 Whatever the method employed, the receivership
courts have, in the past, proved themselves capable of developing new remedies
and of disregarding to some extent the traditional concept of a controversy in
dealing with reorganizations 32 Accordingly, it appears probable that they
27. In real estate reorganizations in the state courts, it is often desirable to utilize
merely a foreclosure action without receivership in order to save expense. See Carey,
Brabner-Smith and Sullivan, Studies In Realty Mortgage Foreclosures (1933) 27 ILL. L.
REv. 849, 852; Comment (1934) 34 COL. L. Ray. 706, 711.
28. See GLEN, op. cit. supra note 8, § 430. While this device will be displaced to a
large extent by the new bankruptcy machinery, it will probably not disappear entirely.
Ibid.; see Sabel, The Corporate Reorganization Act (1934) 19 MINIr. L. RFV. 34, 54; Sabel,
Equity Jurisdiction In The United States Courts With Reference To Consent Receiverships
(1934) 20 IowA L. REv. 83, 100, 101. Indeed, where receivership and foreclosure pro-
ceedings have been consolidated, there may be some difficulty in transferring the proceedings
to a bankruptcy court. See Comment (1936) 30 ILL. L. RxV. 627.
An alternative method of reorganization was afforded by the bankruptcy courts even
before the recent amendments, but it was unsatisfactory and little used. See GLWNN, op.
cit. supra note 8, § 429; Friendly, Some Comments On The Corporate Reorganization Act
(1934) 48 HAav. L. REv. 39, 46, 47; Jackson, An Analysis of Section 77B (1936) 2 Coar,
REORG. 267, 269. It will probably be totally supplanted by Section 77B. GRANor,
CORPORATION LAW FOR OMCRS AND DIRECToRs (1935) 637. It should perhaps be noted,
however, that considerable doubt existed as to whether a bankruptcy court had jurisdiction
to pass on reorganization plans. Cf. In re Witherbee, 202 Fed. 896 (C. C. A. 1st, 1913);
In re Northampton Portland Cement Co., 185 Fed. 542 (E. D. Pa. 1911); see Friendly,
supra, at 47.
29. See, e.g., Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S.
445 (1926) (foreclosure sale); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. International C. E. Corp., 66 F.
(2d) 409 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) (receiver's sale); Hauer v. Appalachian Gas Corporation,
19 Del. Ch. 283, 167 Atl. 839 (1933) (receiver's sale). But the Supreme Court has in-
validated a receiver's sale where the corporation was highly solvent and not affected with
a public interest. First National Bank v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504 (1934).
30. Phipps v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922). This
case has been both criticized and supported. See Harding v. American Sumatra Co., 14 F.
(2d) 168 (N. D. Ga. 1926); Rosenberg, Phipps v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co.
(1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 266, n. 1; Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Develop-
ments of the Last Decade (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 901.
31. Jennings v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 240 Ky. 24, 41 S. W. (2d) 537 (1931);
Park v. Grant Locomotive Works, 40 N. J. Eq. 114, 3 At. 162 (1885); cf. Parker v.
New England Oil Corporation, 4 F. (2d) 392 (D. Mass. 1924); see TRACY, op. cit. supra
note 9, § 314. In Moore v. Splitdorf Electrical Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 358, 168 AtI. 741 (1933),
a stockholders' sale was apparently attempted while the corporation was in receivership.
32. See Arnold, supra note 18, at 930; Billig, Corporate Reorganization: Equity vs.
Bankruptcy (1933) 17 MmN. L. R1v. 237.
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will assume jurisdiction to meet the newly felt need for exemptions under Sec-
tion 3 (a) (10).
The rendition of approvals of reorganization plans for exemption purposes
would not be a great extension of the powers which courts have already developed.
For they have frequently considered the fairness of reorganization plans for other
purposes. Thus, where a judicial sale is involved, it is clear that the federal
courts have the power to pass on the fairness of the plan in considering whether
a sale should be confirmed,sa and a few decisions indicate that the state courts
will adopt this rule.3 But courts have sometimes refused to exercise this power
before the sale, on the theory that at that early stage the question is moot, since
it is uncertain that the plan will ever be effectuated, and since the court's judg-
ment will not be enforced by any coercive execution.m3 Other courts, however,
have refused to admit that they can function only ex post facto, and have con-
sidered the plan at earlier stages in the proceedings.3 0 A reorganization accom-
plished through a court decree likewise contemplates that the court will pass
upon the fairness of the plan. Indeed, this method is valid, if at all, only if
the plan is thoroughly examined.3 7 And where a voluntary reorganization is
effected during receivership, it also appears possible to obtain judicial approval
of the plan regardless of the apparent lack of a justiciable controversy.P One
33. Kansa City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U. S. 445 (1926);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. International C. E. Corp., 66 F. (2d) 409 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933);
see PAY N_, op. cit. supra note 8, at 57-61; Swaine, supra note 30.
34. Eastern States Public Service Corporation v. Atlantic Public Utilities, 17 Do. Ch.
338, 156 At. 214 (1931); Hauer v. Appalachian Gas Corporation, 19 Del. Ch. 283, 167
At. 839 (1933); Chase Nat. Bank v. 10 East 40th Street Corp., 238 App. Div. 370, 264
N. Y. Supp. 882 (1st Dep't, 1933); De Betz's Petition, 9 Abb. N. C. 246 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.
1878). Furthermore, a New York court has considered this proper even in a foreclosure
action unaccompanied by receivership. Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon Street
Corporation, 237 App. Div. 789, 263 N. Y. Supp. 359 (2d Dep't, 1933). It has been stated
that the state courts, with the exception of New York, have steadfastly refused to take
cognizance of reorganization plans. QumDRY, BoN-ys A=n Boar,'HOIn ns (1934) § 341 (e).
And it is considered doubtful by some how far the New York courts will extend the prac-
tice. See Fried, supra note 4, at 315, n. 21. But even where courts have refused to exercise
jurisdiction over reorganization plans, they have not expressly denied its existence. See
Comment (1934) 34 COL. L. Rnv. 706, 711. The scarcity of cases in which the jurisdiction
has been exercised is perhaps explainable by the fact that attempts to obtain state court
supervision have been infrequent. See Carey and Brabner-Smith, supra note 9, at 11.
35. See Conley v. International Pump Company, 237 Fed. 286, 287, 28S (S. D. N. Y.
1915); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 15 F. (2d) 434, 440 (N. D.
Ill. 1926); Swaine, supra note 30, at 910.
36. The opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 233
Fed. 812 (E. D. Mo. 1916) indicates that it is proper, and often desirable, to hold the
hearing on the plan at an early date. In several cases, the hearing has been held on
application for an order of sale. Habirshaw Electric Cable Co. v. Habirshaw Electric Cable
Co., Inc., 296 Fed. 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924); Eastern States Public Service Corporation v.
Atlantic Public Utilities, 17 Del. Ch. 338, 156 Atl. 214 (1931); Hauer v. Appalachian Gas
Corporation, 19 Del. Ch. 283, 167 AtL 839 (1933); cf. Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144
Joralemon Street Corp., 237 App. Div. 789, 263 N. Y. Supp. 359 (2d Dep't, 1933).
37. National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U. S. 426 (1933).
38. Jennings v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 240 Ky. 24, 41 S. W. (2d) 537 (1931);
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procedure employed is to procure the approval upon application by the receiver
for permission to enter into the reorganization.80 And in New York, the interest-
ing practice was developed of considering the fairness of a plan for a voluntary
reorganization proposed by a committee before granting the committee access
to the list of bondholders.40 In many of these cases, the court's jurisdiction has
been attributed to its power to decide questions affecting the property in its
possession.41 This theory could be used even more effectively to support the
power of the court to approve a plan for exemption purposes, for not only
might the fairness of the plan have a possible effect on the property in custodia
legis, but an exemption would reduce reorganization expenses. Other bases
for jurisdiction have been suggested which likewise seem applicable where an
exemption is sought, such as the duty of an equity court to see that its process
is not employed to achieve unfair results; the power of the court to prevent the
consummation of an unfair sale through the use of the bidding advantage
possessed by a majority of the security holders; and the power of the court
to administer the trust which is before it either as a result of the foreclosure
of a mortgage deed of trust, or because of the trust relationship between a
committee and its depositors.42 Accordingly, it appears that a receivership
court may have power to pass on the fairness of the plan even in the early
stages of the proceedings, and even though no controversial issues are thereby
decided.
43
If the court has the requisite jurisdiction, a subsidiary problem may arise
as to whether this jurisdiction can be invoked by advocates of a plan who are
not original parties to the proceeding. In the event that it becomes necessary
to obtain an exemption before the sale occurs, they must intervene in order to
present their plan. 44 In the past, intervention in reorganization proceedings has
see Parker v. New England Oil Corporation, 4 F. (2d) 392, 394 (D. Mass. 1924); Moore
v. Splitdorf Electrical Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 358, 368, 168 At. 741, 745 (1933). Contra:
Platt v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 65 Fed. 872 (E. D. Pa. 1894). In Bill v. New Albany,
Etc. Ry. Co., 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1407, at 379 (D. Ind. 1870), it appears that a decree
"ratifying and confirming" a voluntary reorganization agreement was obtained in a fore-
closure action not involving a receivership.
39. Jennings v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., Parker v. New England Oil Corporatlon,
both supra note 38.
40. People v. S. W. Straus & Co., 149 Misc. 38, 267 N. Y. Supp. 227 (Sup. Ct. 1933);
see Comment (1934) 34 COL. L. RFy. 706, 727-730.
41. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 238 Fed. 812 (D. Mo. 1916); Habir-
shaw Electric Cable Co. v. Habirshaw Electric Cable Co., Inc., 296 Fed. 875 (C. C. A.
2d, 1924); cf. Graselli Chemical Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co., 252 Fed. 456 (C. C. A. 2d)
1918); see Comment (1934) 34 CoL.. L. Rav. 706, 711.
42. See Carey and Brabner-Smith, supra note 9, at 11-14; Fried, supra note 4, at
315, n. 21.
43. See decree of the Delaware Court of Chancery, July 11, 1934, in the Electric Public
Service Company receivership, noted in (1935) 1 Cow. RZORO., at 234; cf. Republic Supply
Co. of California v. Richfield Oil Co. of California, 74 F. (2d) 907 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
44. In certain cases, the approval need not precede promulgation of the plan, but is
sufficient to afford exemption if obtained before the definitive securities are isued. See
supra, note 10. In such cases, the purchasers at the sale could apparently submit their
plan at the hearing for confirmation of the sale without intervention, since they become
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sometimes been granted as a matter of right, sometimes in the court's discretion,
and sometimes refused altogether, depending largely on the purpose of the inter-
vention, and on whether the intervenor was already adequately represented in
the proceedings. 5 Intervention for the purpose of presenting a plan for approval
is a rather novel development. But the courts may regard it with greater favor
than the more typical petition to come in for the purpose of attacking another's
plan, since it does not seem to afford a weapon for obstructionists and strikers.40
And conceivably a committee might be allowed to intervene for exemption pur-
poses even though adequately represented in other matters by a trustee or
receiver, on the theory that the ordinary duties of a trustee or receiver would
not include obtaining judicial approval of a particular committee's reorganiza-
tion plan.
On the question of a receivership court's power to pass on the fairness of a
deposit agreement more difficulty is encountered. For not only is a controversy
lacking, but there seems to be no body of precedent for such action. -0  Con-
ceivably, the court's jurisdiction might be supported on the theory that the
whole receivership constitutes a controversy, and that a decree approving a
deposit agreement is merely the exercise of the court's power to administer
the property in its possession.4 7 For, as in the case of a reorganization plan, an
exemption would reduce reorganization expenses.4 8 Furthermore, it is arguable
that the terms of a deposit agreement have a direct bearing on the merits of the
reorganization plan which is ultimately developed, and hence affect the property
before the court. Although it has been flatly denied that a deposit agreement
has such an effect,49 this attitude seems unrealistic, as has perhaps been recog-
nized by one able judge, who suggested that intervention by a committee should
always be conditioned on the court's approval of the committee's deposit agree-
ment50 Again, if a deed of trust is involved, reliance might be placed on the
court's power to administer the trust. In addition, the court's power might be
said to exist on the theory that the deposit agreement itself constitutes a declara-
parties through buying in at the sale. Investment Registry v. Chicago & 11. E. R. Co.,
212 Fed. 594 (C. C. A. 7th, 1913).
45. See Moore and Levi, Federal Intervention (1936) 45 YAMu L. J. 565, 595 et !eq.
There is some indication that the state courts are more liberal than the federal courts in
this regard. See QumiDRY, op. cit. supra note 34, § 302. Statutes may be controlling in
some jurisdictions. But even a mandatory statute has been construed as discretionary.
Meyer v. Title Guaranty & Trust Co., 228 App. Div. 641, 238 N. Y. Supp. 48 (2d Dep't,
1929); see Comment (1934) 34 CoL. L. Rxv. 706, 715, n. 54.
46. Cf. Comment (1934) 34 CoL. L. Rnv. 706, 715, n. 54; Comment (1934) 34 CoT..
L. Rav. 1308, 1318.
47. Compare the attitude sometimes demonstrated with regard to bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. Vitagraph v. St. Louis Prop. Corp., 77 F. (2d) 590 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); see
Comment (1936) 45 YAr.E L. J. 649, 654, n. 30.
48. See Legis. (1934) 34 CoL. L. Rnv. 134S, 1354, n. 43.
49. Habirshaw Electric Cable Co. v. Habirshaw Electric Cable Co, Inc., 296 Fed.
875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924).
50. See statement by Judge Mack as Arbitrator in Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
v. Ulster & Delaware Railroad Co., S. D. N. Y. E., 61-329, April 8, 1932, set forth in
Romtucn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 209, n. 36.
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ion of trust. But even if the agreement could be classified as a trust instrument
before deposits had been obtained, the proposition that a court has power to
adjudicate upon the fairness of the terms of a trust instrument would be difficult
to support. In case the requisite jurisdiction does exist, however, the subsidiary
question again arises as to whether the committee can intervene to present
its deposit agreement for approval and thus take advantage of the existing
jurisdiction. In this connection, the problem is much the same as in the case
of a reorganization plan. Some additional embarrassment might be experienced,
in that the committee might be unable to show that it had an interest in the
proceedings before it represented other security holders. Nevertheless, at least
some members of the committee are sometimes security holders themselves,,
1
and their interest might be sufficient to justify intervention. Whatever the
theoretical considerations, however, courts have permitted intervention and issued
orders approving deposit agreements apparently without serious question.
2
If it is established that the necessary power of approval exists in receivership
proceedings, it appears clear that the courts have power to provide for the
requisite hearings. It has been a common practice to hold hearings on re-
organization plans at which all interested parties were allowed to be heard.m
The machinery employed has taken the form either of sending out individual
notices to present objections0 4 or of a widely published order to show cause.6
There seems to be no reason why this practice could not be extended to include
hearings concerning deposit agreements.
2. Judicial Proceedings in Accordance with Special Statute. The fundamental
problem involved in considering the courts as possible sources of exemptions
under Section 3 (a) (10) is not entirely solved by a statute conferring the
necessary powers. For most constitutions would be violated by legislation
attempting to foist administrative duties on constitutional courts.60 But where
the approval of reorganization plans and deposit agreements can be shown to
be a proper judicial function, 7 a statutory provision authorizing such action
51. See RomieHR, op. cit. supra note 9, at 72. It has been stated that the practice of
including security holders as members of the committee is decreasing. See Dawin0, op. dt.
supra note 7, at 1108.
52. MacManus v. The Celotex Company, Eq. No. 981 (D. Del. 1934); see Legis. (1934)
34 COL. L. Rzv. 1348, 1353, n. 41.
53. See, e.g., Jameson v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 20 F. (2d) 808, 815
(C. C. A. 7th, 1927).
54. See Harding v. American Sumatra Tobacco Co., 14 F. (2d) 168, 169 (N. D. Ga.
1926); Eastern States Public Service Corporation v. Atlantic Public Utilities, 17 Del. Ch.
338, 156 Atl. 214 (1931).
55. Jennings v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 240 Ky. 24, 41 S. W. (2d) 537 (1931).
Notice by publication may be deemed insufficient by the Commission. As to the suffi-
ciency of such notice to bind creditors, see Frank, Some Realistic Reflections On Some
Aspects of Corporate Reorganizations (1933) 19 VA. L. REV. 698, 701-707.
56. Cf. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911); In re Richardson, 247 N. Y.
401, 160 N. E. 655 (1928); see BORCHRD, op. cit. supra note 19, at 29-31.
57. For example, the constitutionality of empowering the bankruptcy courts by statute
to exercise jurisdiction over deposit agreements bas been defended on the ground that It
is a power incident to the administration of the debtor's estate. See Gerdes, The Constil-
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naturally removes all doubt as to the court's power to perform that function.
Although several types of statutes containing provisions of this sort will be
considered, their constitutionality depends on such varying factors that no at-
tempt will be made here to include that question in the discussion.
Undoubtedly the most important type of statutory reorganization is that
provided for by Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. In proceedings under that
section, a much narrower problem is presented than in the case of an equity
receivership. For here exemptions under Section 3 (a) (10) are necessary only
in regard to certificates of deposit.12 There is considerably more basis for
arguing that a court supervising a reorganization under Section 77B has power
to approve deposit agreements. For it has all the powers of a court of equity, 3
and in addition, is given authority under Section 77B (b) to scrutinize deposit
agreements presented by creditors' committees.r9 Furthermore, Section 2 (15)
of the Bankruptcy Act gives the court power to "make such orders, issue such
process, and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as
may be necessary for the enforcement Qf the provisions of this act? ' cO It is
arguable that the fundamental purpose of Section 77B is to facilitate re-
organization and that, since consideration of a deposit agreement might be
deemed to be one step in achieving that object, the court has power under
Section 2 (15) to enter the necessary order.0 ' The problem of intervention
has been but little altered by the statute, but it seems clear that a committee
representing a stockholder or bondholder would be allowed to intervene to pre-
sent its agreement for approval in the court's discretion, under the provision
that "any creditor or stockholder shall have the right to be heard . . . upon
filing a petition for leave to intervene, on such . . . questions arising in the
proceeding as the judge shall determine."02  This provision would likewise
authorize the court to afford the prospective recipients of certificates of deposit
the necessary hearing if it saw fit. As in the case of equity receiverships, the
courts have held hearings and entered orders approving deposit agreements,
apparently without experiencing much doubt as to their jurisdiction.0a Some
of the agreements approved, however, have conferred but limited powers on
the committee,64 and the approval may be rendered only for the limited pur-
tutionolity Of Section 77B Of The Bankruptcy Act (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. Ray. 196,
231-233; Weiner, supra note 8, at 1192.
58. § 77B (a). See GRMAGE, op. cit. supra note 28, at 656-657.
59. The scrutiny power has usually been regarded as providing authority to afford
exemptions for certificates of deposit under Section 3 (a) (10). See Dodd, supra note 4,
at 1121-1122; Legis. (1934) 34 COL. L. R v. 1343, 1354. While the power is expre-ly
granted only in respect to creditors' committees, it has apparently been exercised over
agreements presented by stockholders' committees. See Rohrlich, The New Deal In Cor-
poration Law (1935) 35 CoL. L. Rnv. 1167, 1182.
60. 30 STAT. 545, 546 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 11 (15) (1926).
61. Cf. Continental Illinois Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Chicago, R. L & Pac. Ry.,
294 U. S. 648 (1935).
62. § 77B (c) (10). See Moore & Levi, supra note 45, at 604.
63. Matter of Pararount-Publix Corporation, No. 56763 (S. D. N. Y., Feb. 20, 1935);
see Legis. (1934) 34 CoL. L. Rv. 1348, 1353, notes 41, 42. But see Matter of Prudence
Bonds Corp., No. 26545 (E. D. N. Y., Sept. 14, 1934).
64. See Spaeth and Friedberg, supra note 11, at 146-148.
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pose of providing exemptions, the court reserving jurisdiction to make such
further orders as may prove necessary.0 5
In some instances, state statutes providing a general reorganization procedure
appear to afford a source of power to grant exemptions under Section 3 (a) (10).
For example, a Maine statute contains the broad provision that where a cor-
poration is in statutory receivership, a reorganization may be conducted under
the direction of the court, and such orders may be entered as equity requires.0 0
Again, it is sometimes provided that if, while the corporation is in statutory
receivership, a compromise between the corporation and its creditors, or stock-
holders, or both is proposed, the court shall order a meeting of the creditors, or
stockholders, or both, and if the compromise agreement obtains sufficient sup-
port from these groups, it is to become binding with the approval of the court.0 7
Likewise, several states allow a somewhat similar provision to be inserted
in the corporate charter, and here the machinery may apparently be put
in motion by a summary application to a court having equity jurisdiction, it
being unnecessary that the corporation be in receivership.08 Under all these
statutes, it would appear to be within the court's power to hold the necessary
hearings. Accordingly, these various provisions might be used as a basis for the
requisite jurisdiction as to reorganization plans. But with the possible excep-
tion of the Maine statute, they would hardly prove of assistance in regard to
deposit agreements. Several states have general provisions for reorganizations
which do not appear to vest the court with any additional powers qven in con-
nection with the plan.69
The recent deflation of real estate values has led in a few instances to more
specialized legislation designed to facilitate real estate mortgage reorganiza-
tions. One type of such legislation places the problem of rehabilitating mortgage
65. This was done in Matter of Paramount-Publix Corporation, No. 56763 (S. D. N. Y.,
Feb. 20, 1935).
66. ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 56, §§ 87, 88; cf. N. Y. STOcK CoaP. LAW (1901) § 20
(1897), §§ 22, 106 (1922); S. D. Comp. LAws (1929) §§ 8825-8829.
67. ILL. Rav. STAT. (1935) c. 32, § 90 (c); PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 15, § 2852-
1109 (3); MNN. STAT. (Mason's Supp. 1934) § 7492-54; NVAsir. Ray. STAT. ANN. (Reming-
ton's Supp. 1935) § 3803-58. Kentucky has a somewhat similar provision applicable only
to railroad and bridge companies. Ky. STAT. (Carroll 1930) § 771a (1-6). The Minnesota
statute may be made inapplicable by a charter provision to that effect. For discussions
of this type of statute, see Hoshour, The Minnesota Business Corporation Act (1933) 18
MN. L. REV. 1, 12; Little, The Illinois Business Corporation Law (1934) 28 ILL. L. Ray.
997, 1019, 1020.
68. CoLo. Coin'. STAT. (Supp. 1932) § 2243 (8); DEL. RaV. CODE (1915) c. 65, § 5,
as amended by Laws 1927, c. 85; Mich. Acts 1935, No. 194, § 4 (3); W. VA. CooE (1931)
c. 31, art. 1, § 6 (h). Louisiana has a similar statute applicable only if the corporation
is in statutory receivership. LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 1143. For discussions of this
type of statute, see Sargent and Zelkowich, The Problem of Reorganizing "Solvent" Cor-
porations (1934) 29 ILL.. L. Ray. 137, 142; Comment (1932) 30 MVcu. L. Rat. 934.
Although these provisions have been inserted in charters, they have apparently not been
used as a method of reorganization. See GLENN, op. cit. supra note 8, § 428.
69. See, e.g., N. Y. STOCx CORP. LAW (1923) §§ 95-99; Omo GEN. CODE (Page's Supp.




guaranty companies in the hands of an administrative agency under court super-
vision. Statutes of this sort exist in California, New Jersey and New York, the
latter state having two statutes-the Schackno Act and the Mortgage Commission
Act.70 The statutes in all three states give the court express power to hold
hearings and pass on the fairness of reorganization plans, the California Act
adopting almost the same wording as is employed in Section 3 (a) (10). Ac-
cordingly, an exemption for definitive securities issued in these reorganizations
may be available if the approval can be granted before registration becomes
necessary. The California statute clearly allows the court to approve the plan
before it is promulgated, 72 and nothing in the New Jersey statute appears to
prevent such action. But both New York acts contemplate the submission of
the plan to the security holders before judicial approval. Inasmuch as the
approval must sometimes precede the promulgation of the plan in order to gain
exemption,'0 the availability of an exemption may depend on the court's juris-
diction aside from express statutory authorization. None of the three statutes
provide explicitly for court approval of deposit agreements. Accordingly, where
this approval becomes necessary,73 recourse would have to be had to a general
grant of power, 74 or to the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The New Jersey
court has entered an order approving a deposit agreement in a proceeding under
the statute.
75
In New York and Michigan, a second type of statute exists which is designed
to protect bondholders in a foreclosure action.70 Both statutes give the trustee
70. Cal. Laws 1935, c. 145, § 12629; N. J. Laws 1934, c. 3, as amended by c. 64;
N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 745, as amended by Laws 1935, c. 588, Laws 1934, c. 919, Laws 1933,
c. 780 (Schackno Act); N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 19, as amended by c. 290, c. 586, c. 638
(Mortgage Commission Act). For discussions of this type of legislation, see Comment
(1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 663; Note (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1007; Comment (1935) 35 Cor.
L. Rav. 874. The California statute is to expire April 1, 1937, or earlier, if the insurance
commissioner finds the emergency is terminated. The Schackmo Act is to expire in 1940.
71. The issue of new definitive securities is not always necessary in these reorganization
where there is no foreclosure sale. See Fried, supra note 4, at 317.
72. A certain percentage of the security holders must consent to the plan, but consents
are expressly made effective whether obtained before or after court approval of the plan.
73. Protective committees would probably be little used under the California statute,
since they could not propose a reorganization plan, that function being delegated exclu-
sively to the Commission or the mortgage insurer. Cal. Laws 1935, c. 145, § 12629 (c).
And committees are not absolutely necessary under any of the acts, since the administrative
body might propose and carry out the plan without any centralization of the security
holders' interests. In New York, provision has been made for the formation of corpora-
tions to perform the functions of protective committees, but the courts are given no special
supervision over these corporations. N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 453.
74. The New Jersey statute contains a very broad general grant of power. N. J. Laws
1934, c. 3, § 6. The New York Mortgage Commission Act authorizes the court to "make
orders in respect of any and all matters as to which court action is hereby provided"
and to make orders "to enforce any provision of this act." N. Y. Laws 193S, c. 19, § 17.
The California court may "determine all questions required to be determined pursuant
to this section.' Cal. Laws 1935, c. 145, § 12629 (d).
75. In The Matter Of Fidelity Union Title And Mortgage Guaranty Company, No. 99/590
(N. 3. Ch., Feb. 21, 1934).




of the mortgage deed power to buy in at the foreclosure sale, and the New York
act confers authority upon the court to pass upon the fairness of reorganization
plans. The Michigan statute does not grant this power in express terms, but it
might perhaps be implied from the rather broad control the court is given over
the trustee, particularly in the section of the act empowering the court to approve
the terms and conditions of any sale by the trustee.77 In neither statute is there
express authority to approve deposit agreements. In Michigan, however, a pro-
tective committee could obtain the necessary supervision elsewhere, and a court
approval of its deposit agreement would seem unnecessary. 78 Both statutes
provide adequately for notice and hearings.
Another specialized type of legislation in several states gives the courts juris-
diction over the reorganization of state banks.79 But the statutory provisions
will rarely prove useful in regard to exemptions under Section 3 (a) (10). For
while the courts are frequently expressly authorized to afford the necessary hear-
ings and approvals in connection with reorganization plans, it would usually be
unnecessary to obtain exemptions under Section 3 (a) (10) for definitive securi-
ties issued by the new or reorganized bank.8 0 And no express provisions exist
authorizing the approval of deposit agreements. A more noteworthy statute,
however, has recently been enacted in New York concerning the resumption of
business by a state bank which has been in the possession of the bank superin-
tendent.8 ' It provides that such a bank, upon re-opening, is to issue to its de-
positors non-negotiable transferable certificates representing the portion of their
accounts not subject to withdrawal. It further provides that the holders of certi-
ficates representing at least 15% of the principal amount may form a corporation
for the purpose of issuing its securities in exchange for the certificates. Upon
the request of the certificate holders, and the consent of the superintendent of
banks, the bank may apply to a court for an order approving the terms and
conditions of the proposed exchange. In words seemingly looking to an exemp-
tion under Section 3 (a) (10), provision is then made for the necessary notice,
hearing, and approval of the exchange. This clearly affords an opportunity for
exemption of the definitive securities issued by the new corporation. But there
is no express provision for the approval of deposit agreements, in case they
should become necessary in centralizing the interests of the certificate holders.
77. MIcH. Coari. LAWS (Mason, Supp. 1933) § 14380-8.
78. See infra.
79. IOWA CODE (1935) § 9239-a (1-5); MIcH. Comp. LAWS (Mason, Supp. 1933)
§ 11962-1; Hss. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1933) § 3817-1; Nev. Stat. 1933, c. 190, §§ 68-75;
N. H. PuB. LAWS (1926) c. 263; N. Y. BANxInG LAW (1933) § 61-a; N. D. Laws 1933,
c. 72; Ohio Laws 1935, pp. 34-36; S. C. CODE (Supp. 1934) § 7856; TEX. ANN. Civ. S'AT.
(Vernon, 1925) art. 454; VT. PuB. LAWS (1933) §§ 6761-6770.
80. Section 3 (a) (2) of the Securities Act exempts "any security issued or guaranteed
by any national bank or by any banking institution organized under the laws of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia the business of which is substantially con-
fined to banking and is supervised by the State or territorial banking commissioner or
similar official;" The phrase "substantially confined to banking" may make the exemption
inapplicable to some trust companies. See Feldman, The New Federal Securities Act (1934)
14 B. U. L. Rzv. 1, 25.
81. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 553.
1064 [Vol. 45
3. No Proceedings Pending. Perhaps ihe most serious difficulties in obtain-
ing exemptions from the courts under Section 3 (a) (10) are presented where
the exchange of securities, or the solicitation thereof, transpires at a time when
no court proceedings are in progress. The problem sometimes arises in regard
to definitive securities, as in the case of a statutory merger or consolidation, a
stockholders' sale of the corporate assets, an exchange of new stock for existing
shares of the same corporation, a voluntary scaling down of the corporate debt
structure, or a sale of the corporate assets following a foreclosure by entry or
under a power of sale provided for in a mortgage or deed of trust. Or it may
occur in connection with certificates of deposit, where it is necessary to solicit
deposits in any of the foregoing situations, or before the commencement of pro-
ceedings in equity receivership or under Section 77B. Under such conditions,
a declaratory judgment statute appears to offer the only conceivable method of
obtaining a court hearing.82 But the same fundamental obstacles are encoun-
tered in obtaining declaratory relief as in any other judicial proceeding. For
the only distinctive feature of the declaratory judgment statutes is that they
authorize a declaration concerning legal relations without the necessity of append-
ing some form of coercive execution. By no means do they obviate the require-
ments that there be the usual operative facts creating a right, privilege or im-
munity; that there be an actual, and not merely fictitious controversy between
adverse parties; and that the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter and
parties.83 Indeed, the need of an actual controversy over the fairness of the
reorganization plan or deposit agreement is accentuated in a declaratory pro-
ceeding. For the court's jurisdiction could not be based on its powers inci-
dental to the administration of an estate, as in proceedings in receivership, or
under Section 77B.
The lack of a controversy between adverse parties appears to present an
insurmountable difficulty in the case of certificates of deposit and of definitive
securities exchanged in pursuance of a voluntary scaling down of the corporate
debt structure. If the issue raised were simply whether the Securities Act applied
to the securities in question, an action by the issuer against the Commission
or the Attorney General seeking a declaration of exemption might well present a
sufficient controversy to justify declaratory relief.84 But here the operative fact
giving rise to the complainant's claim of exemption is the declaration of approval
itself. Before that approval has been obtained, a prospective issuer would appear
to have no basis for a claim of exemption as against the administrators of the
Act. Rather, he must bring his proceeding against someone legally interested in
contesting the fairness of his plan or agreement. On this issue, those entrusted
82. The United States and many states have declaratory judgment statutes. For a
compilation, see BORC.ARD, op. cit. supra note 19, at 634-650.
83. See BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 19, at 23, 24.
84. Cf. American Trust Co. v. McAllister, 136 Ore. 338, 299 Pac. 319 (1931); In re
Petition of Templar Motor Car Company, 27 Dauphin County 276 (Pa. C. P. 1924); Stuart
v. Utility Investing Corporation, 78 F. (2d) 279 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935) (bill for injunction).
A proceeding has been brought to obtain a declaration of exemption under Section 3 (a) (9)




with the enforcement of the Act could hardly be said to have an adverse interest.
And, as previously pointed out, no controversy between adverse parties would
appear to exist between the issuer and the prospective recipients of securities
under the deposit agreement or the plan of voluntary reorganization."5
In the case of a stockholders' sale of assets, a merger or consolidation, or an
exchange of new stock for existing shares of the same corporation, however, a
better opportunity for obtaining declaratory relief would seem to be presented.
Conceivably, a corporation intent upon carrying out such a reorganization might
institute proceedings making several stockholders defendants as representatives
of any who might wish to join them.80 As previously indicated, such an action
might well involve, a controversy over the fairness of the reorganization plan, 87
and therefore warrant a declaratory judgment. Of course, some actual opposi-
tion would be necessary, since courts will refuse declaratory relief where the
controversy before them is obviously fictitious. 88 But if a justiciable controversy
can be shown, the path to declaratory relief in the state courts should be fairly
clear. Additional jurisdictional questions would arise, however, in the federal
courts. The requirement as to jurisdictional amount could probably be easily
satisfied, since the value of the property in question would in all likelihood ex-
ceed $3,000. But it would also be necessary to show diversity of citizenship.80
The requisite diversity would exist if all the representative defendants were
citizens of states other than that of incorporation of the plaintiff. And this
would be true although other stockholders whom they represented were citizens
of the state of incorporation." Nor would the court be ousted of jurisdiction
if some of the latter stockholders intervened to be heard in the proceedings."1
The problem of obtaining diversity as to the representative defendants, how-
ever, is complicated by the possibility that a proceeding of this nature, involving
the internal affairs of the corporation, might be allowed only in the state of in-
corporation. 2 If the corporation were thus forced to bring its proceeding in the
85. See supra, p. 1055; Legis. (1934) 34 CoL. L. Rav. 1348, 1353.
86. A somewhat analogous situation was presented in Lake St. El. R. Co. v. Ziegler,
99 Fed. 114 (C. C. A. 7th, 1900), where a corporation brought suit against individual
minority bondholders, seeking to have the court approve a voluntary reorganization plan
and enjoin the defendants from foreclosing. For a discussion of the problems Involved
in suing representative defendants, see Comment (1922) 36 HAM. L. Rav. 89. There should
be no unusual difficulty in bringing declaratory proceedings against representative defendants.
Such action has been adopted in suits against taxpayers. City of Muskegon Heights v.
Denigelis, 253 Mich. 260, 235 N. W. 83 (1931); see Ellingwood, Declaratory Judgtnents In
Public Law (1934) 29 ILL. L. Rav. 174, 183.
87. See notes 22, 23, 24, supra.
88. See Elfingwood, Declaratory Judgments In Public Law (1934) 29 ILL. L. Riy. 1,
28-30.
89. For a discussion of the questions relating to federal jurisdiction under the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act, see (1935) 13 N. C. L. REv. 324.
90. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356 (1921).
91. Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U. S. 61 (1885); see Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
255 U. S. 356, 366 (1921).
92. Cf. Wallace v. Motor Products Corporation, 25 F. (2d) 655 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928).
This limitation on jurisdiction is usually based on grounds of public policy and is by no
means universally applied. See Rohrlich, supra note 23, at 722, 723. Moreover, the rule
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state of incorporation, it might prove difficult to obtain personal service on any
stockholders who were citizens of other states. Of course, stockholders of foreign
citizenship might be present in the state of incorporation, or perhaps their consent
or appearance could be procured. The latter course, however, might possibly be
regarded by the court as indicative of collusion, and hence prove fatal
3 If
these difficulties can be overcome, no reason appears why a federal court could
not enter a declaration approving a reorganization plan of the type under dis-
cussion. In proceedings of this nature either the federal or state courts could
allow all interested parties to be heard as freely as in other casesY4
There is perhaps a slight possibility that a similar device could be employed
in the case of a reorganization following a foreclosure by entry or under a power
of sale provided for in a mortgage or deed of trust. For example, a bondholders'
committee might institute the proceedings, naming dissenting bondholders or
bondholders of another class as representative defendants. The lack of de-
cisions involving a dispute over the fairness of the reorganization in such cir-
cumstances, however, would undoubtedly prove a serious handicap in showing
that there existed any controversy over which the court had power to adjudicate.
If the need for exemption were urgent, it would perhaps be more advisable to
commence judicial foreclosure proceedings and attempt to obtain the court's
approval of the plan during the foreclosure action, rather than to proceed under
the power of sale.9 5
A final factor that should be taken into consideration in regard to obtaining
declaratory relief is that the court's action is often deemed to be discretionary, 0
and hence peculiarly open to guidance by the dictates of public policy. Courts
may feel that the purpose of Section 3 (a) (10) was merely to avoid the dupli-
cation of functions which would result if registration were required where a
court already had a reorganization under supervision, supposedly providing
adequate protection to those interested, and that an adjudication designed only
to avoid registration would not accord with the policy of the Securities Act.°
Furthermore, a court might be averse to undertaking the burdensome task of
examining an entire reorganization scheme until absolutely necessary. It might
well be considered socially desirable, however, regardless of the question of
is ordinarily invoked in suits against the corporation, and might not be enforced vwhere
the corporation itself sues in a foreign state.
93. The defendants must fairly represent those whose rights are involved, so that the
issues may be fully and honestly tried. See Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 303 (U. S.
1853); Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Lake St. El. R. R. Co., 68 InI. App. 666, 6S1 (1S96).
94. Parties represented are ordinarily allowed to intervene and be heard at any stage
of a class suit. See Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants (1934)
19 CoaN. L. Q. 399, 422; Comment (1934) 34 Cor. L. Rxv. 118, 128.
95. A power of sale contained in a mortgage is usually regarded as a cumulative remedy
not affecting the right to foreclose in equity. 3 JoNE, MomRCAEs (1928) § 2295. There
is perhaps more question as to the right to foreclosure of a trust deed, but such an action
might be entertained on the theory that the court was administering the trust. See Carey,
Brabner-Smith and Sullivan, Studies In Foreclosures In Cook County (1933) 27 Irs. L. REV.
595, 620.
96. See Bonc~acA, op. cit. supra note 19, at 99-113; Ellingwood, supra note 86, at 213, 214.
97. Cf. Hayden Plan Co. v. Friedlander, 97 Cal. App. 12, 275 Pac. 253 (1929).
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exemptions under Section 3 (a) (10), that such an examination be had for the
purpose of protecting the security holders involved.
°8
ADmlNISTRAIE BODIES
A number of federal administrative bodies appear to have sufficient authority
to afford exemptions under Section 3 (a) (10),91 but their jurisdiction is re-
stricted to specialized types of reorganizations, and in some cases would not be
invoked because of the availability of other exemptions. For example, the
Interstate Commerce Commission might well have the requisite power in regard
to securities issued during railroad reorganizations. 10 0 But such reorganizations
would ordinarily be conducted under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, which
itself affords exemptions for both definitive securities and certificates of deposit,12
and definitive securities issued by a carrier subject to the Transportation Act
are exempt under Section 3 (a) (6) of the Securities Act. Again, several federal
bodies possess powers of supervision over the various federal financial institutions.
Thus, the Comptroller of the Currency is expressly authorized to pass upon the
fairness of plans for the reorganization of national banks, 10 and is given rather
broad power to supervise national agricultural credit corporations;10 2 the Farm
Credit Administration is given control over receivership proceedings involving
federal land banks, joint stock land banks, national farm loan associations, and
federal intermediate credit banks;' 0 3 the Governor of the Farm Credit Admin-
istration may prescribe rules and regulations for the merger, consolidation or
dissolution of federal credit unions; 10 4 and the Federal Reserve Board is author-
ized to supervise generally, and to liquidate or reorganize federal reserve banks.10 5
These various agencies might well have sufficient authority to afford exemptions
under Section 3 (a) (10) for definitive securities issued by the particular in-
stitution involved.10 6 But such exemptions would be unnecessary where the
98. See Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 105, 119, 120.
99. It was contemplated that such federal agencies as the Farm Credit Administration,
the Federal Reserve Board, and the Comptroller of the Currency would perform this
function. Statement of House Conference Managers (1934) 78 CoNe. RzC. 10264.
100. The Commission may hold hearings and render approval in connection with the
issuance of securities by an interstate carrier. 41 STAT. 494-497 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A.
§ 20a (1926). And it is given power to pass on reorganization plans and deposit agree-
ments in proceedings under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. § 77 (d) (p).
101. 48 STAT. 3, 72 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. § 207 (1935).
102. "All National Agricultural Credit Corporations shall be under the supervision of
the Comptroller of the Currency. . . . The Comptroller of the Currency shall exercise the
same general power of supervision over such corporations as he exercises over national
banks. . . ." 42 STAT. 1467 (1923), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1241 (1926).
103. 39 STAT. 381 (1916), 42 STAT. 1454 (1923), Ex. Or. 6084, March 27, 1933, 12
U. S. C. A. §§ 961, 963, 1025 (1935).
104. 48 STAT. 1221 (1934), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1766 (a) (1935).
105. 38 STAT. 262 (1913), 12 U. S. C. A. § 248 (h) (j) (1926). These powers are not
impaired by the Bank Conservation Act. 48 STAT. 5 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. § 210 (1935).
106. A letter from general counsel of the Farm Credit Administration contains the
following statement concerning joint stock land bank receiverships: "In connection with
receivership plans for the purchase and liquidation of assets, securities may be issued in
exchange for the claims of bondholders against the trust assets. On June 27, 1934 It was
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securities could be brought within Section 3 (a) (2) of the Securities Act.O
And it appears doubtful whether the powers conferred on the administrative
officials and bodies mentioned are sufficiently broad to justify granting exemp-
tions for certificates of deposit issued by independently organized protective
committees. The federal bodies presenting the most far-reaching possibilities
as sources of exemptions are perhaps the Securities and Exchange Commission
itself and the Federal Power Commission. It seems clear that the Public Utility
Holding Company Act gives the Securities and Exchange Commission authority
to hold hearings and to pass upon the fairness of plans for the reorganization of
public utility holding companies, 108 and it is barely possible that the Commission
has similar powers in regard to the issuance of certificates of deposit during such
reorganizations.109  It is perhaps more doubtful whether these powers may be
exercised to afford exemptions under Section 3 (a) (10), since the Holding Com-
pany Act provides that nothing contained in it is to "affect the rights, obligations,
duties, or liabilities of any person" under the Securities Act." 0 It is arguable,
however, that the object of this provision was merely to make it clear that the
ruled by the Federal Trade Commission, [then administering the Securities Act] that if
such securities are issued pursuant to section 3 (a) (10) 'and the terms and conditions of
their issuance have been approved, after the required bearing, by the Farm Credit Admin-
istration, they are exempt from all provisions of the Securities Act except those contained
in Sections 12 (2), 17 and 24'2' Similar rulings would presumably follow in regard to
federal land banks, national farm loan associations, or federal intermediate credit bankL.
107. That section exempts "Any security issued or guaranteed by the United States or
any Territory thereof.., or by any person controlled or supervised by and acting as an
instrumentality of the government of the United States pursuant to authority granted by
the Congress of the United States, or any certificate of deposit of the foregoing, or any
security issued or guaranteed by any national bank . . . or any security issued by or
representing an interest in or a direct obligation of a Federal Reserve Bank."
108. A registered holding company must file a declaration with the Commi ion before
issuing securities or altering the rights of security holders. 49 STAT. 814, 15 U. S. C. A.
§ 79 f (1935). The Commission is authorized to hold hearings and to decide whether the
terms and conditions of the issuance of the securities, or the proposed alteration of security
holders' rights is detrimental to the interest of the public, investors, or consumers, in deter-
mining whether the declaration is to become effective. 49 STAT. 815, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79 g
(1935).
Likewise, in any proceeding in a federal court for the reorganization of a registered
holding company, the reorganization plan is not to become effective unless approved by
the Commission, after hearing, prior to its submission to the court. 49 STr. 820, 1
U. S. C. A. § 79 k (f) (1935).
The Commission has adequate power to hold hearings and admit all interested parsons
as parties. 49 STAT. 832, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79 s (1935). For a discscon of these power
by the Commission's general counsel, see S. E. C. Release No. 54 (Public Utility Holding
Company Act series), Dec. 23, 1935, 133 C. C. H. § 8510.
109. No deposits in connection with a reorganization plan may be solicited until the
plan has been approved by the Commission. And the Commission may issue such rules,
regulations, or orders regarding such solicitation as it deems necessary or appropriate in
the public interest, or for the protection of investors or consumers. 49 STAT. 820, 15
U. S. C. A. § 79 k (g) (1935). See S. E. C. Release No. 54 (Public Utility Holding
Company Act series), Dec. 23, 1935, 133 C. C. H. § 8510.
110. 49 STAT. 834, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79 u (1935).
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terms of the Holding Company Act do not of themselves repeal or modify the
Securities Act and that the provision was not intended to negative a grant of
authority to the Commission to afford exemptions contemplated in the Securities
Act. Th6 Federal Power Act provides that no electric utility subject to the Act
can dispose of its assets, merge, or consolidate without the approval of the Fed-
eral Power Commission, and likewise authorizes the latter body to pass upon
all issues of securities by electric utilities subject to the Act."'1 This authority
appears sufficient to justify exemptions under Section 3 (a) (10) for definitive
securities issued in reorganizations, but hardly seems broad enough to apply
to certificates of deposit. 112  No other federal administrative bodies appear to
have the necessary jurisdiction. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation is
empowered to make loans subject to such terms, conditions, and restrictions as
its directors determine; and it may compromise claims against a railroad in
reorganization under Section 77 or in equity receivership by taking securities
on terms to be approved by the Corporation. l 5 Likewise, the Secretary of the
Treasury is authorized by Section 77B (e) of the Bankruptcy Act to consent to
a reorganization plan in proceedings under that section where the United
States is a creditor or stockholder. But these powers could hardly be stretched
sufficiently to justify holding hearings and passing upon the fairness of the
plan or agreement involved with regard to other interested parties.
114
Several types of state administrative bodies merit consideration as possible
sources of exemptions under Section 3 (a) (10). Of these, banking and insurance
commissioners are specifically mentioned in the section itself. The question as
to the power of these officials to afford exemptions for reorganization issues
by banks and insurance companies is relatively unimportant, since definitive
securities issued by a new or reorganized bank would ordinarily be exempt
under Section 3 (a) (2) of the Securities Act,80 and insurance companies are
usually liquidated rather than reorganized. 115 Where the problem does arise,
however, it is complicated by the uncertainty as to whether these officials must
be expressly authorized to afford the necessary hearings and approvals.110 The
111. P. L. No. 333, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) tit. II, §§ 203, 204.
112. The original House amendment exempted securities issued under the supervision
of the Federal Power Commission from the Securities Act. But the following providon
was substituted in conference: "Any public utility whose security issues are approved by the
Commission ...may file with the Securities and Exchange Commission duplicate copies
of reports filed with the Federal Power Commission in lieu of the reports, information, and
documents required under section 7 of the Securities Act .... " P. L. No. 333, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935) tit. II, § 204 (h). See Statement of House Conference Managers (1935)
79 CONG. Rzc. 14621. This might be considered as indicating Congress' belief that super-
vision by the Power Commission would not be an adequate substitute for the sanctions
of the Securities Act.
113. 48 STAT. 1108, 1109 (1934), 49 STAT. 4, 15 U. S. C. A. § 606 (b) (g) (1935).
114. For a discussion of the function of the Secretary of the Treasury in reorganizations,
see (1935) 1 CORP. REORo. 383. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation is apparently
making some constructive suggestions in reorganizations in which it is involved, See
(1934) 1 CORP. REORG. 143.
115. See Legis. (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 722.
116. The wording of Section 3 (a) (10), set forth supra, note 5, seems ambiguous in
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power to approve reorganization plans is sometimes given to bank commis-
sioners, 1 17 and in lesser degree, to insurance commissioners?' 8  But there is
seldom any express provision for hearings at which prospective recipients of
securities can be heard,n and in some cases the officials are not authorized to
pass upon the fairness of the plan.- Nowhere is there express authorization
to pass upon deposit agreements.' 21 Accordingly, if the power of these officials
to fulfill the requirements of Section 3 (a) (10) exists at all, it must ordinarily
be implied, and hence, in most cases, they could afford exemptions only if the
section should be interpreted as not requiring express statutory authorization.
In connection with the remaining state bodies, the requirements of Section 3
(a) (10) undoubtedly are satisfied only if there exists a clear statutory authoriza-
this connection, in view of the lack of punctuation following "banking or insurance com-
mission." Cf. Op. of Gen'1 Counsel, supra note 13.
117. See discussion and compilation of statutes in Merry, Bank Reorganization and
Recapitlization In Michigan (1933) 32 Micn. L. Rv. 137; Legis. (1932) 32 Cot. L. REv.
1395; Legis. (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 152; Comment (1933) 32 .ficir. L. Rmv. 221; Note
(1933) 43 YALE L. J. 346.
118. There are very few statutes providing for general reorganization of insurance
companies, the typical legislation being designed to effectuate liquidation. See Legis. (1933)
33 COL. L. Rav. 722; Comment (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1146. There are, however, a few
rehabilitation statutes which give the commissioner some degree of control over the dis-
position of the property. Ind. Acts 1935, c. 162, art. II; MD. Alm. COD (Flach, Supp.
1935) art. 48A, §§ 51-51M; Mo. STAT. AN.x. (Vernon, Supp. 1935) v. 6, § 5930; N. Y.
INs. LAW (1933) art. XI, §§ 400-428.
It is rather commonly provided that merger or consolidation must have the approval of
the commissioner. Anx. DIG. STAT. (Crawf. & Moses, Supp. 1927) § 5975c; GA. CoD
(1933) § 56-1618; Ia- REv. STAT. (1935) c. 731, §§ 29-31; Ind. Acts 1935, c. 162, §§ 114-119;
IOWA CODE (1935) §§ 9105-9117; K,;. Rsv. STAT. ANx. (Supp. 1933) § 40-309; MDJn. CODE
(Bagby, 1925) art. 48A, § 48; sS. GEr. LAWS (1932) c. 175, § 19A; N. J. Comp. STnT.
(1911) p. 2853, § 48; N. C. CODE (1935) § 217 (n); Omo Gr;. CODE (Page, 1926) § 9351;
OxE-. STAT. AnN. (Harlow, 1931) §§ 10791-1001; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 40, §§ 436,
459a; S. D. Coup. LAws (1929) §3 9165-9167; Tx. AN.. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art.
5041; WAsH. REv. STAT. Ar.. (Remington, 1932) § 1060; Was. STAT. (1933) § 201.30.
The statutes cited in note 70, supra, relating to the reorganization of mortgage guaranty
companies, contemplate that the commission or commissoner is to approve reorganization
plans.
In a few states the commissioner is given control over the issuance of securitie3 by an
insurance company. Cal. Laws 1935, c. 145, §§ 820-860; H/ n. Ray. STr. Ann. (Supp.
1933) § 40-104; OHIo GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) § 6373-19.
119. This is typically true of the provisions relating to banks. See Legis. (1934) 34
COL. L. Rv. 152, 153. Occasionally hearings are provided for regarding the merger or
consolidation of insurance companies. See statutes of Indiana, Iowa, and South Dakota,
supra, note 118. The administrators of the statutes relating to mortgage guaranty com-
panies, cited supra, note 70, are not expres ly authorized to hold hearings.
120. This is particularly true of the statutes relating to the merger or consolidation of
insurance companies, cited supra, note 118.
121. A New York statute provides for the formation of corporations to perform the
function of protective committees. See supra, note 73. The insurance commissioner is
empowered to approve or disapprove of the certificate of incorporation of such bodies,
but presumably the terms and conditions of the proposed exchange of securities would
not appear in the certificate.
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tion to hold hearings at which all prospective recipients of securities have the
right to be heard, and to approve the fairness of the terms and conditions of
exchange. 18
One potential source of exemptions lies in the state security commissions. But
an examination of the various blue sky laws1 22 leads to the conclusion that very
few commissions have the requisite authority. Two types of statutes must be
eliminated at the outset as offering no possibilities, namely, those which become
operative only when evidence is presented that fraud has been or is about to
be committed,'123 and those which merely require that dealers be licensed.
124
In the case of the remaining statutes, which require a permit for each issue of
securities, various difficulties arise. In the first place, securities issued in re-
organizations may be unaffected by the statute. It is true that definitive secu-
rities issued pursuant to a reorganization would, in most cases, come within the
definition of "security" used in the particular act. It would sometimes be
more doubtful whether certificates of deposit were also included.128 But an
apparently insuperable obstacle results in many cases from the fact that securi-
ties issued in the course of a "bona fide" reorganization are exempt.120  And the
administrators are seldom expressly given power to pass on the fairness of the
terms and conditions of exchange. More often they are required to determine
whether the sale of securities would work a fraud on the purchaser, or whether
a "proposed plan of business" is fair. Perhaps the most serious difficulty, how-
ever, lies in the lack of satisfactory provisions for hearings. Some statutes
merely require the filing of information, while others couple this with a discre-
tionary power of investigation in the commission. In neither case does there
seem to be a clear authorization to hold hearings. And even where hearings are
authorized, it is seldom expressly provided that persons other than the applicant
for the permit are to be heard. But in California, and perhaps Wisconsin, the
statutes do vest their administrators with sufficient power. The California
Securities Act has been amended with the express purpose of authorizing the
Division of Corporations to hold the necessary hearings and grant the required
approval, both as to reorganization'plans and deposit agreements. 127 The Divi-
sion has apparently been quite active in performing this function.128 The Wis-
consin statute, although not directed at Section 3 (a) (10), likewise appears
to grant the requisite authority.'2 But its exercise is conditional upon a prelim-
122. For compilations of the state laws, see THORPE AND ELIS, FE.ERAI SECUITIES ACT
MANuAL (1933) § 147; CoP.poL=ON MANUAL (37th ed. 1936) p. 2021 et seq.; 132 C. C. H.
pp. 5503-5984.
123. The statutes in Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey and New York aro of this typo.
124. Statutes of this type exist in Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island. The Connecticut statute requires permits for individual issues only in tho
case of mining and oil stocks.
125. See Comment (1933) 27 ILL. L. Ray. 531, discussing the effect of the Illinois Secur-
ities Act on reorganizations.
126. See 132 C. C. H., Chart IV.
127. Cal. Laws 1935, c. 166. For discussions, see Comment (1935) 23 CALW. L. Rzv.
348; Legis. (1935) 24 CAIF. L. Rxv. 107.
128. Information based upon a communication of April 6, 1936, from the California Divi-
sion of Corporations to the YALE LAW JouRNAL.
129. Wis. Laws 1933, c. 158, § 189.05 (15).
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inary finding of unfairness in the proposed issuance of securities, based upon
an examination of information required to be filed, and is entirely discretionary
with the commission. No attempt seems to have been made to gain exemptions
under the latter act.130 It should, of course, be borne in mind that even where
the state commissions have the necessary jurisdiction, it may not extend to
interstate transactions.
31
The possibility that the public service commissions may afford exemptions in
connection with public utility reorganizations likewise deserves consideration.
There are, broadly, two types of provisions from which the necessary power
might be derived-those providing for commission control over the issuance
of securities, and those governing merger, consolidation, or reorganization in
general. It is rather commonly provided that securities may be issued only
with the approval of the commission, which frequently can impose such condi-
tions as it sees fit.' 32 Furthermore, the commission is often authorized to hold
hearings. The power to allow all interested parties to be heard at these hear-
ings, however, is not always expressly granted. But a still more serious diffi-
culty is that the commission is but seldom empowered to pass upon the fairness
of the terms and conditions of the proposed issuance. In most cases, the funda-
mental object in providing for control over the issue of securities was to prevent
overcapitalization, 133 and as a consequence, it is typically provided that the
issue is to be approved if it is in the public interest, or for a necessary and legiti-
mate purpose. It seems that in employing these general tests, commissions have
occasionally taken possible injustice to existing security holders into considera-
130. Information based upon a communication of Feb. 15, 1936, from the Acting Director
of the Securities Division of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission to the YxX LAw
Jovu-ar.. The letter states: "We think it would be competent for this department to
hold a hearing and notify such persons [prospective recipients of securities] if it thought
appropriate. . . .The section does not appear to us to rovide the absolute right of the
security holders to receive notice of such a hearing, nor does it seem to us to bind the
Commission in its judgment if such security holders should at such meeting express their
views, one way or the other. Under these interpretations of the provisions of our law,
we doubt that, if acted upon, a basis might be established to claim exemption under the
federal law."' It has been indicated, however, that the hearing need not be mandatory
under the state law, the requirements of Section 3 (a) (10) being satisfied if the hearing
is authorized and actually held. See Op. of Gen'l Counsel, supra note 13.
131. Sales of securities by a seller in one state exclusively to purchasers in other states
are seldom governed by the statutes of either jurisdiction. It has been a-sumed by some
that the state commissions could not be given control over such transactions without
interfering unduly with interstate commerce. This conclusion, however, is apparently not
necessitated by any court decisions. See Klagsbrunn, Regulation Of Interstate Security
Sales-A Recent Report (1933) 1 U. op Cm L. Rxv. 88. For the typical attitude, see
Doerfer, The Federal Securities Act Of 1933 (1934) IS MIUQ. L. REv. 147, 149; James, The
Securities Act Of 1933 (1934) 32 AzcH. L. REv. 624, 625; Steig, What Can The Regulatory
Securities Act Acconplish? (1933) 31 lrcm. L. REv. 775, 784.
132. For compilations of statutes and discussions, see Heaton, The Control Exercised
By The Michigan Public Utilities Commission Over The Issuance Of Corporate Securities
(1933) 12 Mricn. S. B. J. 199; Rosenbaum and Lilienthal, Issuance Of Securities By Public
Service Corporations (1928) 37 YA=E L. J. 716, 903; Waltersdorf, State Control Of Utility
Capitalization (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 337; Legis. (1933) 7 Tmra. L. Q. 353.
133. See Waltersdorf, supra note 132, at 342.
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tion,134 but even if they were to carry this to the extent of passing on the fairness
of reorganization plans, the express statutory authority required by Section 3
(a) (10) would appear to be lacking. Approximately one-half the statutes
require the commission's approval of a merger or consolidation,'88 and occa-
sionally the commissioner is given some control over reorganizations of a more
general character.1 36 But again, the tests upon which the approval is to depend
are usually designed to prevent overcapitalization, rather than to insure a fair
plan of reorganization. Furthermore, hearings are not often provided for in
this connection. In a few instances, however, an exemption for definitive securi-
ties may be available under Section 3 (a) (10). For example, the District of
Columbia Public Service Commission is authorized to approve the terms of a
consolidation, and is given rather broad powers to hold hearings.187 Likewise,
the Maryland statute empowers the commission to approve the issue of securities
in connection with a judicial or foreclosure sale, to such an amount and in such
a character as appears reasonable and equitable, or proper to protect fully the
rights of security holders of the vendor corporation. 18 It, too, is given a blanket
authority to hold hearings.8 9 But in neither case does the power conferred
appear broad enough to justify the exemption of certificates of deposit.
Finally, mention should be made of a rather unique statute140 recently enacted
in Michigan setting up a Public Trust Commission, which is given general
supervision over the activities of protective committees. Although the grant of
power is not entirely clear, it is possible to construe the act as authorizing the
necessary hearings and approvals in regard to deposit agreements. It seems
less clear, however, that the statute authorizes similar action in regard to re-
organization plans. Nevertheless, the Commission is at present exercising this
authority in both instances. 14
CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey of the possible sources of exemptions under Section
134. See Waltersdorf, supra note 132, at 354.
135. For a compilation of statutes and discussion, see Hall, State Control O/ Consolidation
Of Public Utilities (1932) 81 U. or PA. L. REv. 8, 11.
136. See, e.g., N. Y. Pur. SExv. Comm. LAW (1928) § 55-a, (1930) §§ 69-a, 82-a, 101-a,
(1931) § 89-g. In New York, the Metropolitan Division of the Department of Public Service
is to develop plans involving reorganization for the improvement of city transit. The Division
is to hold hearings and "adopt" plans, and the local authorities are to "approve" them, but
neither is expressly authorized to pass on the fairness of the plans. Id. §§ 122-129. The
securities issued in such reorganizations would be exempt in any event under Section
3 (a) (2) of the Securities Act, if issued or guaranteed by the state, a political subdivision
thereof, or by a public instrumentality.
137. D. C. CODE (1929) tit. 26, §§ 101, 67-69. The Commission has broad rule-making
powers in connection with hearings. Id. § 54. And the chapter is to be liberally construed.
Id. § 118.
138. MD. Ax. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 415.
139. Id. §§ 381, 392.
140. MIcH. Comn'. LAws (Mason, Supp. 1933) § 290 (1-21), as amended by Laws 1935,
No. 218.
141. Information based upon a communication of April 3, 1936, from the Michigan Public
Trust Commission to the YALE LAW Jouu'AL.
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3 (a) (10) leads to the conclusion that the courts, while by no means uni-
versally available, have power to afford such exemptions in a substantial num-
ber of cases, whereas administrative bodies possessing sufficient authority are few
in number, and often limited in jurisdiction to rather specialized situations.
This conclusion raises considerable doubt as to the soundness of the premise upon
which Section 3 (a) (10) is founded. For the courts do not appear particularly
well adapted to accomplish by direct supervision what the Securities Act was in-
tended to achieve. In the first place, the historical concept that courts should
remain in a state of inertia until set in motion by litigants, rather than conduct
independent investigations, 1 42 constitutes a serious handicap. For applications
for exemptions involving the fairness of deposit agreements, and to a lesser ex-
tent, reorganization plans, are often uncontested, and as a consequence, the
courts are tending to grant exemptions as a matter of course without detailed con-
sideration, particularly in regard to certificates of deposit-1 3 Secondly, experi-
ence with the state blue sky laws has demonstrated that supervision of security
issues is unsuccessful unless carried out by a specialized and highly trained body.
Although our judiciary as a whole is doubtless composed of able men, a heavily
burdened court of general jurisdiction can hardly be expected to possess the
qualifications or to devote the time necessary to achieve completely effective
control.' Finally, the courts not only lack facilities for providing the public
with facts as a guide to investments,145 but their approval of a particular plan
or agreement may be made to serve as a form of misleading advertisement. On
the other hand, administrative bodies, which at present play a comparatively
minor role in granting exemptions, might well prove better suited to perform
this function than the courts. Typically, they have broad powers of investiga-
tion which can be exercised on their own initiative; their work is somewhat
specialized in nature, which should make for a high degree of efficiency; and
many of them have power to make facts available to the public.140 Although
this superiority in equipment does not of itself ensure perfection in the exercise
142. See Comment (1936) 20 Mu=. L. REv. 191.
143. See Dodd, supra note 4, at 1121, 1122; Dodd, Amending The Scecurities Act-The
American Bar Association Committee's Proposals (1935) 45 Y=r.n L. J. 199, 211-214.
Recognizing this difficulty, at least one court has adopted the expedient of appointing
committees itself, apparently with a view to controlling their activities through the power
of removal. See Sabel, Recent Development In Corporate Reorganikations (1936) 20 Mnn.
L. Rxv. 117, 131, n. 75. Even here, however, the court acted on the request of petitioning
parties.
144. Cf. Waltersdorf, supra note 132, at 337, 338.
145. The extent to which the public may be expected to take advantage of information
in choosing investments is perhaps doubtful. See Douglas and Bates, supra note 2, at 171,
172. But information concerning the affiliations of protective committee members might
prove helpful to security holders contemplating depositing their securities. See Dodd, supra
note 143, at 213, 214.
146. Many of the state security commissions have power to publish facts which they
obtain in the course of investigation. This is less generally true of public utility com-
missions. The Maryland commisson discussed supra, however, has this authority. Both
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Power Commission likewivs may
make information available to the public.
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of supervision, the results achieved in at least one instance compare favorably
with those obtained through the exercise of judicial control.147
Accordingly, if the theory underlying Section 3 (a) (10) is to be adequately
carried out in practice, it would seem desirable to effect a shift of the exemption
power from the courts to administrative bodies. It may be considered doubtful
whether administrative control should be increased by conferring the exemp-
tion power on state agencies not expressly authorized by law, since that might
result in turning the question over to a body completely unequipped to handle
the problem. Probably, more state bodies will be granted express statutory
authorization as legislatures become aware of the possibilities afforded by Sec-
tion 3 (a) (10). It has been suggested that a national administrative body
should be created to control the entire field of reorganization, but this has been
criticized as impractical. 48 Legislation is now contemplated, however, which
would set up a federal agency as a conservator having power to pass on real
estate reorganization plans in connection with proceedings under the Bankruptcy
Act, or as a condition to reorganization loans by the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation. 49 If such an agency were established having power not only over
real estate, but likewise over other forms of reorganization, the problem of re-
organization exemptions might well be solved by leaving the question exclusively
in the hands of that agency and of those state agencies possessing express statu-
tory authorization. 50
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
THE introduction, through the Securities Act of 1933,1 of revolutionary con-
cepts of federal control of the securities market, designed to protect the in-
147. The California Commissioner of Corporations, is insisting upon the elimination of
several of the more undesirable features of deposit agreements. The Michigan Public Trust
Commission, however, is for the most part requiring modifications only in regard to fees
and expenses charged to depositors.
148. See Gerdes, Corporate Reorganizations Under Section 77B (1935) 69 U. S. L. Rny.
633, 639; cf. Dodd, supra note 143, at 214, n. 22.
149. See (1935) 1 CORP. REORG. 421; N. Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1936, at 23, col. 1.
150. A statute is now being proposed which would establish a federal administrative
court having the "jurisdiction and authority now vested in the several departments, com-
missions, administrations, and other executive agencies of the Government over the revoca-
tion of licenses, permits, registrations, or other grants for regulatory purposes. . . ." See
McGuire, The Proposed United States Administrative Court (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 197. This
jurisdiction would not appear to include power to grant exemptions. Conceivably, such
power could be conferred on the court. But an agency acting as conservator in reorgan-
ization proceedings would probably be more intimately acquainted with the problems
involved, and therefore better adapted to handle the question of exemptions than the
proposed administrative court.
1. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 905 (1934); 15 U. S. C. A. § 77 (1935).
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vestor, 2 naturally evoked a flood of criticism and comment.3  On the other
hand, the work of the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and
Exchange Commission4 in molding certain provisions of the Act through in-
terpretation and application, and in filling in and modifying others through
the promulgation of rules and regulations, although it impinges more directly
upon the conduct sought to be regulated than does the Act, has not as yet been
subjected to so searching analysis or discussion. This Comment will examine
the pronouncements explaining the meaning and scope of the statutory pro-
visions, which the two commissions have made in the course of their administra-
tion of the Act.
The Act does not give the Commission power to interpret its provisions.
Even if this power were expressly granted, it is highly doubtful whether such
interpretations would be conclusive. The interpretation of statutes has tradi-
tionally been the peculiar function of the judiciary. The technique and prin-
ciples of statutory interpretation, like those of the common law, have arisen
out of piecemeal adjudications involving the rights of particular litigants?
The doctrine of separation of powers emanating from the Constitution would
quite effectively nullify any attempt to vest in an administrative body absolute
power to interpret a statute.
Although the Commission has not been authorized to interpret the Act, its
2. By requiring complete and accurate disclosure of information about securities the
Act is intended to protect investors from fraud and to give them the basis for an informed
judgment as to value.
3. Ballantine, Amending the Federal Securities Act (1934) 20 A. B. A. J. SS; Bane, The
Federal Securities Act of 1933 (1934) B. U. L. ]bzv. 35; Dean, The Federal Securities
Act: An Examination by a Critic, N. Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1933, VIII at 3; Dodd, Amending
the Securities Act-The American Bar Association Committee's Proposals (1935) 45 YrAn
L. J. 199; Douglas and Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933 (1933) 43 Yx= L. J. 171;
Douglas and Bates, Some Effects of the Securities Act upon Investment Banking (1933)
1 U. or CL L. Rv. 283; Hanna and Turlington, The Securities Act of 1933 (1933) 23
Ir. L. Rxv. 482; James, The Securities Act of 1933 (1934) 32 Mici. L. REV. 624; Kr_ler,
The American Securities Act and'its Foreign Counterparts: A Comparative Study (1935)
44 YA r. L. J. 1133; MacIntyre, Criminal Provisions of the SecuritieV Act and Analogies to
Similar Criminal Statutes (1933) 43 YAL'x L. J. 254; Rodell, R~gdation of Securities by the
Federal Trade Commission (1933) 43 YAx. L. J. 272; Shulman, Civil Liability and the
Securities Act (1933) 43 YALE L. 1. 227; Tea--, Duty of Directors and others as Prefcribed
by Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (1934) 20 WA. L. RPv. 817. For a more com-
plete bibliography see C. C. H. Stocks and Bonds Law Service, Vol. M 3901 (1936).
4. The Securities Act of 1933 was administered at first by the Federal Trade Commi-ion.
On September 1, 1934, its duties were transferred to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission by virtue of the amendments of 1934. The latter Commission is administering the
Act at the present time. The term "Commission" is used in a generic sen-e in the text
of this Comment. Where it is necessary to distinguish between the two commicsions, when
discussing a particular interpretation, this will be done in the footnotes.
5. Implicit in discussions of the principles of statutory interpretation is the assumption
that interpretation is exclusively for the courts. See De Sloovre, Preliminary Questions in,
Statutory Interpretation (1932) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 407; De Sloovbre, Steps in the Process
of Interpreting Statutes (1932) 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rzv. 1; De Sloovre, Textual Interpreta.
tion of Statutes (1934) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. PRay. 53S; Landis, A Note on "Statuton, In-
terpretation" (1930) 43 HAnv. L. Ry. 886; Radin, Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43
THAv. L. Rv. 863.
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administration of necessity has entailed numerous opinions as to the meaning
and application of many of the statutory provisions. These opinions appear
in informal advisory letters sent by the Commission in response to inquiries
on particular points of construction, G in decisions by the Commission on such
matters as the issuance of stop orders, in the appeals by the Commission to the
courts for injunctive relief against violations of the Act, and in the orders and
regulations promulgated under the Act. The legal effect to be accorded by the
courts to these interpretations is of significance to those persons subject to the
Act, many of whom rely upon them and all of whom desire to know with some
degree of certainty exactly what burdens have been placed upon their activities
by the Act. The problem has two aspects: first, whether reliance upon an ad-
ministrative interpretation that is held erroneous is a good defense against
civil or criminal liability; and second, whether an administrative interpretation
of a statutory provision from which an appeal has been taken to the courts will
be upheld.
In appeals from Commission orders on the ground that the Act has been
interpreted erroneously, the courts, while giving weight to the administrative
construction, will undoubtedly reserve to themselves the ultimate power to
declare what the Act means, and will approach the problem with open minds to
preserve this judicial prerogative.7  Whether this same attitude will be carried
over into those cases where the defense of reliance upon an interpretation of
the Commission is asserted when the attempt is made to impose civil 8 or
criminal9 liability is not so clear. The traditional view has been to disregard
6. These informal letters furnish the bulk of the administrative interpretations of the
Securities Act. Only a few of them, however, are published in the releases; the others
are not available except to their addressees and to the Commission. Almost all letters
reflect only the opinion of counsel to the Commission and not that of the Commisson
itself; and this fact is expressly pointed out in many of the letters.
7. This does not mean that the courts will frequently overrule the Commission, but
rather that they will not give conclusive effect to its interpretations merely because it has
spoken. It is likely that the Commission and the courts will be in accord in most cases. But
cf. Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, U. S. Sup. Ct. April 6, 1936, U. S. L. Week,
April 7, 1936, at 753.
8. The civil liabilities imposed by Section 12 for violation of Section 5. Where the
attempt is made to impose civil liability, the courts are less likely to accept the defense of
reliance upon an administrative interpretation than in the case of criminal prosecutions; for,
to permit the defense in civil cases might deprive by administrative ruling an injured,
innocent plaintiff of a statutory remedy to which he would otherwise be entitled. That
consideration is lacking in the case of a criminal prosecution. See Long v. Thompson, 177
Wash, 296, 31 P. (2d) 908 (1934), noted in (1934) 9 WAsr. L. RaV. 167. Cf. People v.
Ferguson, 134 Cal. App. 41, 24 P. (2d) 965 (1933), noted in (1934) 22 CA.M. L. REv. 569.
9. Section 24 imposes penalties upon any person who wilfully violates any of the
provisions of the Act. While it might be argued that one who relies upon an interpreta-
tion of the Commission which is later held erroneous does not wilfully violate the Act, the
term "willful" has not been given that construction in analogous statutes. To constitute a
wilful violation there need be only an intent to do the act that has been prohibited, not
an intent to violate a statute. See State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351, 195 Pac. 211 (1921) ;
Commonwealth v. Nichols, 257 Mass. 289, 153 N. E. 787 (1926); People v. Marcus, 261 N,
Y. 268, 185 N. E. 97 (1933). See also Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses (1933) 33 COL. L.
Rv. 55.
the defense in such cases.1° Section 19 (a) of the Act provides: "No provision
of this title imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good
faith in conformity with any rule or regulation of the Commission, notwith-
standing that such rule or regulation may, after such act or omission, be
amended or rescinded or be determined by judicial or other authority to be
invalid for any reason". Since most of the interpretations given by the Com-
mission appear in informal letters rather than in rules or regulations, this Sec-
tion will not ordinarily be directly in point, but the arguments in favor of the
extension of its spirit to all interpretations are cogent. The Securities Act
conditions access to the capital market with considerable burdens. The financial
community is entitled to know what these burdens are. But little protection
to investors is to be gained by imposing on the financial community the added
burden of uncertainty until a court has spoken with finality upon every point
of ambiguity. The administrative interpretations have been made by experts
in the field of finance who have been reluctant to give interpretations which
might restrict the scope of the Act," and who have shown themselves com-
petent to make determinations of a judicial nature upon which reliance may be
placed with assurance. Furthermore, it would be unreasonable, in view of the
complexity of the Securities Act, for a court to impose upon an individual the
burden of outguessing a commission of experts as to what its provisions mean 2
The need for administrative interpretation varies from section to section,
depending both upon the ambiguity of the legislative text and the nature of
the problem involved. The opinions of the Commission as to meaning and
application cluster about a few of the more controversial sections. Discussion
of the interpretations placed upon the Act section by section appears to be
the most convenient and useful method of treatment.
DEFINITIONS
Section 2 (1) of the Act defines the term "security" with sufficient breadth
to cover the many types of instruments that fall within the concept of a
security in the commercial world, expressly including certificates of deposit,
investment contracts, voting-trust certificates, fractional undivided interests in
oil and gas rights, and warrants or rights to subscribe to a security. The
question of whether certain unique types of security interests fall within the
definition of a "security" under the Blue Sky Laws of the States has been a
10. Hoover v. The State, 59 Ala. 57 (1877) (criminal); Hamilton v. The People, 57
Barb. 625 (N. Y. 1870) (criminal); State v. Foster, 22 R. I. 163, 46 AtI. 833 (1900)
(criminal); Long v. Thompson, 177 Wash, 296, 31 P. (2d) 903 (1934) (civil). Contra:
People v. Ferguson. 134 Cal. App. 41, 24 P. (2d) 965 (1933) (criminal). But see La
Bourgogne, 210 U. S. 95, 134 (1903) (civil).
11. It is only an interpretation which holds that the Act does not apply to a particular
situation or that it does not require a certain mode of conduct which raises the problem
of the imposition of liability as a result of acting upon such administrative opinion.
12. For an interesting case arising under a State Blue Sky Law adopting the approach
here urged, see People v. Ferguson, 134 Cal. App. 41, 24 P. (2d) 965 (1933). Defendant
was charged with selling securities without a permit in violation of the Corporate Securitics
Act of California. His defense was that he had been advised by the Corporation Com-
missioner that the "trust interests" he contemplated selling were not within the provision
of the Act, and that a permit was therefore unnecessary. His conviction was reveri'd
because the trial court had excluded this evidence.
1936] COMMENTS 1079
YALE LAW JOURNAL
frequent subject of litigation."3 While this same kind of question has arisen
under the Securities Act and has given rise to many informal opinions on the
point by the Commission, the issue is of far more interest than importance.
The definition of "security" in the Act is general and flexible enough to con-
trol substantially all access to the national capital market, and those interests
which appear on the fringes of the definition and introduce doubt in interpreta-
tion are of relatively minor significance.
For example, in a suit by the Commission to enjoin a violation of the Act,
a Federal District Court upheld the contention of the Commission that the
interest involved was a "security" within the Act and enjoined the defendant
from using the mails or any means of interstate commerce in selling such
securities until a proper registration statement was in effect. 14 The contract,
on a standard form, provided that the purchaser invest money with the
defendant, a broker, who was to use it at his discretion for trading in com-
modities and securities for a period of ninety days. At the end of that period
profits or losses, which the contract itself characterized as speculative, were to
be shared. Such a contract quite clearly appears to fall within the term "in-
vestment contract" included in Section 2 (1) and, if offered to the public, as
may be inferred from the fact that it was on a standard form, should be
registered before being offered for sale.
Section 2 (3) of the Act provides that the term "sale", "sell", "offer to sell",
or "offer for sale" shall include every contract of sale or disposition of, attempt
or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest
in a security, for value. Preliminary negotiations or agreements between
an issuer and any underwriter are excluded from the definition. The typical
situation, of course, offers no difficulty; but it is the borderline transactions
which require interpretation. The definition of a "sale" offers more difficulty
than that of a "security", for the transactions to be characterized as sales
under the Act are not enumerated so carefully as are interests to be known as
securities, and the definition includes many more transactions than those
commonly known as sales. The question seems to be not whether any sort
of title passed, but rather whether the policy of protecting investors will be
advanced by including a particular kind of transaction within the definition
of a "sale" and therefore within the jurisdiction of the Commission.
15
The Commission has applied the concept of sale or offer of sale to numerous
transactions. Concerning a proposed issue of bonds, carrying a conversion
13. Barnhill v. Young, 46 F. (2d) 804 (S. D. Cal. 1931); Barrett v. Gore. 88 Cal, App,
372, 263 Pac. 564 (1928); Schmoyer v. Van Hosen, 111 Kan. 759, 208 Pac. 554 (1922);
State v. Ogden, 154 Minn. 425, 191 N. W. 916 (1923); State v. Heath, 199 N. C. 135, 153
S. E. 855 (1930); Creasy Corp. v. Enz Bros. Co., 177 Wis. 49, 187 N. W. 666 (1922).
14. S. E. C. v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp. 245 (D. Minn. 1935), noted in (1936) 36 COL, L.
REV. 683.
15. For cases involving the application of the definition of a "sale" under the State Blue
Sky Laws, see State v. Dobson, 140 Kan. 445, 37 P. (2d) 10 (1934); Edward v. Ioor, 205
Mich. 617, 172 N. W. 620 (1919); Link, Petter & Co. v. Polle, 241 Mich. 356, 217 N, W.
60 (1928); Marney v. Home Royalty Ass'n of Okl., 34 N. M. 632, 286 Pac. 979 (1930);
Josslyn v. Dahinden-Schmitz Co., 208 Wis. 468, 243 N. W. 473 (1932).
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privilege which might be exercised at any time after the bonds were issued,
the question was raised whether that would constitute a "sale" or "offer to
sell" the stock into which the bonds were convertible.'0 In an informal letter
the Commission answered that if the conversion right could not be exercised
until some future time, the issue of bonds would not involve an offer of the
stock, but since that right of conversion was to accrue immediately, the issuer
of the bonds would have to register the stock also and pay a registration fee
for that stock.17 In decisions rendered in two stop order proceedings, the
Commission held that the distribution free of charge of stock upon which
assessments were to be levied for the purpose of financing constituted a sale.18
In both cases stop orders were issued since the Commission found that the
statements to the effect that the stock was to be given away rather than sold
were misleading. The Commission has also interpreted within the concept of a
sale the typical transactions in which voting trust certificates are delivered
against the deposit of securities under the trust and those in which a security
is issued in exchange for outstanding securities, claims, or property interests.10
Since other sections of the Act expressly refer to those transactions and indi-
cate by implication that they are to fall within the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission,2 0 the conclusion that they are "dispositions of... a security.., for
value" is justified. In an informal opinion the Commission stated that the
distribution by a dealer or underwriter of pamphlets of a statistical service,
commenting favorably upon securities which he intends to sell in the future,
would closely resemble a present offer to sell those securities, and would be
prohibited until a registration statement was in effect.21
A "sale of securities", in the last analysis, is the jurisdictional basis of regu-
lation by the Commission. Its meaning is broader than its component terms.
It is the link between industry and the capital market. Any definition of
"security" or "sale" based upon considerations of intrinsic meaning drawn
from a strict interpretation of the legislative text rather than upon the realities
of the securities market and the policy of the Securities Act to protect investors
and to effect more reliable market evaluation of securities would to that extent
frustrate the purpose of the Act. The definitions of those terms in the Act
are both broad and flexible, and the few interpretations of them which are
available out of the many rendered by the Commission indicate that the Com-
mission is thinking of control over the capital market rather than simple and
logical definitions to be applied mechanically.
16. The last sentence of Section 2(3) provides that where the converzion privilege may
not be exercised until some future time, the issue of the original securities shall not h
deemed a sale of the securities into which they are convertible; but the precise question here
involved is not expressly covered by the legislative text.
17. F. T. C. Release No. 97, Pt. 2, Dec. 28, 1933.
18. In re Gold Producers, Inc., 1W. T. C. 619 (1933); In re Sierra Nevada, Ltd., F.
T. C. Release No. 140, March 24, 1934.
19. F. T. C. Release No. 97, Pt. 1, Dec. 23, 1933.
20. Section 2(1) includes a voting trust certificate within the definition of a "security."
Section 2(4) defines the issuer of a voting trust certificate as the per-on p2rforming the
acts and assuming the duties of manager pursuant to the provisions of a trust agreement.
21. S. E. C. Release No. 464, August 19, 1935.
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Section 2 (4) defines an issuer of a security as a person who issues or pro-
poses to issue any security, except that in the case of certificates of deposit,
voting trust certificates, collateral-trust certificates, or shares in an unincor-
porated investment trust not having a board of directors, the issuer is the
person performing the duties pursuant to the trust or agreement under which
such securities are issued. The issuer of fractional undivided interests in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights is defined as the owner of any such right or of any
interest in such right (whether whole or fractional) who creates fractional
interests therein for the purpose of public offering. This section of the Act
has required explanation by the Commission rather than creative interpretation,
particularly in respect to fractional undivided interests in mineral rights, Which
are highly complex and technical. The Commission has divided such interests
into five classifications, meaningless, even when defined, to anyone not an
expert in the field,2 2 and has explained the application of the definition of an
issuer to each. The Commission has stated that three points must be considered
in determining who is the "issuer" of a royalty interest. An issuer must be
the owner of the royalty interest in question. He must create fractional inter-
ests therein. And the subdivision must be made for the purpose of public
offering.23  Since such interests are capable of infinite subdivision, it is possible
that there may be several issuers of the same royalty interest. All issuers must
register, and if they are not residents of the same State, the exemption pro-
vided in Section 3 (a) (11) of the Act2 4 is not available to them. The lack
of interpretations of the definitions of issuers of other types of securities would
seem to indicate that the problems encountered in their application have not
been serious.
Section 2 (10) defines a "prospectus" as any notice, circular, advertisement,
letter, or communication which offers any security for sale. Section 5 makes
it unlawful to use any means of interstate commerce or the mails to sell " such
22. (1) "Royalty interests"--fractional undivided landowners' oil or gas royalty interests;
(2) "working interests"--fractional undivided oil or gas leasehold interests, the holders of
which share in all the expense of development or operation of the lease; (3) "free worldng
interests"--fractional undivided oil or gas leasehold interests in a lease, any part of the ex.
pense of development and operation of which is borne by persons other than the holders,
(4) "over-riding royalty intdrests"--rights of participation in the oil or gas produced by
another, which are unlimited as to amount ultimately to be received; (5) "oil and/or gas
payments"--rights of participation in the oil and/or gas produced by another, which are
limited in amount. S. E. C. Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933,
Article 5, Regulation B, published in Release No. 627 (Class C) Jan. 21, 1936.
23. The creation of fractional interests for the purpose of public offering, a part of the
definition of an issuer of royalty and leasehold interests, has been interpreted not to apply
to issuers of "overriding royalties" or "oil or gas payments." The definition applicable to
issuers of those two types of interests is "every person who issues or proposes to issue any
security." S. E. C. Compilation of Regulations, Forms, and Opinions Applicable to Oil and
Gas Interests, Release No. 435, July 13, 1935.
24. Section 3(a) (11) grants exemption to a wholly intra-state issue of securities. This
exemption is discussed infra, at p. 1090.
25. The term "sell" is, of course, used in the broadest sense as defined in Section 2(3)




security through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise unless there
is in effect a registration statement. Section 8 provides that a registration
statement may not take effect until at least twenty days after filing with the
Commission. The question arose as to whether it would be proper for an
issuer or underwriter to distribute by the use of the mails circulars describing
a particular security during the twenty-day waiting period. The purpose of
that waiting period was to prevent the recurrence of high-speed, reckless dis-
tribution of securities which made impossible careful appraisal and analysis
by investors. The Commission stated that buyers must maintain freedom of
action during the period and that any binding commitments or offers to buy
or sell made prior to the effective date of the registration statement would
violate the provisions of the Act covering the waiting period. Since, however,
the Commission itself was under the duty to make available to the public in-
formation filed with any registration statement,20 the Commission stated that
the distribution of purely descriptive circulars would advance the policy of the
Act; but the point was emphasized that such circular must be only informative
and should expressly negative any implication that through it anyone is at-
tempting to offer to sell securities or to solicit offers to purchase. That is, it
must definitely be not a "prospectus".2
-
Section 2 (11) of the Act defines an underwriter in the following manner:
"The term 'underwriter' means any person who has purchased from an issuer
with a view to, or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any
security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such
undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect
underwriting of any such undertaking; but such term shall not include a person
whose interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not
in excess of the usual and customary distributors' or sellers' commission".
It is important under the Act to determine who the underwriters of an issuer
are, for the names of the principal underwriters must appear on the registration
statement and the civil liabilities of Section 11 are imposed upon every under-
writer of an issue. That the definition includes a purchasing banker of an
issue which is subsequently to be offered to the public is clear. Whether it
also applies to a strict underwriter-one who merely insures' the success of a
sale of securities-is more doubtful,2 8 but a careful reading of the definition
leads to the conclusion that both types of underwriters were intended to be
included. The Commission has not yet spoken to clear up that point. The
26. Section 6 (d) of the Act.
27. F. T. C. Release No. 70, Nov. 6, 1933. See also S. E. C. Release No. 464, August
19, 1935.
28. In H. R. Rr.s. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) 12, it is stated: "The term
(underwriter) is defined broadly enough to include not only the ordinary underwriter, who
for a commission promises to see that an issue is disposed of at a certain price, but also
includes as an underwriter the person who purchases the issues outright with the idea of
then selling that issue to the public." Careful commentators have pointed out, however,
that the legislative text does not clearly embody that declaration of intent. See Douglas
and Bates, Some Effects of the Securities Act upon Investment Banking (1933) 1 U. or Cmr.
L. R v. 283, 294.
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application of the definition to this complex phase of finance has raised many
other problems, a few of which have been passed upon by the Commission.
The Commission has stated that a protective committee which, after approval
of its plan of reorganization by the bondholders, obtains the securities of the
new corporation in connection with the acquisition of the property of the old
corporation and distributes those securities to the depositing bondholders, is not
an underwriter.29 The transaction has been characterized as a "sale" by the
new corporation to the depositing bondholders with the committee acting as
"trustee" or "agent" for the depositors rather than as a distribution of secur-
ities through the committee as underwriter. Since the protective committee is
considered the issuer30 of the certificates of deposit which must be registered
under the Act unless exempted by reason of some governmental authority's
approval of their issuance, 3 ' and since the final exchange of certificates of
deposit for securities in the new corporation in many instances is subject to
further supervision by courts or banking, insurance, or securities authorities,
there seems to be no need to impose further liability upon the protective com-
mittee as underwriter of the new securities. The view of the Commission on
that point, therefore, seems justified. In regard to what persons may be con-
sidered within the definition of underwriter as participating in the distribution
of securities, the Commission has ruled that a person engaged in the business
of purchasing the securities of an issuer and then selling its own securities to
furnish the proceeds with which to acquire them is to be regarded as an under-
writer of those original securities.3 2  Although the effect of this ruling is to
impose upon such a distributor the liabilities both of issuer of its own securities
and underwriter of the others, an opposite interpretation, by permitting the
sale of the original securities without the disclosure of any information about
their issuer,3 3 would permit an ingenious evasion of the strict letter of the
Act to frustrate its policy.
All persons taking part in the distribution of securities (members of a sell-
ing syndicate and dealers) are included within the definition of "underwriter"-
except those whose interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter
or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary distributors' or sellers' com-
mission. This cgmmission has been defined not to include amounts paid to
any person whose function is the management of the distribution of all or a
substantial part of the particular issue, or who performs the functions norm-
ally performed by an underwriter or an underwriters' syndicate3 4  This re-
29. F. T. C. Release No. 97, Pt. 3, Dec. 28, 1933.
30. Section 2(4) defines the issuer of certificates of deposit as the person performing
the acts and assuming the duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the Provisions of the
trust or other agreement or instrument under which such securities are issued.
31. This exemption, provided in Section 3(a) (10), is discussed infra, at p. los8.
32. F. T. C. Release No. 47, Sept. 22, 1933; incorporated in S. E. C. Rules and Regula-
tions under the Securities Act of 1933, Rule 140, Release No. 627 (Class C) Jan. 21, 1936.
33. Since the sale by the original issuer of the entire issue of securities to a single
person would be a "transaction by an issuer not involving any public offering," those
original securities would be exempt from registration under Section 4(1). This Section
is discussed in detail infra, at p. 1092.
34. F. T. C. Release No. 96, Dec. 21, 1933 and S. E. C. Release No. 530 (Class C) Oct
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strictive definition of the Commission reflects its vigilance in preventing an
exception provided in the Act for one purpose, from being expanded beyond
that purpose, with resultant emasculation of other provisions.
A-EMPTIONS
The Act exempts from its provisions certain enumerated types of securities
and transactions. The purpose of such exemptions is twofold. One class of
exemptions limits the application of the Act to the distribution of securities
rather than to trading in them and restricts its incidence to the issuance of
securities in the future. Concerning the second class, within which most of
the exemptions fall, Congress has determined that the intrinsic nature of cer-
tain securities or the circumstances surrounding their issue in enumerated in-
stances provide adequate protection to investors. Since neither securities
nor transactions fall into simple, distinct categories, the application of the ex-
emptive provisions of the Act to the diverse situations in which exemption has
been sought has involved difficult questions of interpretation. In the interpre-
tation of these provisions as applied to situations not falling clearly within the
ambit of their text, the Commission has a wide field of discretion in either
restricting or expanding the application of the Act in accordance with its
views of how much protection investors in general and those in particular
situations ought to have.
The Act leaves to implication the precise meaning of "exemption from regis-
tration". The Commission has stated as its interpretation that where exemp-
tion is provided for in the Act, no information need be filed with the Com-
mission and the prospectus form and content may be determined entirely by
the issuer or seller.35 Since exemption from registration carries with it not only
freedom from the delay and expense incident to registration but also im-
munity from the civil liabilities imposed by Section 11 of the Act for false
registration statements, the drive for exemption has been strong. The Com-
mission has passed upon numerous situations where it has been contended that
there exist the factors necessary for exemption.
Section 3 (a) (1) exempts "Any security which, prior to or within sixty days
after the enactment of this title, has been sold or disposed of by the issuer or
bona fide offered to the public, but this exemption shall not apply to any new
offering of any such security by an issuer or underwriter subsequent to such
sixty days". The purpose of this exemption is to restrict the application of the
Act to appeals to the capital market made after its enactment. Although most
of the situations calling for interpretation of this Section clustered around the
months immediately succeeding the passage of the Act and many of the prob-
lems have receded into the background with the lapse of time, a few of those
problems have current significance. The Commission has ruled that stock
originally issued before May 27, 1933, but kept in the corporate treasury, must
18, 1935; incorporated in S. E. C. Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933,
Rule 141, Release No. 627 (Class C) Jan. 21, 1936.
35. F. T. C. Release No. 217, August 29, 1934.
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be registerdd if offered for sale after July 27, 1933.36 But in a case where
stock had been issued to former stockholders and, prior to May 27, 1933, the
underwriter had entered into contracts with those stockholders to buy some of
their stock, the conclusion was reached that the offering by the underwriter
after July 27, 1933 of that stock to the public is not a "new offering ...by
an underwriter" and therefore is exempt under Section 3 (a) (1).11 A novel sit-
uation involved the exemption of certificates of deposit and the securities ulti-
mately deliverable where the solicitation of deposits was begun prior to July
27, 1933. Under the deposit agreement the committee had continuing power
to accept deposits, to acquire the mortgaged property and to transfer it to a
corporation or trusts and to issue corporate stock or trust certificates against
it to the depositors, without further submission to the holders. It was held
that even though some of the deposits were made after July 27, 1933 and the
securities ultimately deliverable were issued after that date, both types of
securities were exempt since the offering was made by the issuer prior to July
27, 1933, and since that offering contemplated both certificates of deposit and
the securities ultimately deliverable without further action by the holders.08 It
was pointed out that the opposite holding would obtain if the deposit agree.
ment had to be amended after July 27, 1933 to give the committee the con-
tinuing power to solicit deposits for a further period.
Section 3 (a) (3) exempts "Any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's
acceptance which arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which
have been or are to be used for current transactions, and which has a maturity
* , .of not exceeding nine months". Exemption was sought for nine months
collateral trust notes secured by purchase money notes given by members of
the public in connection with installment purchases. The finance company
which issued the collateral trust notes had purchased the underlying purchase
money notes from dealers. The ruling was that the collateral trust notes were
exempt, their proceeds being regarded as used for "current transactions" if
their issuer was in the business of making loans and if those proceeds were
used in making loans upon or buying purchase money notes or in paying off
outstanding collateral trust notes exempt under Section 3 (a) (3). 89
Section 3 (a) (5) exempts "any security issued by a building and loan as-
sociation . ..or similar institution, substantially all the business of which is
confined to the making of loans to members . . . ". Mortgage loan com-
panies which obtain loans from the R.F.C. in order to relend the proceeds to
local industries and mercantile businesses sought exemption for shares of
their stock. It was ruled that if the stock of the company is issued only to
borrowers or if the stock issued to borrowers carries voting rights in the same
36. F. T. C. Release No. 131, March 13, 1934.
37. F. T. C. Release No. 97, Pt. 4, Dec. 28, 1933.
38. S. E. C. Release No. 538 (Class C) Oct. 26, 1935.
39. S. E. C. Release No. 401, June 18, 1935, superseding the opinion expressed In S, E.
C. Release No. 388, June 8, 1935, to the effect that such collateral trust notes were not
exempt.
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proportion to their investment as that issued to the organizers, the company
was sufficiently similar to a building and loan association to come within the
exemption.40
Section 3 (a) (8) exempts "Any insurance or endowment policy... issued
by a corporation subject to the supervision of the insurance commissioner...
of any State". Under this section it was held, assuming the issuer to be under
the supervision of the Superintendent of Insurance of New York. that con-
tracts guaranteeing the payment of principal and/or interest due on a bond
are to be considered insurance policies and exempt from the Act.41
Section 3 (a) (9) exempts "Any security exchanged by the issuer with its
existing security holders exclusively where no commission or other remunera-
tion is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting such exchange". This
section is intended to exempt exchanges of securities which effect a change in
the internal capital structure of an issuer and influence the capital market only
remotely. A typical example would be an exchange of no-par stock for par
stock to reduce the stated capital item in a balance sheet. The application
of this section has necessitated numerous interpretations by the Commission.
"Commission or other renumeration" has been defined as not including pay-
ments for services in effecting but not promoting such an exchange of securi-
ties2 or payments made by the issuer to its security holders in connection with
an exchange of securities for outstanding securities, when such payments are
part of the terms of the offer of exchange.43  The Commission has further
extended the exemption granted to the exchange of securities by declaring that
a "sale" is not involved where, in statutory mergers or consolidations, secur-
ities are distributed to the stockholders of the corporation whose assets have
been purchased in exchange for those assets.44 It has been pointed out, how-
ever, that mere formal compliance with the requirements of Section 3 (a) (9)
will not confer exemption if the real purpose of the transaction is to evade the
registration requirements of the Act in the raising of new capital.s
The history of the exemption provided in Section 3 (a) (9) offers an inter-
esting illustration of the kind of difficulty encountered, because of the intricacy
40. F. T. C. Release No. 86, Dec. 13, 1933.
41. Letter by Baldwin Bane, Chief of the Securities Division of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, Oct, 1933, C. C. H. Stocks and Bonds Law Service, Vol III, U 2158.02. In reach-
ing his conclusion, the writer relied upon Bowers v. Lawyers' Mortgage Co., 285 U. S. 182
(1932), and United States v. Home Title Ins. Co. 285 U. S. 191 (1932).
42. Letter by the Chief of the Securities Division of the Federal Trade Commissaon,
interpreting Section 4(3) of the old Act. The amendments of 1934 repealed that Section
and re-enacted it in modified form as Sections 3 (a) (9) and 3 (a) (10). C. C. H. Stocks
and Bonds Law Service, Vol. 1II, f 2161.03.
43. S. E. C. Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933, Rule 150, Release
No. 627 (Class C) Jan. 21, 1936.
44. S. E. C. Release No. 353, April 30, 1935; S. E. C. Release No. 493 (Class C) Sept.
20, 1935. For a criticism of this interpretation, see Dodd, Amending the Sectriies Act-
The American Bar Association Committee's Proposals (1935) 45 Y.e L. J. 199, 203.
45. S. E. C. Release No. 646 (Class D) Feb. 3, 1936.
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of the subject matter of regulation, in embodying legislative purpose in bold
legislative text. In the Act of 1933 this exemption appeared in Section 4 (3)
which provided for exempted transactions and not exempted securities. Under
that same Section 4 transactions by dealers, within one year of the offering
date to the public, were denied exemption. The question early arose whether
dealers trading in Section 4 (3) securities within one year after public offering
were exempt. The Commission ruled that although the exemption was char-
acterized as an exempted transaction of exchange, it was available along the
line of distribution to dealers. 46 When Congress enacted the amendments of
1934, it incorporated this ruling of the Commission into the Act by moving
that particular exemption from Section 4 to Section 3, thus characterizing as
exempt the security rather than the transaction of exchange. The question
next arose whether securities previously received by a controlling stockholder
in a bona fide exchange granted exemption under Section 3 (a) (9) should be
registered before being offered to the public through an underwriter. Although
a literal application of Section 3 (a) (9) exempting the security given in ex-
change would carry that exemption to the transaction set out above, the Com-
mission ruled that the offer by the controlling stockholder to the public was
not exempt. Such a stockholder was held to have become an "issuer" within
the meaning of Section 2 (11); and the person through whom he attempted
to offer his stock to the public, as the underwriter of such issuer, could not sell
those securities unless they had been properly registered by the person actually
issuing them.
47
The reason for these difficulties in statutory expression and administrative
interpretation is apparent. Neither Section 4 nor Section 3 completely compre-
hends the purpose of the exemption sought to be provided. The securities given
in exchange are not exempted because of their inherent qualities, nor is it the
purpose of the Act to exempt simply the transaction of exchange. The exemp-
tion rather is an exemption of securities because of the circumstances surround.
ing their issue and ultimate distribution to investors. When the circumstances
of such exchange and distribution involve no threat of danger to investors if the
securities are not registered, full exemption is available to those securities.
From that point of view the two administrative interpretations-the first, hold-
ing transactions of dealers exempt when the Act called only the transaction
of exchange exempt, and the second, holding the sale by the controlling stock-
holder not exempt when the Act characterized the security as exempt-are
explicable. Both holdings, while difficult to sustain by logical reasoning from
the words of the Act, reflect an intelligent application of the theory of the
exemption to situations which do not fall neatly within the legislative mandate.
Section 3 (a) (10) exempts "Any security which is issued in exchange for
one or more bona fide outstanding securities, claims or property interests, or
partly in such exchange and partly for cash, where the terms and conditions
of such issuance and exchange are approved, after a hearing upon the fairness
of such terms and conditions at which all persons to whom it is proposed to
46. F. T. C. Release No. 97, Dec. 28, 1933.
47. S. E. C. Release No. 646 (Class C) Feb. 3, 1936.
1088 [Vol. 45
issue securities in such exchange shall have the right to appear, by any court,
or by any official or agency of the United States, or by any State or Territorial
banking or insurance commission or other governmental authority expressly
authorized by law to grant such approval". This exemption applies to cer-
tificates of deposit as well as to securities ultimately deliverable and gives the
issuer an alternative: he must either register the securities or procure the
proper governmental approval requisite for exemption. Such approval is
clearly required as a condition for exemption, and the Commission has had
merely to make clear when such approval is proper. The Commission has
pointed out that the following three conditions must be met in order that the
securities be exempt under Section 3 (a) (10): (1) there must be adequate
notice to all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities of the hearing on
the fairness of their issuance, (2) express authorization must include authority
to approve the fairness of the terms and conditions of the issuance and exchange
and not merely authority to approve the terms and conditions, and (3) the
need not be mandatory.48
approving authority must be authorized to hold a hearing, but such bearing
Another exemption of the Securities Act, similar to Section 3 (a) (10) and
concerning which there has been considerable doubt and discussion, appears in
Section 77B (h) of the Bankruptcy Act. It is there provided that "All
securities issued pursuant to any plan of reorganization confirmed by the
court. . . and all certificates of deposit representing securities of or claims
against the debtor which it is proposed to deal with under any such plan, shall
be exempt from all the provisions of the Securities Act... ". It was not clear
whether confirmation by the court was essential under Section 77B (h) of the
Bankruptcy Act for the exemption of certificates of deposit, but the Com-
mission's interpretation was that the term "such" referred back to "any plan...
confirmed by the court" and therefore the exemption afforded by Section 77B
(h) of the Bankruptcy Act applied only to certificates of deposit issued sub-
sequent to the court's confirmation of a plan.40 This result, similar to that ob-
taining under Section 3 (a) (10), practically nullified the exemption granted
in Section 77B (h) of the Bankruptcy Act since solicitation of deposits typi-
cally precedes approval by a court. The Commission has indicated, however,
that deposits may be solicited without registration where such deposits do no
more than evidence approval of a plan proposed by a reorganization com-
mittee. Thus, in its efforts to mitigate abuses incident to reorganization, the
Commission has attempted to persuade reorganization committees to abdicate
the broad powers which formerly were granted them in deposit agreements by
offering in return exemption from registration for certificates of deposit. These
views of the Commission on the meaning of Section 77B (h) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act are of the utmost importance in guiding reorganization policy and
procedure. The problems involved are complex and significant, and the worth
48. S. E. C. Release No. 312 (Class C) March 15, 1935.
49. S. E. C. Release No. 296 (Class C) Feb. 15, 1935. See also letter of Aug. 24, 1934,
by Chief of the Securities Division of the Federal Trade Commission to Goldw-ater & Flynn,
reported in C. C. H. Stocks and Bonds Law Service, Vol. III, U 2162.05.
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of the interpretations by the Commission in the light of those problems has
been the subject of extensive comment."0
Section 3 (a) (11) exempts "Any security which is a part of an issue sold
only to persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of
such security is a person resident and doing business within, or, if a corporation,
incorporated by and doing business within, such State or Territory". While
it may be true that most such intra-state issues are small and do not offer
serious threat of danger to investors if exeript, that conclusion is by no means
inevitable. The exemption appears to have been motivated by considerations
of constitutional limitations upon federal power rather than by considerations
of financial policy. The Commission, bearing out this view, has held that
Section 3 (a) (11) does not exempt securities 'sold within a State before a
registration statement which has been filed is in effect, if the entire issue is not
to be sold within that State.5 '
In its numerous opinions on the application of Section 3 (a) (11 ) to various
other situations the Commission has shown an appreciation of the realities in-
volved and has striven to give that provision meaning in terms of the entire
policy of the Act. It has been stated that the submission of a plan of reorgan-
ization involving the issuance of certificates of deposit to a resident attorney for
non-resident bondholders was really a submission to the non-resident principals
and therefore the certificates were not exempt. 2  On the other hand, it was
held that the forwarding of an offer of a security addressed to a person within
the State to a point outside would not involve the loss of an exemption other-
wise available to an intra-state issue; the offeror was advised, however, not to
accept a subscription received from such non-resident.5 3 Concerning the exemp-
tion under Section 3 (a) (11) of fractional, undivided interests in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, the Commission pointed out that it would be necessary to
consider carefully the type of interest involved and the applicable definition of
the term "issuer". It was indicated that in the case of many royalty and lease.
hold interests it might be found that the conditions of the exemption could not
be met because two or more issuers of the same interest resided in different
States.y 4
The Commission has ruled that the conditions which must be met to secure
exemption for an intra-state issue relate only to the original issue of securities
and that residents of the one State may later sell their securities outside that
50. Dodd, Reorganization Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What? (1935) 48 HAnV.
L. Rzv. 1100; Dodd, Amending the Securities Act-The American Bar Association Com.
mittee's Proposals (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 199; Spaeth and Friedberg, Early Developments
under Section 77B (1935) 30 Lz. L. R.v. 137; Comment (1934) 34 Co,. L. REv. 1348;
Comment (1936) 45 YA=E L. J. 1050.
51. F. T. C. Release No. 97, Pt. 10, Dec. 28, 1933. At the time this interpretation was
made, the exemption of an intra-state issue was provided for in Section 5(cl of the Act,
The amendments of 1934 placed this exemption in Section 3(a) (11).
52. F. T. C. Release No. 97, Pt. 9, Dec. 28, 1933.
53. F. T. C. Release No. 97, Pt. 12, Dec. 28, 1933.
54. S. E. C. Compilation of Rules, Regulations, Forms and Opinions Applicable to Oil
and Gas Interests, Release No. 435, July 13, 1935. See also C. C. H. Stocks and Bonds
Law Service, Vol. III, 2642B.
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State without violating the Act, if the original conditions are met in substance
as well as form.55 Sales made by an issuer to residents are not exempt under
Section 3 (a) (11), however, if there results further distribution of those
securities in other jurisdictions. Whether the purchasers within the State are
"ultimate investors" is the decisive issue-a complex question of fact which
can be determined only with reference to the particular circumstances of
each case.
The attempt of the Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corporation to secure
exemption under Section 3 (a) (11) furnishes an illustration in point. That
corporation issued $8,000,000 worth of bonds and sold them all to four banking
firms in New York City. Believing this sale within the State of New York satisfied
the requirements for exemption under Section 3 (a) (11), counsel for the issuer
advised their client that the bonds did not require registration under the
Securities Act. After the bonds had been sold to the public, temporary registra-
tion was sought for them on the New York Stock Exchange under the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934. The Commission, believing the Securities Act had
been violated, withheld registration for trading. The issuer thereupon filed
a registration statement for the bonds under the Securities Act. After the
Securities Act had been complied with in this manner, the Commission granted
registration for trading on the New York Stock Exchange and explained the
grounds of its former refusal in a well-documented opinion in which the evidence
was carefully reviewed.56 The Commission found that four months after the
issuance of these bonds $1,198,000 (approximately 15%) of them had found
their way through the hands of underwriters, subunderwriters, and dealers to
non-resident investors. The Commission concluded that the issuer knew that
the four banking firms purchased the bonds as "underwriters" with a view to
distribution, and that since the non-residents purchasing 15% of the bonds and
not the four banking firms were the ultimate investors, the exemption of Section
3 (a) (1l)-relating to an issue sold only to persons resident within a single
State-was not available for these bonds. An opposite interpretation would
have given to the exemption provided in Section 3 (a) (11) an unjustifiably
broad meaning and would have permitted a serious inroad into the effective
scope of the Act.
Section 3 of the Securities Act, which deals with exempted securities, makes
no general provision concerning voting trust certificates, certificates of de-
posit, or "when, as, and if issued" contracts representing exempted securities.
In several opinions the Commission has held that neither voting trust certificates
nor certificates of deposit representing exempt securities are exempt on that
account, since in each case the issuer is some one other than the issuer of the
security expressly exempted and neither the issuer nor the circumstances of
issue have those characteristics upon which the exemption of the underlying
securities was predicated.57 Congress has indicated by the amendments of 1934
that it approves this interpretation by the Commission. 8 Standardized con-
55. F. T. C. Release No. 97, Pt. 11, Dec. 28, 1933.
56. In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S. E. C. 147 (1935).
57. F. T. C. Release No. 86, Dec. 13, 1933; F. T. C. Release No. 97, Pt. 8, De . 28, 1933.
58. While Section 3(2), exempting securities issued by the United States or any State,
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tracts constituting obligations to take certain securities on a "when, as, and
if issued" basis were similarly declared by the Commission to be not exempt
if issued by some one, such as a broker or dealer, other than the issuer of
the exempt securities underlying those contracts; but if the issuer of the
underlying securities also issued certificates for such securities on a "when, as,
and if issued" basis, an exemption available to such securities was declared also
available to the certificates. 9
Section 4 (1) of the Act enumerates transactions which are exempt from
the Act. These are transactions by any person other than an issuer, under-
writer, or dealer, and transactions by a dealer except those within one year
after the security was offered to the public. These exemptions broadly limit
the scope of the Act to regulation over the distribution of securities rather
than trading in them. The second clause of Section 4 (1) exempting "trans-
actions not involving any public offering" appears to be out of place in Section 4,
for it relates to distribution and not trading and the purpose of Congress seems
to have been to exempt the securities so offered rather than the mere transac-
tion of issuance. The Act does not define "public offering" and the doubts
which have arisen have called for numerous expressions of opinion by the
Commission on its meaning.
Although the Act appears restricted to "public offering" of securities 0 and
although the term has been judicially defined upon numerous occasions in
cases under the British Companies Act"' and the Blue Sky Laws of
various states,62 its meaning in the Securities Act is far from certain.
A definition of "public offering" will be useful only to the extent that it
advances the purpose of the exemption which that term delimits. The
reason for the exemption is obvious. In an offering to a small, select group
of associates or investors, particularly in the case of prospective stockholders
of a closed corporation, it may reasonably be assumed that such offerees either
are intimately acquainted with the affairs of the issuer or are in a position to
bargain for adequate disclosure of significant facts. Consequently the pro-
tection of their interests does not require the imposition upon the issuer of the
burden of disclosure incident to registration. Realizing that the purpose for which
the exemption was intended could not be furthered by a simple, clear definition of
"public offering", the Commission has wisely refrained from such an attempt; but
was amended to include certificates of deposit for those securities, no other exemptive pro-
vision of the Act has been similarly amended.
59. See summary of oral statement by Chief of the Securities Division of the Federal
Trade Commission reported in C. C. H. Stocks and Bonds Law Service, Vol. III, 7611.
60. While a close analysis of the Act indicates that all its provisions are not expressly
limited to public offerings, authorities on the Act convey the impression that its provisions
are intended to regulate only offerings to the public. See Douglas and Bates. Some Efcets
of the Federal Securities Act Upon Investment Banking (1933) 1 U. or Cm. L. REV. 283.
61. Nash v. Lynde, [1929] A. C. 158; Sherwell v. Combined Incandescent Mantles
Syndicate, 23 T. L. R. 482 (1907).
62. Robertson v. Business Boosters' Country Club, 210 Ala. 460, 98 So. 272 (1923);
Robertson v. Business Boosters' Country Club, 212 Ala. 621, 103 So. 576 (1925); In re
Leach, 215 Cal. 536, 12 P. (2d) 3 (1932).
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on the contrary has stated that whether or not a particular offering is public is a
complex question of fact, in the determination of which the surrounding cir-
cumstances of each case are relevant. Among the factors to be considered are
the number of offerees and their relationship to each other and to the issuer,
the number of units offered, the size of the offering, and the intent of the offeree
in purchasing, that is, whether for investment or resale.P The Commission has
pointed out that it is the size of the group of persons to whom the offer is open
that is considered important rather than the size of the group to whom the
securities are actually offered or sold, and that a private sale to an underwriter
or dealer for the purpose of resale to the public quite definitely cannot be in.
eluded within the exemption of Section 4 (1)."
Applying these principles, the Commission has stated that an offer to 2,450
employees of the issuer was public and therefore not exemptc and that an offer
addressed to stockholders of an issuer may be a public offer if the number of
stockholders is substantial. 6 Concerning an offer of $1,766,000 of preferred
stock to 25 offerees, the Commission gave no opinion-but merely enunciated
the principles set forth above and left the decision as to the necessity of registra-
tion with the issuer,63 with the prospect of criminal and/or civil liability as the
penalty for a wrong guess.67 While the reluctance of the Commission to commit
itself on an unequivocal definition of "public offering" and its refusal to exempt
offerings to stockholders and employees are not invulnerable to criticism, its
attitude carries out the policy of the Securities Act by insuring that only in
those cases where it is reasonably certain that offerees bargain with an adequate
background of knowledge, which is hardly the case with employees and stock-
holders of large corporations, should the issue be considered to fall within the
exemption of Section 4 (1).Gs
The Commission has further ruled that the exemption granted to "trans-
actions not involving any public offering" is not lost if the issuer subsequently
decides to make a public offering of securities of the same character and files a
registration statement.69 Since the character of a private offering, which is the
basis of the exemption, is not affected by a subsequent public offering, such a
63. S. E. C. Release No. 285, Jan. 24, 1935.
64. S. E. C. Release No. 603 (Class C) Dec. 16, 1935.
65. F. T. C. Release No. 97, Pt. 6, Dec. 28, 1933. It is significant to note that an
amendment to the Act e.pressly exempting offers to employees was rejected on the ground
that such offers were already exempt as not involving a public offering. See C. C. H.
Stocks and Bonds Law Service, Vol. III, U 2203.05.
66. F. T. C. Release No. 97, Pt. 5, Dec. 28, 1933.
67. Whether dvil liabilities under Section 11 will be imposed for fake registration state-
ments filed by an issuer who erroneously believed himself subject to the Act cannot be
answered dearly in the negative. In a somewhat analogous situation the CommL--ion
has ruled that material information given, but not called for in the registration Etatement,
when false, may constitute grounds for the issuance of a stop order. In re Unity Gold
Corp., 18 F. T. C. 649, 653 (1934).
68. See Dodd, Amending the Securities Act-The American Bar Assodation Committees
Proposals (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 199, at 205-203, for a defense of the Commik'on's inter-
pretations relating to public offerings.
69. S. E. C. Release No. 305, March 2, 1935.
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result is entirely consistent both with the previous attitude of the Commission
and the purpose of the exemption.
Section 4 (2) exempts "Brokers' transactions, executed upon customers'
orders on any exchange or in the open or counter market, but not the solicita-
tion of such orders". The Commission has pointed out that even though such
transactions are exempted in general terms, the exemption applies only to the
broker's half. Whether or not his customer is also exempt depends entirely
upon the status of the customer and the type of transaction in which he is
engaged. Where the broker's customer was an issuer which sought some other
exemption for its securities to which they were not entitled, it was stated that
such issuer could not sell through a broker on the stock exchange without
registering those securities. 70 Although this interpretation does not come from
the textual confines of Section 4 (2), the restriction it places upon the literal
meaning of that Section may be justified without difficulty. In general, the
application of the Securities Act is limited to the distribution of securities rather
than trading in them. The purpose of the exemption provided in Section 4 (2)
is to assure an open market for securities in the hands of investors at all times,
even though a stop order may have been entered prohibiting further distribu-
tion, and thus to prevent investors from suffering vicariously for the wrongs
of an issuer. To extend exemption under Section 4 (2) to an issuer distributing
securities through a broker would quite clearly be inconsistent both with the
purpose underlying that Section and with the policy of the entire Act.
STOP ORDERS
Section 8 (a) provides that a registration statement shall become effective 20
days after it has been filed with the Commission. Section 8 (b) authorizes the
Commission, after opportunity for hearing, to refuse to permit a registration
statement to become effective if on its face it is incomplete or inaccurate in any
material respect and if the Commission gives notice of the hearing within 10
days after the filing date. Since the investigation under Section 8 (b) is
restricted to the registration statement itself and must be made hastily, it is
rather under Section 8 (d) that the Commission has acted to protect investors.
Section 8 (d) gives the Commission power, after opportunity for hearing, to
issue a stop order at any time suspending the effectiveness of a registration
statement if it appears to the Commission "that the registration statement in.
dudes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading". The Commission has issued numerous stop orders under
Section 8 (d), 71 and in the well-documented decisions accompanying many of
those orders it has been able to articulate its views as to the meaning of that
subsection. At the outset it is to be noted that under the Securities Act the
70. F. T. C. Release No. 131, March 13, 1934.
71. As of April 1, 1936, 102 such orders had been issued, of which 75 were still in effect.
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Commission is merely an office for the registry of information about securitiesY
Its function under Section 8 is limited to an investigation of the truth and
completeness of information contained in registration statements. The Com-
mission may go no further. It may not refuse or suspend registration because
it considers a security speculative or inequitable, a power granted to administra-
tive agencies under the Blue Sky Laws of many of the States.7 3
One problem which has arisen under Section 8 (d) is the time in reference
to which the truth of any statement at issue is to be tested. In view of the
requirement of Section 11 (a), which sets forth the time when the registration
statement became effective as the criterion for civil liability for a false state-
ment, the Commission has determined that it is without power to issue a stop
order if it finds that a statement reflected the truth as of the time the registra-
tion statement became effective, even though subsequent changes in the condi-
tion of the issuer render such statement no longer true. 4
A more difficult question-the crucial question under Section 8 (d)-is what
is a material fact the false statement or omission of which furnishes grounds
for the issuance of a stop order. The misrepresentation of a fact and its ma-
teriality, which latter point was closely related to reliance by plaintiff, are
elements of the common law action of deceitY7 The Commission's treatment
of "material fact" in its decisions on the issuance of stop orders is reminiscent
of those actions in deceit, for although reliance is not an element of the civil
remedies provided in the Act, the Commission has defined a material fact as
"a fact which if it had been correctly stated or disclosed would have deterred or
tended to deter the average prudent investor from purchasing the securities
in question".7 6 That definition adds but little substance to the term "material
fact". As in the case of "reasonable man", "preponderance of evidence", or
"proximate cause", any attempt at further definition is likely to be merely the
repetition of verbal formulas. A "material fact"--in the abstract without
reference to a specific case-is a material fact. Whether a certain fact is
"material" in particular circumstances is a matter of judgment which involves a
consideration of the numerous problems sought to be solved by regulation of the
securities market. A comprehensive definition of "material fact" would be an
72. "The public should thoroughly understand that the Commission is not authorized
to pass in any sense upon the value or soundness of any security. Its sole function is to
see that full and accurate information as to the security is made available to purchasers
and the public, and that no fraud is practiced in connection with the sale of the security."
F. T. C. Release No. 1, May 27, 1933.
73. CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) art. 3814, § 4; 2 MlcEM ComnP. I-,ws (1929) § 9780;
NEB. Coin. STAT. (1929) 81-5408; Wis. Laws 1933, c. 158, § 189.07.
74. In re Howard, 18 F. T. C. 626 (1934). Sections 12 and 17 of the Act, however,
provide a remedy in such situation.
75. For a concise summary of the elements of the action of deceit, see Shulman. Civil
Liabiity and the Secwities Act (1933) 43 YAr= L. J. 227.
76. In re Howard, 18 F. T. C. 626, 629 (1934). Two English cases adopting that
definition in reference to the British Companies Act were relied upon by the Commzion:
Smith v. Chadwick, 9 App. Cas. 187 (1883); Broome v. Speak, [1903] 1 Ch. 5S6, aWd,
[1904] A. C. 342.
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illusion. Its meaning may best be gathered from a study of its application to
diverse situations.
Several difficulties must first be considered. The materiality of deficiencies
alleged by the Commission is seldom questioned by issuers and as a result
the Commission in its decisions on stop orders considers whether statements
are false or their omission misleading without discussing materiality as such."
A further difficulty is that since many of the decisions consider as many as
six or more material deficiencies in registration statements, the true ratio de-
cidendi of any particular decision is often undeterminable.
In the application of the concept of "material fact" in the decisions on the
issuance of stop orders, the first question to be considered is what is a fact,
Literally and in the orthodox action in deceit a statement of fact is a statement
of existing relationships whose truth can be tested objectively. An opinion,
promise, or prophecy is not a fact, and in theory does not fall within the pur-
view of Section 8 (d); but, just as in the action of deceit, or a suit to cancel
a contract of purchase for fraud, 78 the concept of fact has been extended to
cover these statements of less objective realities. In one decision the Com.
mission regarded a prophecy that cash would be distributed to depositing bond-
holders, known to be untrue as of the time it was made, as an untrue statement
of fact since it misstated the mind of the person making the prophecy. 0 A
statement in a registration statement that profits of $250,000 were contemplated
frorm a contract for the sale of gravel was held a false statement of fact where
the issuer was bound to know that the contract was impossible of performance
and that such expectation of profits was fantastic.80
The decisions of the Commission on the issuance of stop orders dealing with
facts fall into three categories: those dealing with (1) the false statement of a
material fact, (2) a statement misleading because of the omission of a material
fact, and (3) a statement misleading because of the manner in which material
facts are stated.
. The decisions on untrue statements of material facts are numerous. Over-
valuation of assets and flagrant departure from the standards of appraisal
purported to have been followed have been held within that category. 81 Other
statements held to be false statements of material facts were an engineer's
report of value based upon a romantic, unfounded hope,82 a statement that an
issuer was engaged in the business of manufacturing mechanical devices when
77. See, e. g., In re American Gyro Co., 1 S. E. C. 83 (1935); In re Big Wedge Gold
Mining Co., 1 S. E. C. 98 (1935).
78. California Credit and Collection Corp. v. Goodwin, 76 Cal. App. 785, 246 Pac. 121
(1926) (representation that plan would be located in certain county held representation of a
material fact); H. W. Smith, Inc. v. Swenson, 105 Cal. App. 60, 286 Pac. 1050 (1930)
(representation of future dividends held one of fact) ; Buhler v. Loftus, 53 Mont. 546, 169
Pac. 601 (1917) (statement that company would start business in two months held a
material fact).
79. In re Commonwealth Bond Corp., 18 F. T. C. 635, 648 (1934).
80. In re Brandy-Wine Brewing Co., 1 S. E. C. 123 (1935).
,8L In re Haddam Distillers Corp., 1 S. E. C. 37 (1934) ; In re Continental Distilleva and
Importers Corp., 1 S. E. C. 54 (1935).
82. In re Plymouth Consolidated Gold Mines, Ltd., 1 S. E. C. 139 (1935).
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substantially all of its business was printing,8 3 and a statement that stock was
not to be sold but was to be given away, when actually such stock was assessable
for the purpose of financing.8 4
The decisions on the issuance of stop orders contain abundant instances of
the Commission's judgment as to what are omissions to state a material fact
required to make a registration statement not misleading. The following
omissions, among others, were found to fall within that category: neglect of an
engineer to state that some of the shafts he included in his report on the ap-
praisal of mining property were filled with water,8 5 failure of the president of
an issuer to state that he had owned a lease and option which he sold to the
issuer,8 5 omission to state that a rival committee was soliciting deposits of
securities,86 and failure to record that the regulatory bodies of three states had
denied the issuer permission to sell securities.8 7 The last three statements had
been omitted from registration statements notwithstanding the fact that ques-
tions in the registration forms expressly called for such information.
A third category into which the deficiencies warranting the issuance of stop
orders have fallen, a category not expressly provided for in Section 8 (d), is
the most interesting. It is not the false statement of a material fact nor a
material omission which renders a registration statement misleading, but simply
a statement which, while literally true, conveys a false impression because of
the manner of its expression. While specific legislative warrant for the issuance
of a stop order because of a veiled truth conveying a misleading impression may
not be found in Section 8 (d), legalistic indeed would be a judge who held that
false statements alone, and not false impressions, justify the issuance of a stop
order. Under the flexible concept of false or misleading impression, the Com-
mission has become more than simply an office for the registration of complete
information about securities and has issued stop orders suspending the effective
registration of securities which it would probably bar as "unsound" or "specu-
lative" if it had that power. When disclosure of information about such
securities becomes complete and frank by amendment, however, the Commission
may no longer withhold registration; but such disclosure may reasonably be
expected to dampen considerably the public ardor to buy.
The registration statements which the Commission has found to convey false
impressions reflect a high degree of ingenuity. In a plan of investment for
school teachers, the bonds offered contained the figures "$1,000" prominently
displayed and underneath in fine type the statement "(Consisting of $750 cash
and $250 stock)". The Commission found that statement misleading in view
of the fact that the stock valued at $250 had been sold to the promoters at
$.50 and was carried on the balance sheet at that same low figure88 In another
83. In re American Gyro Co, 1 S. E. C. 83 (1935).
84. In re Gold Producers, Inc., 18 F. T. C. 619 (1933); In re Sierra Nevada, Ltd., F.
T. C. Release No. 140, March 24, 1934.
85. In re Franco Mlining Corp., S. E. C. Release No. 650, Feb. S, 1936.
86. In re Howard, 18 F. T. C. 626 (1934).
87. In re American Gyro Co., 1 S. E. C. 83, 92 (1935). See also In re The Trinity
Corp., F. T. C. Release No. 72, Nov. 10, 1933.
88. In re National Educators Mutual Ass'n, Inc., 1 S. E. C. 203 (193S).
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case, the Commission held that the characterization of a man without scientific
training, who used a fantastic vibrator to find and value gold, as a "world re-
nowned geologist" was most misleading.89 In a chain scheme of investment
where every investor was to put in one dollar and persuade four others to in-
vest the same amount, and those four each to persuade four more, and so on,
it was stated that if this process were carried to the sixth stage, each original
investor would receive $729. The Commission issued a stop order, holding the
hope of realization visionary and the whole scheme misleading.00 A "stock-
holders' protective plan" in a speculative oil venture provided that out of
every $100 contributed, $70 would be invested in oil and $30 in a trust fund
consisting of safe bonds. In twenty years that $30 would have increased
to $100 and the stockholder was given the option to turn in his stock at that
time and get back his original investment. The Commission held it mislead-
ing to characterize the plan as safe since the investor himself could invest his
money in those proportions and at the end of twenty years he would have
both stock and bondsY' In another decision in which a stop order was issued,
a report on the geology of mining property which contained such statements as:
"Massive tufaceous andesitic and ryolitic of various thickness also form a part
of the Devonian formation", was characterized by the Commission as unin-
telligible and abounding in "meaningless, high sounding, pseudo-scientific
phrases designed principally to impress the uninformed."0 2
It may be gathered from the above examples that "material untruth",
"material omission", and "statement misleading in a material respect" quite
successfully defy close definition. When a statement has been required in the
registration form promulgated by the Commission for that particular type of
security, its omission may prima facie be considered material. As for untruths,
misleading statements, and omissions of parts of statements required in the
forms, their materiality depends not on whether they would tend to mislead an
ordinarily prudent investor, a test impossible of application, but rather on
whether the issuer's disclosures have come up to the standard of frankness and
completeness which the Commission and the courts think the Act demands.
That determination is quite different from discovering the subjective rationaliza-
tion of a non-existent average prudent investor and encompasses more signifi-
cant considerations. As compared to the traditions underlying the flotation of
securities prior to the Act, the standard of honesty and fullness of disclosure
which the Commission has found in the Act is very high. It is doubtful, how-
ever, that the courts will find that the Commission has misinterpreted the Act.
In many cases in which stop orders were issued the issuer has agreed with the
Commission and consented to the entering of the order, 3 and in practically all
89. In re La Luz Mining Corp., S. E. C. Release No. 518, Oct. 11, 1935.
90. In re Wee Investors Royalty Co., 1 S. E. C. 202 (1935).
91. In re Oil Ridge Oil and Refining Co., S. E. C. Release No. 522, Oct. 15, 1935.
92. In re Franco Mining Corp., S. E. C. Release No. 650, Feb. 5, 1936. The Commission
indicated its disapproval of the language used, but pointed out that a proper objection could
not be made to a report simply because it makes use of technical terms.
93. See, e. g., In re Continental Distillers and Importers Corp., 1 S. E. C. 54 (1935);
In re General Income Shares, Inc., 1 S. E. C. 110 (1935) ; In re National Educators Mutual
Ass'n, Inc., 1 S. E. C. 208 (1935).
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of them the decisions have been so well documented and fortified with evidence
on numerous "material" deficiencies that one is convinced that the necessity
for protection to investors far outweighs the claim of the particular issuers to
unhampered access to the capital market.
CIVIL LIABILIIES
Section 11 of the Act imposing civil liabilities for false registration state-
ments goes far beyond the common law action in deceit to give investors an
effective remedy, but its primary function is to furnish an incentive for full
and frank disclosure by issuers. The provisions of this Section are quite com-
plex and have been the subject of extensive comment,M but as yet have not
been authoritatively passed upon by any court in a suit for damages.P3
While the interpretation of this Section is exclusively for the courts in which
civil suits are brought, the Commission has expressed several informal opinions
as to what it thinks various provisions mean. Two opinions in particular are
of interest even though now moot since Congress, to clarify latent ambiguities,
incorporated both into the Act by the amendments of 1934. The first opinion
-was to the effect that it was very unlikely that an underwriter's liability would
ever exceed the aggregate amount at which securities were offered to the
public.9 6 Section 11 (e), as amended, now provides: "In no event shall any
underwriter... be liable in any suit.., for damages in excess of the total price
at which the securities were offered to the public". The second opinion stated
that a person suing under Section 11 (e) in cases where he had sold his securi-
ties at a price in excess of the offering price could recover no damagesYG That
result, although highly desirable, was far from clear from Section 11 prior to
the amendments of 1934, and the Commission encountered some difficulty in
reaching it under the terms of the Act. The Amendments obviated that diffi-
culty by providing that in subtracting selling price or value from purchase
price to measure damages, the purchase price shall not exceed the value at
-which the security was offered to the public.
CONCLUSION
The Commission's interpretations of Sections of the Securities Act are tenta-
tive. They are subject to review by the courts, whose function it is to determine,
in proper cases, what the law is. Whether these courts will invoke strict,
orthodox canons of interpretation to construe the legislative text as it is
94. Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act (1933) 43 Y=u.n L. J. 227; Comment
(1934) 34 CoL. L. Rv. 1090; Comment (1933) 19 ST. Louis L. Rsv. 76; Comment (1935)
44 YA=E L. 3. 456.
95. At least one suit has been instituted, however, in the attempt to ascert the civil
remedies provided in Section 11. Sixteen stockholders of the Continental Distillers and
Importers Corp. brought suits in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia against
the corporation and five of its officers to recover the amount of their stock investments,
alleging that provisions of the registration statement are false. N. Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1936,
at 21, coL 6.
96. F. T. C. Release No. 45, Sept. 22, 1933.
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written or will affirm the interpretations of the Commission framed in the
light of the broad policy of adequate control over access to the securities
market is a question which must await future decisions for definite answer. In
the larger sense, whether the construction of the Act by the Commission has
been statesmanlike and effective for the solution of the problems to be met will
never be answered with any degree of certainty; for, not only are clear criteria
for objective appraisal of the work of the Commission lacking, but it must be
recognized that statutory interpretation is only a small segment of the Com-
mission's broad task and its success or failure in that particular field cannot
easily be segregated from its other functions of administration.
PROGRESS IN INTERSTATE ADJUSTMENT OF THE PLACE
OF TRIAL OF CIVIL ACTIONS: I
THE common law distinguishes traditionally between jurisdiction and venue.
Jurisdiction is said to be based on physical power over person or property.,
Venue, on the other hand, concerns the doctrines determining whether a court
which has the requisite jurisdiction is an appropriate place for trial. Originally
all actions were local and had to be tried where the issuable facts occurred.
As a result of this dual doctrine of local venue and of jurisdiction depending
solely on physical power, the plaintiff often found that the only court which
had jurisdiction had to dismiss his action because of improper venue, while
the only court with proper venue lacked jurisdiction.2  This paradox was early
resolved to a large extent by making the great majority of actions transitory
and triable in any court with jurisdiction over the defendant or his property,
the venue requirement in such cases becoming a mere formality.3 But even
within the category of transitory actions, application of the physical power
concept frequently led to inequitable results: it sometimes favored an elusive
defendant, by unduly impeding the prosecution of meritorious claims, and at
other times afforded the plaintiff an unreasonably wide choice of forums, with a
consequent opportunity to inconvenience the defendant and hamper a fair
presentation of the latter's case.
4
N. B. Many phases of the problem of determining the state of forum of civil actions
have been quite adequately discussed hitherto as more or less isolated issues. The purpose
here is to delineate the problem as a whole and simply to observe the progresM that has
been made towaerd its solution.
1. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 91 (1917); Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions
(1929) 23 ILL. L. REv. 427; Comment (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 415.
2. Livingston v: Jefferson, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,411, p. 660 (C. C. Va. 1811).
3. See Scorr, FUNDAENTALS OF PROCEDURE IN ActiONS AT LAW (1922) c. 1; Kuhn,
Local and Transitory Actions in Private International Law (1918) 66 U. oF PA. L. Rtv.
301; Storke, The Venue of Actions of Trespass to Land (1921) 27 W. VA. L. Q. 301; Wlclcr,
Development of the Distinction between Local and Transitory Actions (1926) 4 TNuN. L.
Rxv. 55. The principle local action remaining is trespass to land. Doherty v. Catskill
Cement Co., 72 N. '. L. 315, 65 Atl. 508 (1905); Brit. So. Africa Co. v. Companhia de
Moqambique, [1893] A. C. 602. Contra: Little v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 69 Minn,
48, 67 N. W. 846 (1896).
4. For an excellent analysis of the problem see Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions
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As a result of the increasing necessity for enlarging the number of forums
available to the plaintiff, while at the same time maintaining such restrictions
on his choice as not unduly to burden the defendant, both courts and legislatures
have been compelled to create distinctions inexplicable in terms of the old dogma.
This subservience of logic to practical considerations precludes an approach to
the problem of interstate adjustment of the place of trial on a purely theoretical
plane. An adequate appreciation of the progress that has been made toward
its solution demands rather an analysis of the practical devices which have been
developed in order to control the determination of the state of forum, the
effectiveness of such devices, and the extent to which they have been utilized.
The function of the legislatures in this process has been largely the broadening
of the plaintiff's choice of forums through the introduction of new methods of
acquiring jurisdiction, while the courts have construed the constitutional limita-
tions applicable to these statutes in such manner as to realize their maximum
potentialities when an extension of the plaintiff's choice of forums seemed
desirable, and to circumvent or nullify them when due regard for the defendant's
interests militated against such a result. The leading r8Ie in this judicial prac-
tice has been played by the "due process of law" formula, recently complemented
by the introduction of the formula of "undue burden on interstate commerce, '*
while additional flexibility has been attained by the development of such non-
constitutional devices as the injunction and the courts' discretionary powers.
The constitutional devices can be discussed most conveniently according to
the type of personality of the defendant-whether individual, partnership,
unincorporated association, or corporation-at least where the action is based
on jurisdiction over the defendant's person rather than his property.0 Although
thus far the commerce clause has been applied in this connection only to
corporations, the due process formula is applied throughout, but with varying
results, dependent largely upon the nature of the defendant.
AcTIONs AGAINST INDIVIMUALS
Jurisdiction Based on Domicil. At an early date the plaintiff's choice of
forums was widened by statutes permitting substituted service at the defendant's
domicil or, frequently, personal service on the defendant without the state,
where the defendant was domiciled in the state, but temporarily resident
(1930) 43 HAvm. L. R y. 1217; Place of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods
of Adjustment (1930) 44 id. 41.
5. Also involved in the process of adjustment are the equal protection, privileges and
immunities, and full faith and credit clauses.
6. Of the three prerequisites of a valid decree or judgment-jurisdiction over the person
or property, jurisdiction over the subject matter, and venue--the first has provided by far
the greatest degree of flexibility. The question of jurisdiction over the subject matter seldom
arises in state courts of general jurisdiction. And venue is of value as an interstate adjuster
only in the occasional action which is of such doubtful character that it may be held either
local or transitory as the equities of the particular case demand. Stone v. United States,
167 U. S. 178 (1897) (action to recover value of timber taken from public lands held transi-
tory, not trespass to land); Ariz. Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 236
Mass. 185, 128 N. E. 4 (1920) (conversion of ore, traditionally transitory action, held local).
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elsewhere. Since domicil as a basis of jurisdiction is a continental con-
cept entirely foreign to the common law,7 the constitutionality of such
statutes under the due process clause cannot be definitely assured in the
absence of a Supreme Court ruling. The only case in point ever to come
before the Court may be said to approve such statutes only by negative impli-
cation,8 but the weight of authority in other courts is clearly in favor of their
validity.9 Even though domicil be recognized as a proper basis of jurisdiction,
however, due process of law further requires that the defendant receive the
best possible notice and opportunity to defend under the circumstances.
10
Therefore, a defendant who can be found physically present within the juris-
diction must be personally served; but if he is domiciled in the state and cannot
be found therein, the due process requirement is satisfied by substituted service
at his domicil or by personal service without the state or possibly even by
publication.'1 While reasonable notice alone is never a substitute for juris-
diction, jurisdiction in such cases is no longer predicated on physical power,
but on domicil.12
Nonresident Motorist Statutes. The problem presented by the transient
motorist who frequently leaves the locus delicti before he can be served with
process has produced a new type of legislation.' 8 As a result of a series of
Supreme Court decisions upholding increasingly liberal nonresident motorist
statutes it is now settled that a state may provide that every nonresident
motorist, upon arrival in the state, shall be deemed automatically to have
appointed a definite state official his agent to receive service of process in
connection with all actions arising out of his use of the state roads; 14 but here
7. It is the basis of the civil law doctrine actor sequitur forum res. See Pcrroud, Principes
de Comnpitence pour les Procs entre Etrangers (1927) 54 JouR. Du DR. INT'. $61; Pillet,
Jurisdiction in Actions between Foreigners (1905) 18 HARe. L REv. 325. But the civil law,
like the common law, has developed numerous exceptions. See Lorenzen, French Rules of
Conflict of Laws (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 731, 742-747; WEiss, MANuEn DE Dnorr INTERNATIO4AL
PRavi (9th ed. 1925) 660 et seq.
8. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 (1917).
9. Douglas v. Forrest,,4 Bing. 686 (C. P. 1828); Continental Nat. Bank of Boston v.
Thurber, 74 Hun 632, 26 N. Y. Supp. 956 (Sup. Ct. 1893); In re Hendrickson, 40 S. D.
211, 167 N. W. 172 (1918); RESTATE ;T, CoNFricr or LAWs (1934) §§ 47(lb), 79, here-
after referred to as RESTATEMENT; see Knowles v. Gaslight & Coke Co., 19 Wall, 58, 61
(U. S. 1873); Grover & Baker Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 287, 297 (1890). But cf.
Raher v. Raher, 150 Iowa 511, 129 N. W. 494 (1911), 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 292 (1912).
See Comments (1911) 11 COL. L. Rgv. 352; (1917) 26 YALE L. 1. 492; Notes (1901) 50
L. R. A. 577, 585; L. R. A. 1917C, 1143.
10. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 (1917).
11. Service by publication has been upheld. Henderson v. Staniford, 105 Mass. 504
(1870); Martin v. Burns, 80 Tex. 676, 16 S. W. 1072 (1891); see note 57, Infra; see Note
(1912) 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 292, 294. Contra: De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, 112
Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345 (1896).
12. Cf. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 (1932) (jurisdiction of federal court
based on allegiance).
13. See Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists (1934) 32 Mien. L. REV.
325; Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists (1926) 39 HAv. L. R-v. $63; Comment
(1928) 14 ST. Lou-s L. REv. 62.
14. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610 (1915); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160
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again the requirements of due process must be satisfied by a provision in the
statute for adequate notice to the defendant., Such statutes are now general,
and they offer the plaintiff a material advantage even -where the defendant
has no property in the state on which execution can be levied, for an action
can be brought on the judgment in the state of the defendant's residence, under
the full faith and credit clause, without the necessity of transportation of the
witnesses who are required in the original action. The courts, moreover, in
construing these statutes, have rendered them available to the nonresident plain-
tiff as well as the resident,' 6 even where he and the defendant are residents
of the same state 7 although they have stopped short generally at construing
the word "operate" in the statutes as applicable to acts of servants or employees
of the defendant owner, unless the statute plainly requires such application?8
Jwisdiction over Nonresident Individuals Doing Business in the State. In
the recent case of Henry L. Doherty and Company v. Goodman,'0 the Supreme
Court extended the doctrine of the nonresident motorist cases to the realm of
economic activity, upholding an Iowa judgment of damages for an illegal sale
of stock obtained against an individual who was a resident of New York trading
in corporate securities in Iowa, solely through agents, under the name of Henry
L. Doherty and Company. Although the defendant, in compliance with the local
"Blue Sky Law,'"20 had registered and filed a written consent to service of
process upon the Secretary of State as his agent, service was had upon the
agent in charge of the defendant's business in the state under an old general
statute providing for service upon an agent or clerk of any "corporation, com-
pany or individual" having "an office or agency in any county other than that
in which the principal resides ... in all actions growing out of or connected
with the business of that office or agency."2'
(1916), noted in (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 422; Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927). See
Meleski, Case di Hess v. Pawlowski (1927) 7 B. U. L. R v. 243.
15. Actual notice, moreover, will not cure the absence of such a provision. Wucbter
v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 57 A. L. R. 1239 (1928); see Comment (1936) 22 VA. L. REv.
477. But service is not invalidated by the defendant's refusal to sign a receipt required by
the statute. Creadick v. Keeler, 35 Del. 169, 160 At. 909 (Super. Ct. 1932). And there
need be no provision for notice in those statutes requiring an express appointment of a process
agent. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916); see Wuchter v. Pizzutti, supra, at 19.
16. Garon v. Poirier, 86 N. H. 174, 164 AU. 765 (1933).
17. State ex rel. Rush v. Circuit Ct., 209 Wis. 246, 244 N. W. 766 (1932).
18. Morrow v. Asher, 55 F. (2d) 365 (N. D. Tex. 1932); cf. Young v. Potter Title &
Trust Co., 114 N. J. L. 561, 178 AUt. 177 (Sup. Ct. 1935), noted in (1935) 49 HVny. L. REv.
145 (statute inapplicable to foreign executor of nonresident motorist killed in accident); see
Comment (1930) 78 U. or PA. L. REv. 771; (1932) 80 id. 909. But there would seem
to be no constitutional objection to a different construction. Poti v. New Eng. Road Macwy
Co., 83 N. H. 232, 140 Atl. 587 (1928) ; cf. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623 (1935).
The driver's being engaged in interstate commerce does not save him from substituted service.
Sweet v. Miller, 147 Misc. 806, 264 N. Y. Supp. 565 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
19. 294 U. S. 623 (1935), noted in (1935) 48 HAv. L. Rnv. 1433, (1935) 33 Mci.m L.
REv. 963, (1935) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. RLv. 113, (1935) 83 U. or PA. L. Rsv. 921. The case I
hereafter referred to as the Goodman case.
20. IowA CODE (1935) § 8581-c9.
21. Id. § 11,079. It is doubtful whether a statute would be upheld which subjected
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The decision was not unheralded, for similar broad statutes exist in at least
eight states22 and they have given rise to like decisions in the state courts,s2
notwithstanding the contention sometimes made that they pertain only to venue
within the state and are not jurisdictional in aspect. But the implications of
the case are not clear. The Supreme. Court, in Flexner v. Farson,24 had denied
the validity, under the due process clause, of a judgment obtained against non-
residents who were doing business in the state as partners, where service was
had upon their agent under a Kentucky statute. That case was distinguished
in the Goodman case upon the ground that the person served in the former
case was no longer the defendants' agent. The latter fact, however, was buried
in the pleadings of the Flexner case; the decision there was based squarely upon
the state's disability, under the privileges and immunities clause, entirely to
exclude nonresident partners and hence to condition their admission upon their
consenting to substituted service upon an agent. Consequently, the Flexner
case appears to have been effectively overruled, and, although Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds, in the Goodman opinion, carefully warned against the decision's
being extended beyond the circumstances of the particular case, there would
seem to be no logical obstacle to an expansion of its doctrine to cover any
sort of business conducted by a nonresident in the state.
25
Yet, logic here, as in other phases of the problem of interstate adjustment,
is apt to be subordinated to practical considerations of reasonableness, ,and if
it is deemed desirable not to extend the decision of the Goodman case beyond
its facts, it can be distinguished simply on the ground of the peculiar nature
of the securities business, a factor which the opinion stressed despite the fact
that service was had upon the defendant's managing agent under the general
statute and not upon the Secretary of State under the "Blue Sky Law." 20 Even
nonresident individuals doing business in the state to suit on causes of action arising In
other states, although the logic of such a distinction is questionable. See notes 44, 67, infra.
22. See CuIp, Process in Actions against Non-Residents Doing Business within a State
(1934) 32 MIcH. L. REV. 909; Daum, The Transaction of Business within a State by a Non.
Resident as a Foundation for Jurisdiction (1934) 19 IowA L. Rv. 421, 422, n. 5; Barry,
Jurisdiction over Non-Residents (1927) 13 VA. L. Rav. 175; Home, Advantages of a Non.
Resident Conducting an Unincorporated Business in Illinois (1919) 14 ILL. L. Ray. 189;
Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Business within a State (1919) 32 HAIv. L. Rv,
871.
23. Davidson v. Doherty & Co., 214 Iowa 739, 241 N. W. 700 (1932), 91 A. L. R. 1327
(1934) (four judges dissenting), noted in (1932) 46 HARv. L. Rav. 153; Stoner v. Higgin-
son & Co., 316 Pa. 481, 175 Ati. 527 (1934), noted in (1935) 83 U. oF PA. L. Ray. 683 (non.
resident partners); see Comments (1935) 1 IowA B. Rav. 53; (1933) 18 IowA L. REV. 257;
(1932) 18 VA. L. REv. 896.
24. 248 U. S. 289 (1919).
25. See RESTATEmENT § 84. The English practice allows service, by leave of the court,
on a local agent of a nonresident principal, with respect to actions arising out of con-
tracts made by such agent within the jurisdiction, notice being sent to the principal abroad
by prepaid registered letter. AsuAL. PRAcrcic, R LES OF ThE SUPR E COURT (1935)
Order 9, r. 8a; cf. Order 11, r. 1; see DxcaY, CoN'ucr OF LAWS (15th ed. 1932) 233; Sun.
derland, The Problem of Jurisdiction (1926) 4 Tax. L. Rav. 429; Keasbey, Jurisdiction over
Non-Residents in Personal Actions (1905) 5 COL. L. RaV. 436.
26. The special nature of the defendant's business, however, was not discussed by the
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so limited, however, the rule of the Goodman case would seem applicable at
least to any business similarly amenable to the state's extensive regulatory
powers27
ACTIONS AGAINST JOINT DEBTORS AND PARTNERS
The physical power concept left the plaintiff completely helpless in the case
of defendants who were liable only jointly, when one or more were outside the
jurisdiction.2 And his burden was not alleviated when the joint debtors were
partners, at least prior to the Goodman case, for, by the great weight of authority,
a partnership was not regarded at common law as an entity suable in the firm
name,29 nor, under the rule in Flexner v. Farson,30 could a valid personal
judgment be obtained against the absent partners individually by service on
their local agent without their consent, even though they were doing business
Iowa court, either in its opinion in Goodman v. Doherty & Co., 218 Iowa 529, 255 N. W.
667 (1934), or in its opinion in the earlier case of Davidson v. Doherty & Co, 214 Iowa 739,
241 N. W. 700 (1932), from which the Supreme Court liberally quoted in the Goodman
case. Furthermore, since there was apparently never any attempt to apply the second
statute, it is problematical whether it was mentioned by the Supreme Court merely to re-
inforce its point of Iowa's treatment of the securities business as exceptional or whether in
some future case the court will grasp upon this additional fact to distinguish the Goodman
case, as in the Goodman case itself it resorted to an obscure pleading in order to distinguizh
the indistinguishable Flexner case.
27. Cf. La Tourette v. MIaster, 248 U. S. 465 (1919) (insurance agents); Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934) (milk business).
28. See Note (1901) 50 L. R. A. 577, 595. If the absent debtor or debtors, however,
were domiciled in the state, there would seem to be no objection to proceeding to a joint
judgment, even though jurisdiction as to some would be based on physical presence and as
to others on domicile, for there would, nevertheless, be personal jurisdiction over all. Cf.
Martin v. Burns, 80 Teax. 676, 16 S. W. 1072 (1891).
29. Dunham v. Shindier & Co., 17 Ore. 256, 20 Pac. 326 (1889). Contra: Johnston v.
Mathews, 32 Md. 363 (1869); Walsh v. Kirby, 228 Pa. 194, 77 Atl. 452 (1910). Although
these latter cases preceded Flexner v. Far-on, 248 U. S. 289 (1919), cited note 30, irfra,
they are not necessarily in conflict, since they involve judgments good only against the
firm assets and not against the partners individually who were not served. See note 35,
infra. It has also been held that any defect by reason of the action's being brought against
the firm is waived by a defense on the merits. Anglo-American Packing & Prov. Co. v.
Turner Casing Co., 34 Kan. 340, 8 Pac. 403 (1885). And one partner may have authority
to employ an attorney to enter an appearance for his copartners. Henck v. Barnes, 84 Hun
546, 32 N. Y. Supp. 840 (Sup. Ct. 1895). But cf. Hall v. Lanning, 91 U. S. 160, 166 (1875).
Such an attorney may confess judgment against the firm. Lahey v. Kingon, 13 Abb. Pr.
192 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1861). But cf. Dixonville Deposit Bank v. Marshall Federal Bakery, 102
Pa. Super. 308, 156 Atl. 629 (1931). A confession of judgment by one partner in advance
of suit binds only his individual property and his interest in the firm as-sets. Uzuaroas
PATN-Rusmr Acr § 9 (3); VanScoten v. Botsford & Kunes, 98 Pa. Super. 270 (1930);
see Hall v. Lanning, supra, at 170. But cf. Walsh v. Kirby, supra.
30. 248 U. S. 289 (1919); Conville v. Dun & Co., 153 La. 1078, 97 So. 197 (1923) (al-
though a partnership is a distinct entity in the civil law). Contra: Stoner v. Hlgginson &
Co., 316 Pa. 481, 175 AUt. 527 (1934), noted in (1935) 83 U. or PA. L. REv. 633. See Hol-
doegel, Jurisdiction over Partnerships, Non-Partnership Associations, and Joint Debtars
(1926) 11 IowA L. Rxv. 193; Magruder & Foster, Jurisdiction over Partr.erships (1924) 37
HA~v. L. Rav. 793.
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in the state. The plaintiff's only remedy at common law was outlawry of the
absent or absconding debtor, but this drastic procedure was never adopted in
the colonies. Instead several statutory remedies were created. Some states
adopted the simple expedient of declaring that all joint obligations should be
deemed joint and several for purposes of suit, thus allowing an action to be
brought for the full amount of the claim against the debtor or debtors over
whom jurisdiction can be obtained.81 Others passed joint debtor acts, under
which a joint judgment may be secured by service upon the debtor or debtors
within the state, execution being necessarily limited, however, in conformity
with the due process clause, to the joint property of the defendants and the
separate property of the debtor or debtors served.8 2
These statutes are generally held to include partnership obligations, some
providing so expressly. A third type of statute, however, created specifically
to meet the partnership problem, subjects partnerships doing business in the
state to suits in the firm name with respect to causes of action arising out of
such business, and limits execution on judgments so obtained to the assets of
the firm and of any individual partner or partners served.8 3 This type of
statute is thus quite similar to the joint debtor type in results,84 but the former
offers partnership creditors several advantages over the latter. 86 The most
important is that the partnership acts permit a judgment against the firm, so
long as the cause of action has arisen out of business done by it in the state,
even when all the partners are nonresident, through service on a local agent80
whereas the joint debtor acts require service on at least one of the individual
defendants. Moreover, although there is some question of the possibility of
levying against the joint property, under the joint debtor acts, in an action
on the original judgment in another jurisdiction, 7 a judgment rendered against
31. RowiLL, MODER LAW OF PARTNI.s= (1916) §§ 495, 496.
32. Blessing v. McLinden, 81 N. J. L. 379, 79 At]. 347 (1911).
33. RESTATEmENT § 86 (1). For lists of statutes, see 1 BE=, CoNm_cr or LAWS (1935)
§ 86.1; WAmuxR, COROA= ADVANTAGES WIMrouT INCORPORAT7ON (1929) bk. 1, c. 3. Some
statutes limit execution only to fi'm assets; and the partnership statutes are generally not
limited to contract actions, as are the joint debtor acts.
34. Both types of statutes are valid so far as they bind the defendant or defendants
served. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 U. S. 277 (1886). And they are invalid to the extent that
they purport to bind individually joint debtors or partners not served. D'Arcy v. Ketchum,
11 How. 165 (U. S. 18505.
35. The~e might be a due process objection to depriving a nonresident joint debtor of his
undivided interest in the joint property. See Tay v. Hawley, 39 Cal, 93, 96 (1870); cf.
Mason v. Denison, 15 Wend. 64, 67 (N. Y. Ct. Err. 1835); see FREEMaN, JunoEmxs (4th
ed. 1892) § 120a. But cf. Brooks v. McIntyre, 4 Mich. 316 (1856). But the objection to
holding the firm property seems to disappear under the partnership acts. Sugg v. Thornton,
132 U. S. 524 (1889); Esteve Bros. & Co. v. Harrell, 272 Fed. 382 (C. C. A, 5th, 1921).
This has been pointed to as "a tacit ... adherence to the conception of the firm as an en-
tity." See Magruder & Foster, supra note 30, at 804. Contra: See WARREN, IOc. cit. 51pra
note 33.
36. Esteve Bros. & Co. v. Harrell, 272 Fed. 382 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921) (all the partners
aliens).
37. Hoffman v. Wight, 1 App. Div. 514, 37 N. Y. Supp. 262 (1st Dep't, 1896); see 1
BEALE, op. cit. supra note 33, § 86.3. Doctrinally, however, it would seem that the Joint
property should be bound wherever situated, for the action is in personam and not based
upon an attachment of the specific property in the state of suit.
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the partnership is a binding adjudication of the firm's liability with respect to
its assets situated in any other state.as This result is not precluded by the fact
that the partnership is not subject to suit in the firm name in the state where
the property sought to be reached is located.30 The action on the judgment
is merely maintained against the partners individually in the second state and
the judgment against the firm is recognized as conclusive of the liability of the
several partners served to the extent of their respective interests in the firm
property.40 A judgment obtained under either type of statute does not, accord-
ing to the better view, operate as a merger of the entire cause and a bar to a
subsequent action for any uncollected portion of the judgment against the
individual debtors or partners not served.
The firm name statutes do not exclude the common law action against all
the partners jointly. 2 The latter type of action is, of course, preferable when
jurisdiction can be obtained over all of them, for it results in a judgment on
which execution is not limited by the due process clause to firm property or
the property of certain members, as it is under both joint debtor and firm name
acts. It would seem, moreover, that such a judgment could now be obtained
even against nonresident partners, under the doctrine of the Goodman case.A
But until the Supreme Court expressly overrules Fexner v. Farson" and further
delineates the Goodman doctrine, the prudent plaintiff will probably satisfy
himself with the possibly less complete, but more certain, statutory remedies."
4
38. East Denver Municipal Irrigation Dist. v. Doherty, 293 Fed. 804 (S. D. N. Y.
1923); RESTATEmE § 86(2).
39. Since rules of procedure follow the law of the forum, the Yemedy of the first state
is not available in the second. Edwards v. Warren Linoline & Gasoline Works, Ltd., 16S
Mass. 564, 47 N. E. 502 (1897) (Pa. "partnership ass'n"); cf. Taft v. Ward, 105
Mass. 518 (1871) (N. Y. joint stock co.). But cf. Edgeworth v. Wood, 58 N. J. L. 463, 33
At. 940 (Sup. Ct 1896) (same).
40. East Denver Municipal Irrigation Dist. v. Doherty, 293 Fed. 804 (S. D. N. Y. 1923);
RE:s~mnsTT § 86(2), com. b.; cf. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 (1910).
41. There is said to be a conflict on this point. See BIranow, EsTOppEL (5th ed. 1890)
104-112. But it can be resolved. The general rule at common law is that a judgment on a
joint action bars the entire cause. Parr v. Snell, [19231 1 K. B. 1 (Ct. App.); Note (1919) 1
A. L. R. 1601. But an exception has grown up under the joint debtor acts, on the ground
that the plaintiff had no choice but to omit some of the debtors in his original action. Olcott
v. Little, 9 N. H. 259 (1838); Crehan v. Megarel, 234 N. Y. 67, 136 N. E. 296 (1922).
Contra: see Mason v. Eldred, 6 Wall. 231, 238 (U. S. 1867). Many states have statute3
expressly changing the common law rule. Mason v. Eldred, supra; WAunr, loc. cit. supra
note 33.
42. Peabody v. Oleson, 15 Colo. App. 346, 62 Pac. 234 (1900).
43. REsTATEmEN § 86(2), com. c. The Goodman case, however, would seem inapplicable
to nonresident joint debtors who are not partners, for they can hardly be said to he "doing
business" in the state in the sense that an individual or partnership or corporation does. See
note 60, infra.
44. The plaintiff should be able to join a common law action with an action against the
firm under the codes. See note 54, infra. There is a further question as to the prerequisites
of the applicability of the firm name acts. This is virtually a virgin field, but the analogy
of actions against foreign corporations would seem generally applicable. See Magruder &
Foster, supra note 30, at 828.
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ACTIONS AGAINST UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS
There appears to be a lacuna in established legal doctrine with respect to
actions against the various sorts of combinations intermediate between co-
partnerships and formal corporations. These associations range in type from
such quasi-corporate groups as joint stock companies and business trusts, which
are governed at common law by the same principles applicable to partnerships,4
to such non-profit groups as labor unions, fraternal and religious bodies and
boards of trade, whose status at common law seems never to have been dearly
defined. Nevertheless, the common law exhibited the same hostility toward
considering any of them entities as it did with respect to simple partnerships,4 0
with the more serious result in the case of associations, however, that the
plaintiff, often finding it practically impossible to join all of the many indi-
vidual members, was left completely remediless. Equity mitigated this hard-
ship to a certain extent by developing the class suit, which lay against repre-
sentative members of the group,47 but there was no clear-cut departure from
45. See Sutherland v. United States, 74 F. (2d) 89, 93 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
46. Tyler v. Boot & Shoe Workers' Union, 285 Mass. 54, 188 N. E. 509 (1933); Beau.
mont v. Meredith, 3 Ves. & B. 180 (Ch. 1814). But, practically, the rule against an assocla.
tion's being a party to an action was evaded in a number of important respects, through the
doctrine of waiver. See Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations (1929) 42
HAuv. L. Rzv. 977, 1000. And in several cases the fact that a trade union was made a party
defendant seemed to be ignored. Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union, 111 Fed.
49 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1901); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077 (1896);
Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 AtI. 881 (Ch. 1894). Suit in the associa-
tion name, moreover, has been allowed without statute, on the analogy of the class suit
(see note 47, infra). Liederkranz Singing Soc. v. Germania Turn-Verein, 163 Pa. 265, 29
Ati. 918 (1894). See generally Jardine v. Superior Ct., 213 Cal. 301, 2 P. (2d) 756 (1931),
79 A. L. R. 305 (1932); Holdoegel, supra note 30; Laski, Personality of Associations (1916)
29 HARv. L. Rxv. 404; Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions (1924>
33 YALE L. J. 383; WAxaxnf, op. cit. supra note 33; Comment (1919) 33 HAv. L. REV.
298.
47. Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Pet. 566 (U. S. 1829); Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288 (U. S.
1853); Harger v. Barrett, 319 Mo. 635, 5 S. W. (2d) 1100 (1928). A decree so obtidned
bars a subsequent action on the same subject matter by the parties represented. Amer.
Percheron Horse Breeders' Ass'n v. Amer. Percheron Horse Breeders' & Importers' Ass'n,
114 Ill App. 136 (1904). The class suit is now largely statutory. The codes, merging law
and equity, extend the doctrine to actions at law, generally providing that when the ques-
tion is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerou
as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or
defend for all. There is thus open to both plaintiff and defendant a valuable device which
is applicable not only to members of unincorporated associations, but to creditors, stock.
holders, bondholders, taxpayers and other groups as well. Yet so commonplace has It
become that there seems to be no concern about the fact that it may result in a binding adjudi-
cation of the rights of persons, either as plaintiffs or as defendants, who are in no way subject
to the jurisdiction of the court. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356 (1921),
noted in (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 487. As to stockholders' suits, see authorities collected in
Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 649, 665. As to creditoars' bills, see Glenn, The Unilorm
Fraudulent Conveyance Act; Rights of Creditors without Judgment (1930) 30 COL. L. REV.
202. See generally Blume, The "Common Questions" Principle in the Code Provision lor
Representative Suits (1932) 30 Mrcu. L. Ray. 878; Wheaton, Representative Suits Invol,-
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the common law doctrine until the comparatively recent Coronado Coal cases
where the Supreme Court, following the English Taff Vale Railway Company
case, 9 held that an unincorporated labor union could be sued as such in the
federal courts.
Aside from the debatable socio-economic controversy there involved, the
Coronado Coal case may be said to indicate a realistic view of the procedural
problem presented by the huge unincorporated associations of today, whose
membership is frequently nation-wide and whose activities are unconfined by
state boundaries. Nevertheless, until the state courts generally recognize the
suability of associations generally at common law, the plaintiff must depend,
as in partnership cases where the common law remedy of joinder of all the
members is unavailable, upon the various statutory remedies which have been
devised with the view both of finding him a ready defendant and of widening
the number of forums in which such a defendant can be made to respond.
The extent to which the several statutory remedies against partners apply to
the various unincorporated associations is simply a matter of statutory con-
struction.5" A number of states, however, have considered such associations
sufficiently distinctive5l 1 to warrant separate statutory treatment, and they have
provided for suits by and against these groups, in the name of the association
or of an officer thereof, with respect to causes of action arising out of business
done by them in the state of suit.5 2 The Supreme Court, moreover, has upheld
ing Numerous Litigants (1934) 19 Colx. L. Q. 399; Comments (1934) 34 Cos. L. REv. 118;
(1934) 19 CoRx. L. Q. 614; (1922) 36 HARv. L. R.v. 89; cf. Chaffee, Bills of Peace with
Mdtiple Parties (1932) 45 HARv. L. Rnv. 1297.
48. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922), 27
A. L. R. 786 (1923); see WnAnx, op. cit. supra note 33, bk. 2, c. 9; Magill & 16agill, The
Suabiity of Labor Unions (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 81. This case, however, arose on a federal
question; the federal courts still refuse to recognize unincorporated associations as having
a citizenship distinct from that of its members for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Levering
& Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 61 F. (2d) 115 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), noted in (1933) 33 Cox. L.
REv. 363, aff'd on another point, 289 U. S. 103 (1933) (labor union); Chapman v. Barney,
129 U. S. 677 (1889) (N. Y. joint stock co.) ; Great So. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177
U. S. 449 (1889) (Pa. "partnership ass'n"); Thomas v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ., 195
U. S. 207 (1904) (board of trustees); McLaughlin Bros. v. Hallowell, 228 U. S. 278 (1913)
(partnership suable in the firm name).
49. Taff Vale Ry. Co. v. Amalgamated Soc. of Ry. Servants, [1901] A. C. 426, 1 B. R. C.
832 (1911); c. Notes (1927) 61 In. L. J. 10, 97. This decision led to the Trade Dlsputes
Act, 6 Edw. VII, c. 47 (1906), whereby trade unions are no longer subject to suit in tort.
50. Johnston v. Albritton, 134 So. 563 (Fla. 1931) (firm name statute held inapplicable).
The converse is also true. In re Grossmayer, 177 U. S. 48 (1900) (TeM ass'n statute held
inapplicable to partnership).
51. Laycock v. State, 136 Ind. 217, 36 N. E. 137 (1894) (trade union); Ash v. Guie,
97 Pa. 493 (1881) (fraternity).
52. Jardine v. Superior Ct., 213 Cal. 301, 2 P. (2d) 756 (1931) (stock exchange) ; State
ex rel. Rr. & Warehouse Comm. v. Adams Exp. Co., 66 Minn. 271, 68 N. W. 1035 (1895)
(N. Y. joint stock co.). The statutes vary greatly. Sometimes associations are lumped with
partnerships, while even broader statutes are not infrequent (see note 21, supra). On the
other hand, some statutes apply only to certain types of associations, like business trusts.
MAss. Am. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 182, § 6; Ozr.A ST. Arnr. (Harlov, 1931)
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a state statute compelling a common law trust, in the same manner as a cor-
poration, to appoint a process agent as a condition of its doing business in the
state." This decision would seem to give the states free rein to determine when
an unincorporated group of nonresident individuals shall be treated as a foreign
corporation for purposes of suit, at least when the association has in fact all
the corporate characteristics. But the doctrine of the Goodman case, permit-
ting service on any local managing agent and thus rendering an express authori-
zation to receive process unessential, may obviate the necessity of thus assimi-
lating all unincorporated groups to formal corporations as a prerequisite of
subjecting them to suits in states other than those of their organization or prin-
cipal headquarters.
These statutes, of course, are merely procedural in scope. They in no wise
enlarge the substantive liability of the individual members of the associationP 4
Thus, in order to secure a judgment against ,the association, the plaintiff must
show that all the members might have been sued jointly," and even then execu-
tion is generally limited by the statute to the association property, although
there would seem to be no due process objection to rendering also liable the
assets of the member or members actually served, on the analogy of the joint
debtor and partnership statutes."
ACTIONS AGAINST FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
When the plaintiff is suing a corporation, his problem is not primarily one
§§ 182a-182b; Wis. STAT. (1931) § 226.14(11); see Note (1927) 46 A. L. R. 169, 185. For
lists of statutes, see Culp, supra note 22, at 909, n. 3; Holdoegel, supra note 30, at 215, n. 118;
WAnxmR, loc. cit. supra note 33. See note 39, supra. Non-profit associations can hardly be
said to be "doing business," but there is no objection to their coming within general associa-
tion statutes so long as they are engaged in the state in their regular activities. Jardine v.
Superior Ct., supra. Contra: St. Paul Typothetn v. St. Paul Bookbinders' Union, 94 Minn.
351, 102 N. W. 725 (1905) (labor union). But cf. Fitzpatrick v. Int'l Typographical Union,
149 Minn. 401, 184 N. W. 17 (1921).
53. Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537 (1928); cf. Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
10 Wall. 566 (U. S. 1870) (Eng. joint stock co. admissible into state only on paying tax).
See Dodd, supra note 46, at 989.
54. Nor do they exclude the common law action against the associates severally or jointly,
according to their substantive liability. Davison v. Holden, 55 Conn. 103, 10 At]. 515
(1887). In the case of business trusts, the trustee is still personally liable unless there is
an agreement by the plaintiff to look only to the trust property. Larson v. Sylvester, 282
Mass. 352, 185 N. E. 44 (1933). As in the case of partnerships (see note 44, supra), the
plaintiff might be able under the codes to join the common law action with the statutory
action. Detroit Light Guard Band v. First Mich. Indep. Infantry, 134 Mich. 598, 96 N. W.
934 (1903). Contra: N. Y. GEN. Ass'NTs LAw (1921) § 13; Mandell v, Moses, 209 App,
Div. 531, 205 N. Y. Supp. 254 (3d Dep't, 1924).
55. McCabe v. Goodfellow, 133 N. Y. 89, 30 N. E. 728, 17 L. R. A. 204 (1892) ("Law
and Order League"); Schouten v. Alpine, 215 N. Y. 225, 109 N. E. 244 (1915) (labor union).
But the court will not inquire on a motion to dismiss in advance of trial whether joint lia-
bility does in fact exist. Jardine v. Superior Ct., 213 Cal. 301, 2 P. (2d) 756 (1931).
56. Statutes have been upheld allowing execution on all the members individually,
whether or not served, as well as the association. Appeal of Baylor, 93 S. C. 414, 77 S. E.
59 "(1913); Patch Mfg. Co. v. Capeless, 79 Vt. 1, 63 At]. 938 (1906); see Comment
(1906) 20 HARv. L. REv. 58. These decisions, however, seem to be spurious. See WAnRaN,
op. cit. supra note 33, at 553.
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of finding a defendant to sue, as it is in the case of unincorporated associations,
for a corporation, being a formally created artificial entity, can always be com-
pelled to defend any action brought against it in the state of its charter.6 7 Rather,
his problem is one of the extent to which other courts are open to him. There
has been no dearth of speculation to justify the assumption by state courts of
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and reconcile the varying extent of such
jurisdiction under different circumstances. 8 Yet in no phase of the problem
of interstate adjustment of the place of trial have theoretical considerations
been more pronouncedly subordinated to practical results through the use of
the constitutional formulas as devices to secure flexibility.
The Due Process Clause. An outstanding example of such use is the fact
that the courts have made it a first prerequisite to a valid personal judgment
against a foreign corporation, in the absence of consent to be sued in a par-
ticular state, that the corporation be "doing business" in the state;u9 yet they
have repeatedly refused to give the term any definition," beyond holding that
"single or isolated" transactions"1 within the state or "mere incidental activi-
57. Jurisdiction can be obtained over a domestic corporation by service on an officer
outside the state, under the same principle which allows service without the state on an
individual domiciled in the state (see note 9, supra). Bennett v. Chicago Lumber & Coal
Co., 201 Iowa 770, 208 N. W. 519 (1926). And service on a domestic corporation by pub-
lication may also suffice. Ward Lumber Co. v. Henderson-White Mfg. Co., 107 Va. 626,
59 S. E. 476 (1907).
58. See 1 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 33, § 89.5 et seq.; BaEA, Trsn L.Aw oF Foantr= Con-
PoRATioNs (1904) cc. 7, 11; Bullington, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations (1928) 6
N. C. L. REv. 147; Cahill, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and Individuals Who Carry
on Business within the Territory (1917) 30 HARv. L. REv. 676; Farrier, Jurisdiction over
Foreign Corporations (1933) 17 MnziN. L. REv. 270; Fend, Jurisdiction over Foreign Cor-
porations (1926) 24 MiciC. L. Rnv. 633; Francis, Domicil of a Corporation (1929) 38
YA=E L. J. 335; H.Nro-soN, Posrrioz; or FoREGN; CoaroRArons as; A-Amrrrac.u; Co:nst=-
TrowA. LAw (1918) c. 5; Stimson, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations (1933) 18 ST.
Louis L. Rnv. 195; also note 196, infra.
59. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189 (1915). The "doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions," moreover, precludes the exaction of an involuntary
consent to be used in the absence of the corporation's "doing busineses" in the state. With
respect to this doctrine, see Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445 (U. S. 1874); Hale, Un-
constitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights (1935) 35 Co.. L. Rnv. 321; HNmms-o:;,
op. cit. supra note 58, c. 8; Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions (1929) 77 U. or PA. L. Rinv.
879; Oppenheim, Unconstitutional Conditions and State Powers (1927) 26 Macma L. Rrv.
176.
60. See People's Tobacco Co., Ltd., v. Amer. Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 86 (1917);
Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business (1927) 100 Cnur. L. J. 177, 189; Osborne, "Arising
out of Business Done in the State" (1923) 7 Mnm. L. REv. 380; Rothschild, Jurisdiction of
Foreign Corporations in Personam (1930) 17 VA. L. REv. 129.
61. James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119 (1927). But the
rule is sometimes applied that the corporation may be sued on a cause of action alising out
of such a single transaction. This probably explains the certain amount of confusion that
has arisen as to whether the place of accrual of the cause of action affects the necesa-
quantum of doing business. See Note (1924) 30 A. L. R. 25S, 292. Foreign corpora-
tions may come within the nonresident motorist statutes. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S.
13 (1928); Poti v. New Eng. Road Mach'y Co., 83 N. H. 232, 140 Atl. 587 (1928).
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ties" 62 are insufficient.6 3  This constant requirement satisfied, the extent of
the plaintiff's power to sue a corporation elsewhere than in the state of its char-
ter seems to depend upon the type of service by which the action is commenced.0
4
The service statutes are of several types, but in general they give rise to three
distinct situations.
(1) Statutes sometimes require the express appointment by a foreign cor-
poration, as a prerequisite to doing business in the state, of some state official
or regular corporate agent as its agent to receive service of process. So long as
the terms of such an agent's appointment are as broad as the provisions of the
statute, the question of the extent of his authority is clearly one of statutory
construction, for there is no constitutional objection to a foreign corporation's
expressly so consenting to be sued on causes of action arising anywhere, even
though unconnected with any business done in the state of forum.06
(2) Where, however, there is no express consent to be sued, either be-
cause of the absence of a statute requiring such consent or failure of the cor-
poration to comply with its provisions, the courts have become involved in
difficulties with respect to the theoretical basis of jurisdiction, and their attempts
62. Michigan Cent. Ry. Co. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492 (1928).
63. Yet the only exception to this requirement is that the corporation is liable to suit
even after withdrawing from the state on causes of action accruing while it was still theve,
so long as there is a statute which can be construed to impose such liability. Hunter v.
Mut. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 218 U. S. 573 (1910); Du Pont Engineering Co. v. Harvey Constr.
Co., 156 Va. 811, 158 S. E. 891 (1931) (dissolved foreign corporation held suable for three
years like domestic corporation). Doubt has been expressed as to the suability of foreign
corporations after their withdrawal, when no service agent has been appointed and service
is had by statute on a state official. Geer v. Mathieson Alkali-Works, 190 U. S. 428 (1903) ;
see 1 BEFAT, op. cit. supra note 33, § 93.1. But the doubt seems groundless, at-least as to
causes of action arising out of business formerly done by the corporation in the state (see
note 66, infra). American Ry. Express Co. v. Royster Guano Co., 273 U. S. 274 (1927);
Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc., v. Superior Ct., 289 U. S. 361 (1933);
see Scott, supra note 13, at 578. But cf. Golden v. Connersville Wheel Co., 252 Fed. 904
(E. D. Mich. 1918). It has been held that withdrawal is effective immediately with respect
to actions arising out of interstate commerce. Guerin Mills v. Barrett, 254 N. Y. 380, 173
N. E. 553 (1930). See Collier, Revocation by Foreign Corporation of Appointment of Agent
to Accept Service of Process (1914) 78 CENT. L. J. 364; Comment (1929) 77 U. or PA. L.
Ray. 1010, 1013.
64. For lists of statutes see Culp, Constitutional Problems Arising from Service of Process
on Foreign Corporations (1935) 19 Mnn. L. Rwv. 375, 378-380.
65. New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Woodworth, 111 U. S. 138 (1884); Pa. Fire In,
Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1917), noted in (1917) 26 YALr
L. J. 794; RESTATEmENT § 91. But cf. Sawyer v. No. American Life Ins. Co., 46 Vt. 697
(1874). A minority of cases assume that the appointment is restricted to actions arising
within the state in the absence of an express provision giving the appointment a broader
scope. See Louisville & Nashville Rr. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320, 329 (1928), noted
in (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1148; Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Ins. Co., 279 U. S. 405, 409
(1929). If, however, the agent's authority to receive service were restricted to certain
types of action, service upon him in an action to which his authority did not extend would
seem to present the questions raised by the second situation, if he were a state official (see
p. 1112, infra) or by the third, if he were an actual agent of the corporation (see p. 1113,
nfra) .
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to open the forum to the plaintiff despite such lack of consent, on the ground
of the corporation's "implied consent" or its "presence" within the state or its
"submission" to the jurisdiction of its courts, without at the same time sub-
jecting the defendant to vexatiously imported litigation, has resulted in the
drawing of illogical distinctions based largely on the place of origin of the
cause of action. Thus, under statutes which provided that, in the event that a
foreign corporation doing business in the state failed to designate a process
agent, service on the Secretary of State should be deemed to be service on the
corporation "for any legal cause of action," the Supreme Court twice refused
to allow suits on causes of action which were not connected with any business
done by the defendant in the state of forum.00 The reasoning in both cases,
however, is somewhat obscure. 7 They are possibly distinguishable on the
ground that the particular statutes involved were defective in not requiring the
respective state officials to give notice to the corporations, and that notice was
not in fact given.68 Nevertheless, the cases have been cited as establishing a
general principle applicable to service upon a state official without express
consent, and the Supreme Court and other courts have been careful to dis-
tinguish them in subsequent opinions. It is, therefore, an open question whether
a statute of this type which expressly extended the state official's authority to
receive service to foreign causes of action and required notification of the de-
fendant would be constitutional0 9
(3) Service on a state official under a statute of the latter type would seem
to present the same problem as service, without the corporation's consent, on
an actual agent of the corporation engaged in the conduct of its business within
the state, for whichever theoretical basis of jurisdiction is adopted, whether
"presence," "submission," or "implied consent," would apply to both cases and
the only difference would be in the form of notification. The Supreme Court
has, however, approved the assumption of jurisdiction in the latter case, 70 so
66. Old Wayne Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8 (1907); Simon v. So.
Ry. Co., 236 U. S. 115 (1914). -But cf. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Concrete Steel Bridge
Co., 37 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
67. Not until these two cases did the idea become current that there was any jurisdictional
significance in the place where the contract was made or breached or the delict occurred,
and much confusion is apparent in the cases as to what, if anything, the significance of these
cases is. 1
68. Due process requires that notice be given when service is had under such statutes.
Consolidated Flour Mlls Co. v. Muegge, 278 U. S. 559 (1928), reversing with memorandum
opinion 127 Okla. 295, 260 Pac. 745 (1927); cf. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13
(1928), cited note 15, supra. But cf. Washington ex rel. Bond & Goodwin & Tucker, Inc.,
v. Superior Ct., 289 U. S. 361 (1933), 89 A. L. R. 658 (1934), noted in (1933) 33 CoL L.
REv. 357, (1933) 18 IowA L. REv. 388, (1933) 81 U. or PA. L. REy. 469; followed in Silva
v. Cromlie & Co., 44 P. (2d) 719 (N. M. 1935), noted in (1935) 49 Htxv. L. REa. 339. See
Culp, supra note 64, at 385-394.
69. Cf. Owen v. Appalachian Power Co., 78 W. Va. 596, 89 S. E. 262 (1916).
70. Although service in such cases is now generally had with the aid of statutes, it may
be had without statute. Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100 (1898). Whether
such service may be had where another agent has been expressly designated under statute
seems to be a matter of construction of the statute. It was held exclusive in Thompson v.
Nat. Life Ins. Co., 28 F. (2d) 877 (W. D. Mo. 1928). But cf. Green v. Equitable Mut.
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long as the agent on whom process is served is sufficiently representative in
character that the law would imply, from his appointment and authority, the
power to receive service of process,71 even where the cause of action arose in
another state. 72 The Court has never squarely decided a case commenced by
service of this type where the cause of action not only arose in another state,
but was totally unconnected in its origin with any business done by the corpora-
tion in the state of suit.7 8 There is, however, no logical obstacle to such an ex-
tension of the Court's decisions, and the majority of the courts that have passed
on this question have argued forcefully in favor of upholding judgments so ob-
tained.
74
The Commerce Clause. Complementing the formula of "lack of due process
of law" as a restriction on this statutory extension of the plaintiff's choice of
forums is the doctrine of "unreasonable burden on interstate commerce," first
introduced by the Supreme Court in 1923 as a factor in the determination of the
proper state of trial.75 In that year, as a result of the notorious liberality of
Life & Endowment Ass'n, 105 Iowa 628, 75 N. W. 635 (1898); Silver v. Western Assurance
Co. of Toronto, 3 App. Div. 572, 38 N. Y. Supp. 335 (1st Dep't, 1896).
71. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218 (1912).
72. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65 (U. S. 1870) (foreign origin not
expressly noted); N. Y., L. E. & W. Rr. Co. v. Estill, 147 U. S. 591 (1893) (defendant's
suggestion of foreign origin disregarded). A fortiori such service is sufficient where the
cause of action atose within the state. RESTATEMENT § 92.
73. The question was expressly left open in Davis v. Farmers' Cooperative Equity Co.,
262 U. S. 312 (1923), cited note 76, infra.
74. O'Brien v. So. Bell Teleph. & Teleg. Co., 292 Fed. 379 (S. D. Ala. 1923); Tauza
v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917); Johnston v. Atlantic Coast
Line Rr. Co., 128 Misc. 82, 217 N. Y. Supp. 758 (Sup Ct. 1926); Stark v Howe Sound Co.,
141 Misc. 148, 252 N. Y. Supp. 233 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Lipe v. Carolina, C. & 0. Ry. Co., 123
S. C. 515, 116 S. E. 101 (1923), 30 A. L. R. 255 (1924); see YouNO, FoPmoN CoiOtoaiovs
AND OZmx CoRpoRAoNs (1912) 41-48. There are several such cases in the Supreme Coott
where it appears definitely that the action arose without the state, but only Inferentially
that it was not connected in its origin with business done in the state. Dennick v. Central
Rr. Co. of N. J., 103 U. S. 11 (1880); In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653 (1893); Barrow Steam-
ship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100 (1898); Mo. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U. S. 565
(1921), aff'g in memorandum opinion Reynolds v. Mo., K. & T. Ry. Co., 228 Mass, 584,
117 N. E. 913 (1917). Contra: Fry v. Denver & R. G. Rr. Co., 226 Fed. 893 (N. D. Cal.
1915); Takacs v. Phila. & R. Ry. Co., 228 Fed. 728 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); cf. Farmers' & Mer-
chants' Bank v. Fed. Res. Bank, 286 Fed. 566, 589 (E. D. Ky. 1915); see 1 BEnL, op. cit.
supra note 33, § 84.3; Fead, supra note 58; GOODRIcH, CoxNrcr or LAWs (1927) § 78;
Scott, supra note 13, at 579, n. 40; (1926) 60 Am. L. Rav. 922; (1927) 61 id. 429.
75. It is not clear whether the interstate commerce clause is a limitation on the existence
of jurisdiction over the subject matter or whether jurisdiction exists, but simply cannot
be exercised in such a way as to burden interstate commerce. The latter would seem to
be the better view, since the doctrine of undue burden on interstate commerce (see note 76,
infra) is hardly so clearly identified with a national policy of permitting the free flow of
interstate commerce that the defendant should not be allowed to waive the objection of Its
own inconvenience. See Gloeser v. Dollar Steamship Lines, 192 Minn. 376, 382, 256 N. W.
666, 669 (1934); Foster, supra note 4, 43 HARv. L. Ray. at 1234; (1930) 43 HAV. L. Rv..
1156. Contra: Baltimore Mail Steamship Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N. Y. 379, 199 N. E.
628 (1936).
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Minnesota juries, there were pending in the courts of that state one thousand
twenty-eight personal injury actions, involving claims of nearly twenty-six
millions of dollars, by nonresident plaintiffs against foreign railroads with no
trackage in the state. Under these conditions the Supreme Court of Minnesota,
in the case of Davis v. Farmers' Cooperative Equity Company, 0 entertained
an action by one Kansas corporation, which did no business in Minnesota,
against another, a railroad which had no lines in Minnesota, on a cause of
action arising wholly within Kansas, process having been served in Minnesota,
under its statute,77 upon the defendant's soliciting freight agent in the state.
Although the Supreme Court might have disposed of the case simply by holding
that there were insufficient activities to constitute "doing business" in the state,78
the Court expressly left the due process question open and chose instead, in an
opinion in which Mr. Justice Brandeis stressed the above statistics and the
obvious inconvenience of trying such actions in forums distant from their place
of origin, to base its reversal solely on the ground that such an action would un-
reasonably burden interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has since decided
several cases developing the doctrine of the Davis case,70 but they leave unde-
termined many questions as to when the orderly administration of local justice
will justify the burden on interstate commerce incident to the trial of foreign
causes of action.
There would appear from these cases, however, to be three principal variables
which enter into a determination of this question. In the first place, the de-
fendant railroad may or may not be operating in the state. This refers to the
presence of trackage and is not to be confused with the due process require-
ment of "doing business," which may evidently be satisfied without the opera-
tion of lines in the state, and which applies only to actions in pcrsonam. A par-
ticular action, on the other hand, may come within the Davis doctrine, even
though the defendant is not "doing business" in the state and the action is not
in personam, but quasi in rein, as it was in several of the Supreme Court cases,
where jurisdiction was obtained by the attachment of the defendant's rolling
stock in the hands of a local road. 0 Secondly, the plaintiff may be a resident or
nonresident, this factor being determined, in the case of a foreign corporation
plaintiff, according to its "doing business" in the state of suit.6 ' And, finally,
the cause of action may be foreign or domestic in origin.82
76. 262 U. S. 312 (1923), hereafter referred to as the Davis case; see Comments (1933)
31 MkcEr. L. REv. 963; (1929) 13 Anm. L. R.v. 485.
77. AIMn .STAT. (Mlason, 1927) § 9231.
78. Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264 (1917); cf. Green v. Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 530 (1907).
79. Cited notes 84, 85, 86, 89, 90, infra.
80. Atchison, T. & S. Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101 (1924); Mo. ex. ret. St. Louis, B.
& M. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 266 U. S. 200 (1924); Denver & R. G. W. Rr. Co. v. Terte, 284
U. S. 284 (1932).
81. International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U. S. 511, 519 (1934).
82. None of the cases distinguishes between foreign causes of action on the basis of
whether or not they are connected in their origin with business done by the defendant within
the state.
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These three factors, it has been observed, 83 create eight distinct possibilities:
Is plaintiff Is defendant operating Is cause of action
resident? in the state? domestic?
1 .................... N o ............. Yes ............... N o
2 .................... No ........... Yes ............ Yes
3 ................. No ........... No ............. No
4 .................... N o ........... No ............... Yes
5 .................... Yes ............. Yes ............... N o
6 .................... Yes ............. Yes ............... Yes
7 .................... Yes .............. N o ............... N o
8 .................... Yes .............. N o ............... Yes
Only the third, fifth, and eighth situations have been passed upon by the
Supreme Court: the third was held to present an unreasonable burden in the
Davis case and others,84 while actions of the fifth85 and eighth8" types were
sustained. But most of the courts that have passed on the first type have also
sustained the exercise of jurisdiction there.87 By analogy to these three types
the second and sixth types would seem a fortiori to present no unreasonable bur-
den. The fourth and seventh situations are doubtful. 88
83. See Farrier, Suits Against Foreign Corporations as a Burden on Interstate Con-
mnerce (1933) 17 MINN. L. Rxv. 381; Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum (1935) 29 ILL. L.
Rv. 867.
84. Atchison, T. & S. Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101 (1924); Mich. Cent. Rr, Co. v.
Mix, 278 U. S. 492 (1929); Denver & R. G. W. Rr. Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284 (1932), last
two cases cited note 89, infra. Contra: N. V. Brood en Beschuitfabriek v. Aluminum Co. of
Amer., 136 Misc. 349, 239 N. Y. Supp. 702 (N. Y. City Ct. 1930).
85. International Milling 'Co. v. Columbia Transportation Co., 292 U. S. 511 (1934),
noted in (1934) 34 CoL.. L. REv. 1135; Amer. Ry. Exp. Co. v. Rouw Co., 173 Ark. 810, 294
S. W. 401 (1927); Cohen v. Del., L. & W. Rr. Co., 150 Misc. 450, 269 N. Y. Supp. 667
(Sup. Ct. 1934); Denver & R. G. W. Rr. Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284 (1932), cited note 89,
infra, semble.
86. Mo. ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 266 U. S. 200 (1924); Pere Mar-
quette Ry. Co. v. Tifton Produce Co., 48 Ga. App. 286, 172 S. E. 727 (1934).
87. O'Brien v. So. Bell Teleph. & Teleg. Co., 292 Fed. 379 (S. D. Ala. 1923); Harris
v. Amer. Ry. Exp. Co., 12 F. (2d) 487 (App. D. C. 1926); McWhorter v. Williams, 155
So. 309 (Ala. 1934); Boright v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Rr. Co., 180 Minn. 52, 230 N. W. 457
(1930); Murnan v. Wabash Ry. Co., 220 App. Div. 218, 221 N. Y. Supp. 332 (2d Dep't,
1927) rev'd on another point, 246 N. Y. 244, 158 N. E. 508 (1927); Denver & R. G.
W. Rr. Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284 (1932) cited note 89, infra, semble. Contra: Weinard v.
Chicago, M. & S. Ry. Co., 298 Fed. 977 (D. Minn. 1924); Pantswowe Zaklady Graviozno v.
Automobile Ins. Co., 36 F. (2d) 504 (S. D. N. Y. 1928), noted in (1930) 43 HAv. L. Rv.
1156; Iron City Produce Co. v. Amer. Ry. Co., 22 Ohio App. 165, 153 N. E. 316 (1926).
The last two cases simply followed the Davis case, overlooking the factual distinction of
operation.
88. No case has been found of the fourth type, a difficult situation to imagine. The
plaintiff's residence alone, however, should not be the determining factor. See International
Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 292 U. S. 511, 519 (1934). It would therefo~e seem
that the fourth situation should present no unreasonable burden, by analogy to the eighth.
And similarly, the seventh situation would seem to be otherwise, by analogy to the third,
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This scheme, however, is of questionable value as indicative of future hold-
ings, for it is based on a consideration of only the ultimate factors. It ignores
the many evidentiary facts which distinguish every case and which, in the
doubtful types of cases particularly, may influence the decision as to the
appropriateness of the local forum in favor of one party or the other50 But it
does illustrate that the courts have been loath to extend the Davis doctrine
beyond the extreme facts of that case or, at the most, the seventh situation,
where the factors are the same except that the plaintiff is a resident of the state
of suit. Beyond these eight situations, all involving actions against foreign
railroad corporations, the applicability of the commerce formula is doubtful.
In the only case involving a domestic railroad in which the argument was ad-
vanced before the Supreme Court, the doctrine of the Davis case was held in-
applicable, but, although the plaintiff in that case was a nonresident and the
cause of action foreign, the defendant was operating in the statep0  Never-
theless, the Davis case presents the possibility of using the commerce clause, as
an additional adjuster of the state of trial for the defendant's protection, when
the necessity is felt for further restriction than is available under the due process
clause, not only in actions against domestic railroad corporations not operating
within the state as well as foreign railroad companies, but also in actions against
non-carrier corporations and non-corporation defendants.'
[To be continued]
But the few cases of the seventh type are in conflict. In accord: Baltimore Mail Steamship
Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N. Y. 379, 199 N. E. 628 (1936); Aliele v. Chicago, At., S. & P. Rr. Co.,
151 Misc. 137, 270 N. Y. Supp. 788 (N. Y. City Ct. 1934) ; Denver & R. G. W. Rr. Co. v.
Terte, 284 U. S. 284 (1932) semble. Contra: Griffin v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 28 F.
(2d) 998 (W. D. Ao. 1928), noted in (1929) 17 CAMP. L. REv. 396; Crssey v. Erie Rr.
Co., 278 Mass. 284, 180 N. E. 160 (1932).
89. Nor does it consider the factor of the plaintiffs change of residence between the
time of accrual of the cause of action and the time of suit. If the plaintiff's moving to
the state of suit is solely for the purpose of bringing his action, he will be deemed still
a .--. =esident. Mich. Cent. Rr. Co. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492 (1929). And this seems to
be so even where he "became a bona fide resident and citizen" of the state of suit.
Denver & R. G. W. Rr. Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284, 286 (1932), noted in (1932) 32 Cor..
L. Rnv. 541.
90. Hoffman v. Alo. ex rel. Foraker, 274 U. S. 21 (1927).
91. Authority thus far is too meager to admit of any prediction. The Davis case and
the other three Supreme Court cases, cited note 84, supra, in which there was an
affirmative holding on the question of undue burden were all actions against railroad cor-
porations. See Baltimore Mail Steamship Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N. Y. 379, 199 N. E. 628
(1936) (steamship co.); Iron City Produce Co. v. Amer. Ry. Exp. Co., 22 Ohio App. 165,
153 N. E. 316 (1926) (express Co.). There is a suggestion in Hoffman v. Mo. ex rel.
Foraker, 274 U. S. 21, 23 (1927), that the commerce doctrine may be extended beyond
carriers, though it may perhaps be limited to corporations. But cf. Steele v. Western
Union Teleg. Co., 206 N. C. 220, 173 S. E. 583 (1934); Winslow Lumber Co. v. Hines
Lumber Co., 125 Ore. 63, 266 Pac. 248 (1928), noted in (1928) 42 Hnv. L. Rzv. 131.
